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ABSTRACT 
As a critical advocate of the philosophy of Enlightenment, Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) 
reconsidered the development of the empiricist and naturalistic philosophies of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and held that their development was connected in 
intricate ways to various quite specific issues arising in nineteenth-century British society. In 
order to respond to these issues, he established a comprehensive framework of philosophical 
thought as the foundation for his practical activities. In this framework, the core argument 
focuses on the relationship between consciousness and action. However, though Green’s 
philosophy has been widely investigated, no study has, as yet, focused exclusively on Green’s 
practical philosophy, and in particular his idea of the ethical citizen. This thesis undertakes 
this task and argues firstly that viewing the relationship between consciousness and action as 
the nexus of the human condition, Green’s practical philosophy is a coherent and consistent 
philosophical system which includes metaphysics; moral and ethical theory; and social and 
political theory. I then go on to argue that, by virtue of his philosophical system, Green 
founded political activity on the basis of metaphysical and moral ideas, on the one side, but 
on the other side, provided politics with a deep raison d’être; that is, to maintain and to 
provide the equality of opportunity for individuals by means of state power. Finally, I argue 
that while Green accordingly established a justification for state action, the nature of such 
state action relates closely to the self-government of individual citizens. Hence, Green’s 
practical philosophy provides an ethical theory of politics which underpins an important 
legacy for contemporary liberal political philosophy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. An exploration of Green’s practical philosophy 
The aim of this thesis is to explore Thomas Hill Green’s practical philosophy (1836-1882), 
focussing particularly on his explication of the complex relation between human 
consciousness and human action in ethical and political life. The scope of Green’s writings 
covers literary criticism, hermeneutics, theology, metaphysics, philosophy, ethics, history, 
and social and political theory. The breadth and the depth of his intellectual vision inspired 
many subsequent philosophers, politicians and social activists, including Edward Caird 
(1835-1908), F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), R. L. Nettleship 
(1846-1892), Henry Jones (1852-1922), Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931), D. G. 
Ritchie (1853-1903), R. B. Haldane (1856-1928), H. H. Asquith (1852-1928), J. H. Muirhead 
(1855-1940), Arnold Toynbee (1852-1883), J. S. Mackenzie (1860-1935), L. T. Hobhouse 
(1864-1929), H. S. Holland (1847-1918), Charles Gore (1853-1932) and Charles Loch (1849-
1923).1 With such a broad impact on the development of the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century British philosophical theory and social and political practice, Green’s moral, social 
and political ideas have offered a significant research topic for scholars. However, the central 
crux of his systematic practical philosophy has remained unclear; that is, his innovative 
account of the complex relation of consciousness and action. While some commentators have 
considered the structure of Green’s philosophical thought, such as Colin Tyler (1997, 2010, 
                                                
1 In An Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943) has described Green’s school as that: ‘[t]he “Greats” 
school was not meant as a training for professional scholars and philosophers; it was meant as a training for 
public life in the Church, at the Bar, in the Civil Service, and in Parliament. The school of Green sent out into 
public life a stream of ex-pupils who carried with them the conviction that philosophy, and in particular the 
philosophy they had learnt at Oxford, was an important thing, and that their vocation was to put it into practice’ 
(Collingwood, 1978: 17). 
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2012), Maria Dimova-Cookson (2001), and Ben Wempe (2004), the main thread of the 
interaction between consciousness and action, by means of which Green integrates 
metaphysics, ethics and politics into a system, has not been sufficiently explored. By 
focussing on his explication of the relationship of consciousness and action, this thesis 
attempts to undertake a systematic exploration of Green’s practical philosophy, with critical 
consideration given to contemporary interpretations. I argue that, firstly, metaphysics, moral 
and ethical theory, and social and political theory (in Green’s philosophical system) are about 
different subject matters, but they are correlative with each other via Green’s sophisticated 
account of the relation between consciousness and action. Secondly, on the grounds of this 
innovative perspective of the complex between consciousness and action, Green’s practical 
philosophy signifies an idealistic conception of liberal politics that advances classical 
liberalism to a constructive, ethical and socialist doctrine of political life, to such an extent 
that Green’s practical philosophy remains insightful for contemporary political philosophy. 
 
2. Consciousness, action and ethical politics 
In this section, I will review some contemporary research on Green’s theory of consciousness 
and action and his conception of politics in order to indicate the originality and the 
contribution of this thesis to the existing studies of Green. 
          Regarding the role of the concept of consciousness in Green’s practical philosophy, 
Ritchie, as a follower of Green’s philosophical and political ideas, has accurately indicated 
that ‘[i]n this fact of self-consciousness, discovered by examination of mental phenomena, 
Green finds the metaphysical basis of Ethics; on the other side the interpretation of self-
realization as the realization of a common good is what makes the connection between Ethics 
and Politics’ (Ritchie, 2004: 169). Following this suggestion and the observation of the crux 
of Green’s practical philosophy, current studies of Green’s theory of consciousness and 
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action can be divided into two kinds: one regards this theory as psychological and 
phenomenological, while the other considers it as metaphysical and ontological. 
          In The Moral Philosophy of T. H. Green (1987) Geoffrey Thomas contributes an 
elaborate study of Green’s philosophical ethics on the basis of a psychological account of 
Green’s theory of moral action. Thomas argues that ‘Green offers a cogent alternative to the 
two standard models of action explanation, here termed the belief-desire theory and the 
cognitive model; that he sketches a subtle and plausible account of the rationality of moral 
action; and lastly that his account of agency both (i) discloses a more comprehensive view of 
the agent than is familiar, a view of the integral agent, and (ii) presents a challenge alike to 
Kantian and to utilitarian constructions of the traditional schema of motive, action and 
consequence’ (Thomas, 1987: 72). To Thomas, against Humean moral psychology, Green 
develops a multi-perspectival model of human deliberation by virtue of his self-
consciousness principle. This in turn provides a comprehensive explication of moral action 
and builds up a theory of self-intervention as the foundation of his philosophical ethics 
(Thomas, 1987: chap. 4). He argues that ‘Green applies his “self-conscious principle”, by 
which the mind unites sensations, also to the phenomena of impulse and desire. A person is 
able ... to detach himself from his own desires, to revise them, and to form a systematic 
structure of desire, so as to achieve “an abiding satisfaction of an abiding self”, by means of 
self-intervention’ (Thomas, 1987: 242). However, while Thomas focuses on expounding 
Green’s moral psychology as the foundation of his philosophical ethics, as well as his social 
and political philosophy, he then confines the psychological account of a moral person to a 
subjective conception of the self-conscious individual agent, and thus fails to recognise the 
ontological commitment of the society and the state to the individual. This entails that he 
cannot but take the state as a mere instrument of society composed by individual persons and 
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consequently conceives of Green’s view of politics as both derivative and instrumental 
(Thomas, 1987: chap. 8). 
          Taking Green’s moral psychology as a phenomenological theory of human practice, 
Dimova-Cookson also appraises the merit of Green’s sophisticated account of moral action. 
While Dimova-Cookson identifies Green’s theory of human practice with a theory of the will, 
she also claims that ‘[i]t is in the theory of the will that Green’s philosophical originality 
begins to be clearly exhibited’ (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 40). To Dimova-Cookson, 
beginning with the concept of self-consciousness, Green indicates two important 
characteristics of human practice: self-distinguishing and self-seeking. She indicates that 
‘[b]y claiming that human beings are motivated by “concept”, Green is arguing that human 
action is not guided by impulse. An agent can distance himself from his urges and from the 
circumstances surrounding his action. Through this distancing he is prevented from 
“coinciding” with his impulses’ (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 41). Nonetheless, like Thomas, 
Dimova-Cookson confines Green’s theory of human practice to a subjective and internal 
account of moral action. This latter argument does not adequately address the ontological 
implication of a social and political life for the individual person as well. 
          On the other hand, in T. H. Green’s Theory of Positive Freedom (2004), Ben Wempe 
provides an ontological and metaphysical exposition of Green’s theory of consciousness. 
Wempe explores the intellectual connection between Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness 
and Green’s, and suggests that Green develops an inseparable view of the relation between 
the self-conscious individual subject and the external object. He claims that ‘[i]n the same 
way as Hegel, Green proceeded from the view that reason manifested itself in the world and 
that our experience and the events of the world were to be understood in the light of this 
process’ (Wempe, 2004: 93). To Wempe, by adopting a Hegelian doctrine of the self-
assertion reason, the central theme of Green’s moral psychology ‘was that the development in 
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the practical conception of an individual human agent will exhibit an ever progressing 
rationalisation’ (Wempe, 2004: 149). Wempe therefore indicates that, according to Green’s 
theory of human consciousness, ‘man will recognise the same force directing his own willing 
in the work of reason as exhibited in the objective social world’ (Wempe, 2004: 150). 
However, by underscoring Hegel’s influence on Green’s philosophy of consciousness, 
Wempe nonetheless does not consider sufficiently the significance of Green’s idea of the 
ethical citizen: thus the difference between Hegel’s concept of the ethical life and Green’s has 
not been fully investigated.2 
          Colin Tyler, in contrast, emphasises the importance of Green’s idea of the 
conscientious individual citizen through a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the 
logical connection between Green’s analysis of the metaphysical structure of human 
consciousness and his philosophical ethics. Tyler argues that on the ground of the analysis of 
human consciousness, Green ‘developed powerful ethical and political philosophies with 
radical implications for the existing structure of society and politics’ (Tyler, 2010: 2). 
However, rather than drawing upon the ontological implication of the society and the state, 
Tyler claims that ‘the collective life expressing those norms and practices would have worth 
only so far as the individuals participating in that life endorsed it after critically reflecting 
upon its key features and fundamental values’ (Tyler, 2010: 166). It appears that Tyler does 
not therefore fully consider the idea that Green’s conception of social community has 
profound ontological commitments for the individual person, placing more emphasis on the 
external circumstances for each individual person to initiate his or her critical reflection and 
moral evaluation. Hence, though Tyler addresses the importance of Green’s idea of the 
                                                
2  Wempe does indicate that ‘Green’s work constitutes an important improvement on Hegel in that he 
emphasised the individual as an end in itself’ (Wempe, 2004: 198). Nonetheless, while he explains Green’s idea 
of positive freedom in detail, he has not investigated Green’s idea of the ethical citizen comprehensively and 
systematically. Meanwhile, although Thomas does not note Green’s inseparable view of the relation between the 
subject and the object and overstates the primacy of the individual person without noting the ontological 
implication of the society and the state, he is aware of the difference between Green’s philosophy of 
consciousness and Hegel’s. See Thomas, 1987: 193-194. 
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practical citizen, on the basis of his analysis of the metaphysical structure of human 
consciousness, he nonetheless maintains an internal and subjective conception of Green’s 
idea of the self-conscious individual person and thus considers social and state actions as 
wholly external (Tyler, 2010: 5). He thereby understates the significance of the society and 
the state in Green’s practical philosophy. 
          Contesting these interpretations of Green’s theory of consciousness and action and 
Green’s conception of politics, I argue in this thesis that the main thread underpinning 
Green’s practical philosophy is his theory of consciousness and action. Additionally, from a 
starting point of the analysis of the relationship between human consciousness and human 
action, Green not only explores the ontological condition of the individual person, but also 
addresses the ontological commitments of the social community to the individual, including 
both the society and the state. By virtue of this consideration of human ontology, the 
distinction between the internal and the external in Green’s view is, in my argument, a false 
dualism that cannot simply be applied to signify the relationship between the individual 
subject and the objective social world. Further, on the basis of the theory of consciousness 
and action, Green’s practical philosophy integrates metaphysics, ethics and social and 
political theory as a systematic whole. Moreover, by virtue of this systematic practical 
philosophy, the other main theoretical contribution Green made concerns his idealistic 
conception of liberal politics. Against the pervasive atomistic individualism in nineteenth-
century British social and political philosophy, Green advocated the importance of the 
collective social life for each individual person and proposed an ethical conception of politics 
in which each individual person, as a citizen, entertains active interests in public affairs and is 
inclined to direct participation in local and municipal politics. With this focus on the ethical 
and collective meaning of social and political life, Green nonetheless maintains the plurality 
and the diversity of values and ideas in his conception of the society and the state. 
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          In addition to the above main arguments, this thesis contributes to a critical 
consideration of the practical implications and limitations of Green’s philosophical thought 
with a special focus on the issue of contemporary pluralism concerning political theorists. By 
adopting Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics in relation to the pluralism issue, the 
tension between the individual (who holds plural and diverse values and ideas) and the 
political authority (the task of which is to maintain social stability and integration) can be 
relieved through the active social and political practices of each individual citizen. In this 
sense, the doctrine of the contemporary political liberalism can be enriched through 
considerations and discussions of Green’s practical philosophy and his idealistic conception 
of liberal politics. I cannot explore and expound this innovative contemporary perspective as 
fully as I wish in this thesis, but I will try to draw upon this potential contribution of Green’s 
practical philosophy to contemporary political philosophy. 
 
3. The scope and the outline of the thesis 
My key aim is to explore systematically Green’s practical philosophy, from his metaphysical, 
moral and ethical theories and to show their impact on his social and political theory. My 
methodology is mainly focused on the ‘textual analysis’ approach: that is to interpret the 
contents and the implications of the text, and to analyse the logical coherence and consistence 
within it and with other texts. Moreover, I will also investigate the relevant context of the text 
in order to identify its original purposes and to provide a comprehensive background for my 
systematic exploration. 
          There are some limitations to the scope of this thesis. Firstly, by virtue of the 
considerable body of work which constitutes both the studies of and writings of Green 
himself, I will focus my discussion and give primary consideration to his philosophical 
doctrines given in his published works, only investigating such parts of his literary criticism 
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and theological writings as relate to his theory of consciousness and action and his 
understanding of ethical politics. Secondly, I will not examine Green’s comments on the 
international relations of Great Britain with other countries such as the United States of 
America, Russia, India, Turkey and other European nations. While these comments contain 
some fascinating ideas, I will nonetheless concentrate my investigation on his domestic 
theory of liberal politics. 
          The thesis includes eight chapters. Chapter One introduces the aim and the structure of 
the thesis in order to provide a concise overview. Chapter Two aims to provide and establish 
the context of Green’s practical philosophy. Living in nineteenth-century British society, 
Green wanted to deal with three consequences arising out of the Enlightenment’s 
achievements: social inequalities and the deficiency of representative government, the decline 
of spiritual morality and social virtues, and the externalised and naturalised view of the 
relationship between human beings and the world. Along with these discussions of the 
historical and intellectual context of Green’s practical philosophy, this chapter identifies the 
main reasons as to why Green intended to establish a theory of consciousness and action as 
the keystone of his philosophical system. 
          Chapters Three and Four deal with two aspects of Green’s human ontology 
respectively. Chapter Three explores Green’s metaphysical theory of human agency, in which 
he builds on Kant’s philosophy of consciousness against the overwhelming empiricist and 
naturalistic philosophy of nineteenth-century Britain. With an exploration of the metaphysical 
theory of human agency, this chapter establishes a preliminary account of Green’s concept of 
human consciousness, and responds to three contemporary criticisms of Green’s determinism. 
Chapter Four considers Green’s developmental view of human consciousness and his theory 
of the moralisation of human consciousness as part of an interactive relationship with social 
and cultural institutions. By addressing the logical connection between the metaphysics of 
 
 
9 
knowledge and the metaphysics of moral action in Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics, this 
chapter recognises the complementary relationship between two metaphysics in Green’s 
thinking, a complementarity which contends that there can be a positive idea of human 
freedom. This is set against the hedonistic utilitarian moral philosophy; it also identifies the 
significance of Green’s idea of the ethical self in opposition to Hegel’s concept of the ethical 
state. 
          Chapter Five investigates the ontological implications and the ethical commitments of 
Green’s conception of society in which every individual is regulated by a principle of the 
common good postulated in each form of social community, whereas the attainment of the 
non-exclusive and non-competitive common good society can only be achieved in and 
through the joint efforts made by all individuals to recognise and to care for each other as 
their alter egos. This chapter also argues that Green’s theory of ‘rights recognition’ identifies 
civil inequalities and economic inequalities in social practice, and that the inherent nature of 
human consciousness prescribes the boundary of what human beings can achieve in pursuit 
of the ideal social harmony. The argument maintains that social conflict and value diversity 
remain persistent in human society; consequently, social and state intervention is required in 
order to eradicate social inequalities and to redistribute natural resources in the provision of 
fair and equal opportunities for individuals. 
          Chapter Six explores Green’s view of the ethical relationship between the self-
government of each individual citizen and the sovereign power. While the difference between 
social and state actions, in response to issues implicit in the social world, can be identified as 
sovereignty used as a compelling power, Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics 
focuses on the moral significance of a rich social and political life for each individual person 
by employing the sovereign power as a means to self-cultivation and self-discipline. I 
therefore contend that Green’s practical philosophy embodies a theory of ethical politics by 
 
 
10 
applying his idea of the ethical self to an idea of the ethical citizen. This chapter also offers a 
response to Avital Simhony’s criticism of Green’s ignorance of the potential danger of state 
power in his moral justification for state action. 
          Throughout Chapters Three to Six, I explore systematically Green’s practical 
philosophy combined with critical examinations of contemporary interpretations. From this 
starting point, I go on to apply Green’s practical philosophy and his idealistic conception of 
liberal politics to the contemporary issues of pluralism in Chapter Seven. I will confine my 
discussion to Berlin’s value pluralism and Rawls’s reasonable pluralism, comparing Rawls’s 
doctrine of political liberalism with Green’s theory of ethical politics in order to argue that 
despite the fact that Green’s practical philosophy cannot be applied directly to solving the 
contemporary issues, it does nonetheless contain many insights that are inspiring and 
illuminative for contemporary political theorists. In summary I therefore argue that Green’s 
legacy is embodied in his idealistic liberalism. 
          Chapter Eight forms the conclusion of the thesis, confirming the notion that Green’s 
idealistic liberalism is one of the most important legacies of his systematic practical 
philosophy, integrating metaphysics, moral and ethical theory, and social and political theory 
into a consistent and coherent whole, and advocating an idea of the ethical citizen that is the 
central tenet of his practical idealism. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AFTER ENLIGHTENMENT:  
THE CONTEXT OF GREEN’S PRATICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
1. Introduction 
As Nicholson indicates, ‘because philosophers have to grasp the essential as it appears to 
them in a particular form at a particular time, their comprehension of the essential is specific 
to them and their experience’ (Nicholson, 1997b: xxx). Before exploring Green’s systematic 
practical philosophy, it is important to grasp his central questions and to understand the 
context of his thought. 
          The context of Green’s philosophical thought has two aspects: the religious and 
theological background and the development of the social and political claims in nineteenth-
century Britain. Melvin Richter (1964) indicates that Green’s evangelical background had a 
profound influence on the development of his thought. In this context the idea of conscience 
is of crucial importance for grasping his liberal theory of citizenship. Scholars such as Denys 
Leighton (2004) and Alberto de Sanctis (2005) have concurred with Richter’s perspective. 
Leighton also addresses the role of the social and political environments in which Green 
developed his moral and political ideas, which remained significant for later generations of 
British politicians. He thus claims that there was ‘the Greenian moment’ in the social and 
political history of Britain (Leighton, 2004: 317-324). Andrew Vincent concludes that there 
were four issues facing a Victorian like Green: the corruption and collapse of the Christian 
religion, the undermining of free will and moral agency by natural science, the practical 
thought of moral conduct premised on the concept of will and the idea of character, and the 
combination of an intensive belief in industrialism with a responsible concept of the state that 
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moralises capitalism (Vincent, 1986a: 2). These evolving religious, moral, social and political 
issues in nineteenth-century Britain, in Vincent’s view, worried Green. On the other hand, 
instead of addressing the religious background of Green’s social and political philosophy, 
Colin Tyler argues that there is a romanticist inclination in Green’s philosophical thought that 
is part of a counter-movement in Enlightenment philosophy.3 He indicates that Green was 
deeply interested in Romantic literature, such as Goethe’s Faust or Wordsworth’s poems 
(Tyler, 2010: 28-34). With his main concern being the establishment of a liberal socialism 
interpretation of Green, Tyler’s exploration of Green’s romanticism nonetheless discloses an 
important context for Green’s philosophical thought: that is, ‘After Enlightenment’.4 
          The Enlightenment movement in general was, as Peter Gay suggests, ‘a volatile 
mixture of classicism, impiety, and science’ (Gay, 1973: 8). Enlightenment philosophers 
favoured classical literatures from Ancient Greece and Rome; most had complex ambivalent 
attitudes towards the Roman Church, in the sense that they sometimes expressed admiration 
for the noble virtues of priests, but at other points vehemently criticised the hypocrisy of 
priests. Meanwhile, along with the success of natural science, such philosophers had a strong 
faith in enlightening the world and moving away from the obscurantism of medieval theology 
towards modernity. Nonetheless, while there is a tension between Christianity and the 
Enlightenment and modernity, in Green’s view, the Enlightenment is actually a moment that 
is consistent with the spirit of the Reformation. Together they indicate the rise of a sense of 
subjective individuality (Green, 1867a: 148-151). The idea of individual spiritual freedom 
                                                
3 A well-known exploration of the intellectual connection between the Enlightenment and Romanticism is Isaiah 
Berlin’s The Roots of Romanticism (1999). 
4 The term ‘After Enlightenment’ I used here has two meanings. One is in the chronological sense that the so-
called Enlightenment emerged from the seventeenth century and developed in the eighteenth century, and the 
age Green lived in was the nineteenth century; the two are successive. The other is in the intellectual sense that 
from the French and the Scottish Enlightenment to the German, legacies of the Enlightenment in general 
gradually encountered reactions and criticisms, such as German and British Romanticism (Brown, 2010; 
Thorslev, 2010). In Green’s case, the focus is how to reconcile the tension between religion and science, faith 
and reason, spirituality and materiality. Green was influenced by Romanticism and was critical of the 
rationalism and scientism of the Enlightenment, however the way he reconciled these tensions was not to 
abandon a rational science perspective but rather to redefine what reason means (Green, 1877a). 
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was elevated from the Reformation and came to be the intellectual inspiration of the 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers. It was used to conceptualise individual 
rights and to theorise personal enjoyments of freedom and conscience (Green, 1906e: 120-
122; Green, 1906k: 278-282). Thus the modern spirit of the Enlightenment is ‘to be free, to 
understand, to enjoy’ (Green, 1906e: 94).5 
       However, along with the development of the Enlightenment from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, life in European society changed dramatically. The great advances of 
technology, the profound achievements of natural science, and the revival of Greek and 
Roman philosophical thought, led to the transformation of economic, social and political 
structures in Europe. In particular, the emergence of empiricist and rational thinking, which 
prevailed among intellectuals, became increasingly influential, permeating throughout society. 
For instance, the significance of facts, which underscored eighteenth-century naturalistic 
philosophy, influenced the public through turning literature, especially poetry, away from the 
inwardness of humanity and towards the outwardness (Green, 1906c: 21-29). That thinking 
considers human beings as being natural consequences of the forces of external 
circumstances, in accord with the laws of nature in their pursuit of a world of pleasure and 
fulfilment. However, the sublimation of the human introspective spirit, which is elevated in 
poetry, is consequently degraded (Green, 1906c: 26, 28).6 One further consequence of 
                                                
5 A caution should be made here, namely that Green’s understanding of the Enlightenment was influenced by 
German philosophers and did not refer to the more common notions of the French Enlightenment. In his 1868 
essay ‘Popular Philosophy in Its Relation to Life’, Green used the German term ‘Aufklärung’ to signify the 
Enlightenment, and furthermore, the term ‘popular philosophy’, which Green regarded as Locke’s child, was 
related to the Popularphilosophie, as a German intellectual movement resuming the empirical tradition of Locke 
as opposed to Kant’s philosophy (Green, 1906e: 92-93; cf. Beiser, 1987: chap. 6). Moreover, it is rare that 
Green comments on the French enlightenment philosophers, such as Denis Diderot (1713-1784) or Voltaire 
(1694-1778), in his writings. With this in mind, the reason why Green takes the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment as succeeding events seem clearer, given his emphasis on individual spiritual freedom. For, 
concerned with the tension between religious faith and scientific reason, many eighteenth-century German 
philosophers considered the spirit of Protestant individualism as a possible way out, see Beiser, 1987: 1-15, 16-
18, 50-52, 60-61. 
6 Although Green was critical of the claim of the significance of facts, his philosophy, as de Sanctis says, ‘had 
an empirical basis and his positions were constantly moulded in the light of the facts’ (de Sanctis, 2005: 75). 
However, there is an important distinction between his understanding of facts and the eighteenth-century 
naturalists and the Enlightenment philosophers’. For Green, as for Kant, facts, or phenomena and experiences, 
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empiricist and rationalist thinking was that inequalities among different social classes were 
interpreted as a normal aspect of natural competition. Social evils were consequently often 
ignored (Green, 1906c: 41-44). 
      Living in the age after the Enlightenment, there are three issues with which Green is 
mainly concerned: the decline of Christianity, social inequality and the deficiencies of 
representative democracy. With these concerns in mind, Green identified the fundamental 
root underpinning these issues as the atomistic and naturalistic conception of the human 
person. Something which also underpinned a great deal of Enlightenment philosophy. In what 
follows I will focus my discussion on the task of exploring the ways in which Green connects 
these issues with Enlightenment philosophy. The discussion will also show that Green’s 
approach blends social and political issues together with questions of morals, ethics and 
metaphysics. In my reading he therefore establishes a system of practical philosophy. 
 
2. Two social and political issues in a modern democratic state 
2.1. Social equality, individual freedom and state action  
One of the more significant issues in nineteenth-century Britain was the aggravation of social 
inequality. At that time, British society went through a dramatic transformation, moving from 
being a primarily agricultural to an industrial society. The resultant massive change within 
economic and social structures caused many traditional values to be challenged and even 
abandoned. For example, new theories and concepts formulated by biologists and geologists 
impacted adversely on religion, morality and social ideas. This was particularly the case with 
Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859) and Sir Charles Lyell’s Geological Evidences 
of the Antiquity of Man (1863) (Vincent, 1986a: 2-7). 
                                                                                                                                                  
are not simply given from the outside but are involved with our consciousness and are thus products of the 
human mind. This understanding of facts then is a starting-point of Green’s metaphysics and moral philosophy 
against naturalistic and empiricist moral philosophy, especially in regard to the question of human agency. 
 
 
15 
          Along with the transformation of society, one of the most important social problems of 
the age was the social inequality existing between different classes, especially between 
farmers and landlords, and labourers and capitalists. As Green pointed out in his 1867 speech 
for the Oxford Reform League, ‘A rich man in England may grow richer more quickly than 
in any other European country. In that sense it is a most prosperous country, but it is a 
prosperity in which the agricultural labourer has no share at all’ (Green, 1867b: 228). 
Although the wealth of the country seemed to be increasing, farmers had no share in this. To 
comprehend this issue, for Green, takes more than an understanding of the laws of supply and 
demand (Green, 1872a: 239; Green, 1874a: 247). The situation was the result of an inability 
of farmers to gain an increase in wages unaided. In particular, for cottagers or tenant farmers, 
the situation was made worse because landlords tended to keep wages low unless they had to 
raise them in order to ameliorate their own wealth and fortune. Secondly, farmers did not 
have either the resources or knowledge to argue and negotiate with landlords. As an example, 
Green described the problem facing Yorkshire labourers, who enjoyed better rates of pay than 
their Dorsetshire equivalents mainly because they had the ability to negotiate. However not 
every farmer or labourer had such abilities. Green went on to contend that the objectives that 
the National Agricultural Labourers’ Union should strive for included increasing the wage 
levels and the creation of a fund for farmers, which would assist them when moving from 
place to place in order to secure better wages, or to negotiate with their landlords in case a 
dispute made them lose their income (Green, 1874a: 246). In contrast to these social supports, 
the mechanism of the free market, in accord with the law of supply and demand, did not 
function well. Rather the self-interested desire for profit undermined such socialising 
mechanisms (Bellamy, 1992: 3-4). 
      If the mechanism of the free market were to function perfectly, under the condition of 
the ideal equilibrium, there would be no extra benefit as profit. This meant that to produce 
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profits would hinder the operation and the function of the free market. However, though the 
theoretical ideal was not equal to the practical situation, classical liberals (or what Bellamy 
called ethical liberals) such as Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, still 
‘believed that the profit motive could be superseded by the desire to do something well for its 
own sake’ (Bellamy, 1992: 4). While they ‘acknowledged that some state regulation was 
necessary both to preserve the market from attempts to undermine it and to remedy its 
deficiencies in providing certain public goods’, they had faith that ‘the evolution of human 
sentiments would ultimately overcome these anti-social tendencies’ (Bellamy, 1992: 4). 
Nonetheless, the social situation in nineteenth-century Britain was not as optimistic as these 
latter liberals thought. The development of human sentiment was not transformed from the 
egotistic into the altruistic. Contrary to these liberals, then, Green considered social inequality 
as ‘an evil which no individual benevolence can cure’ (Green, 1868a: 235); rather, the 
intervention of government was required.  
      However, there was a reason for such liberals to persist in the view that the solution of 
the inequality issue was predicated on the development of a social sentiment that they 
believed to be the primacy of self-cultivation and the idea of character. The idea of character 
was influential among a number of nineteenth-century British intellectuals (Collini, 1985; 
Leighton, 2004: 287-293). With the influence from Evangelical Christianity, this view 
embodied ‘the vision of life as a perpetual struggle in which one’s ability to resist temptation 
and overcome obstacles needed to be subject to constant scrutiny’ (Collini, 1985: 38). This 
implies a process of self-control to resist temptations through the exertion of one’s own will, 
without interference or assistance from others. In effect it is viewed as a person’s moral 
responsibility to strive for character. The idea also had subtle links to the concept of negative 
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freedom, that is, the freedom from interferences or restraints.7 On the basis of this idea, 
overcoming social inequality is considered a personal moral issue with which the government 
should not interfere. Hence, with this ethical implication underpinning their views, liberals 
advocated the importance of individual autonomy versus state intervention.8 As Samuel 
Smiles (1812-1904) argues, 
 
The spirit of self-help is the root of all genuine growth in the individual; and, exhibited 
in the lives of many, it constitutes the true source of national vigour and strength. Help 
from without is often enfeebling in its effects, but help from within invariably 
invigorates. Whatever is done for men or classes, to a certain extent takes away the 
stimulus and necessity of doing for themselves; and where men are subjected to over-
guidance or over-government, the inevitable tendency is to render them comparatively 
helpless.  
… Moreover, it is every day becoming more clearly understood, that the function of 
Government is negative and restrictive, rather than positive and active; being resolvable, 
principally into protection – protection of life, liberty, and property. (Smiles, 1859: 1-2; 
quoted from Greenleaf, 1983: 31) (italic in original) 
 
The role of the state is to protect individuals from interventions and overt harms. It is thus an 
essentially negative claim. However, Green had a different understanding of the relationship 
between individual freedom and state action. He believed that state action ‘need not at all 
                                                
7 Bellamy has indicated the wide meanings covered in the idea of character – that it is of ‘self-culture, self-
control, energy, industry, frugality, thrift, prudence, patience, perseverance, honesty, integrity, temperance, 
sobriety, independence, manliness, and duty’ (Bellamy, 1992: 6). 
8 A famous and extreme proponent of this idea of individual freedom was Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), whose 
philosophy has been called by Greenleaf ‘a philosophy of anti-statism’ (Greenleaf, 1983: 48). However, as Peter 
Nicholson argues, Spencer is not against state action entirely, but only opposes the government interference 
which prevents the natural progress of human society. Concerning discussions of Spencer’s attitude towards 
state action, see Greenleaf, 1983: 48-88; Nicholson, 1990: 133-140. As to the general discussion of the relation 
between Spencer’s philosophy and liberalism, see also Algazy, 1986: 7-15; Gray, 1990.  
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interfere with the independence and self-reliance of those whom it requires to do what they 
would otherwise do for themselves’ (Green, 1986b: 203). In fact, the fundamental 
disagreement between W. V. Harcourt (1827-1904) and Green in regard to the Licensing Act 
of 1872 and the Permissive Bill was closely related to these different understandings of the 
relationship of individual freedom and state action. 
      The Licensing Act 1872 and the Permissive Bill were both related to the abuse of 
alcohol during the nineteenth century. When the social situation for people (such as farmers 
or labourers) became increasingly distressing, alcohol allowed them an escape from the dire 
social and economic realities of their lives. However in Green’s view alcohol not only 
worsened the condition of the working class, but also clouded their political judgements, in 
the sense that brewers could manipulate working people through cheaper or free beer (Green, 
1875a; Green, 1875b). With his personal experience of failing to assist his brother to abstain 
from alcohol in 1862, the temperance movement eventually became an important social 
activity for Green, who engaged with it from 1872 (Nettleship, 1906: cxv-cxvii; de Sanctis, 
2005: 89-92). Moreover, the ‘question of the liquor traffic was the only one upon which he 
was ever drawn into anything like political controversy’ on the basis of his moral and 
philosophical thought (Nettleship, 1906: cxv).  
      The controversy Nettleship indicates concerns Green’s debates with Vernon Harcourt 
in 1873. On 4 January 1873, the editor of the Oxford Chronicle received a letter from Green, 
in which Green expressed his anxiety about Harcourt’s attitude towards belated social reform, 
which might detain Parliament from focusing its attention on what he argued was an urgent 
social issue. Harcourt’s speech on the Licensing Bill in 31 December 1872 showed his 
disagreement with the nature of current reform efforts (Green, 1873a: 217-219). In Harcourt’s 
view, the nature of the Licensing Bill was against his liberal faith that ‘when you have put 
everybody into prison you will not have made your population virtuous. No more will you 
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have made the nation moral, when you have compelled them to be sober against their will’. 
He continued: ‘What really makes sobriety valuable is the voluntary self-control – the 
deliberate self-denial which resists temptation and leads a man, for the sake of himself and 
others, to abstain from vicious indulgence; and this is a thing which you cannot create by Act 
of Parliament’ (Green, 1873a: 217, n. 1). After he had noted Green’s letter to the editor of the 
Oxford Chronicle, he wrote to Green on 8 January and contested that ‘people who are sober 
are generally respectable and the conclusion is drawn that if you could only make every one 
sober you would make every one (or at least most people) respectable. But that seems to me a 
fallacy. Whilst the thing is voluntary and optional people are sober because they are already 
respectable and not respectable because they are sober’ (Green, 1873b: 448, n. 66). For 
Harcourt, state action could not make people respectable, although he did support some social 
reform. In his reply to Harcourt, Green pointed out the inconsistency of Harcourt’s attitudes 
towards the demand for social reform (Green, 1873b: 452). He argued that Harcourt was not 
aware of how serious and severe were the conditions in which the working classes lived 
(Green, 1873b: 450-451). For Green, social reality required the so-called respectable classes 
to take action rather than just stand aside. Nonetheless, Green explicitly expressed his 
agreement with Harcourt about the moral worth of voluntary self-control, namely ‘that the 
Law cannot make men good, that its business is to set them free to make themselves good, I 
quite agree’. He continued that ‘[t]he question is how these truisms are to be applied’ (Green, 
1873b: 452). That is to say, Green was a man with ideals, but he was also practical. He 
agreed with the moral ideals that most liberals advocated, but he also questioned whether or 
not the ideals and principles could be applied in practice consistently and adequately.9 
      In January 1881, Green gave a lecture entitled ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of 
Contract’ for the Leicester Liberal Association in which he demanded government 
                                                
9 For details of the controversy between Green and Harcourt in regard to the licensing question and state action, 
see Nicholson, 1986; Nicholson, 1990: 177-188. As to Green’s distinctive idea of character and its influences, 
see also Leighton, 2004: 287-299. 
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intervention into social issues relating to the working condition of labourers, the inequity 
between farmers and their landlords in contractual terms, and the matter of intoxicating 
drinks (Green, 1986b). In this lecture, Green introduced a positive idea of individual freedom 
which is compatible with the need for state action: 
 
When we speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive 
power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, 
too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others. We mean by it a power 
which each man exercises through the help or security given him by his fellow-men, 
and which he in turn helps to secure for them. (Green, 1986b: 199) 
 
In other words, not only can the idea of individual freedom be compatible with benevolent 
support, but it also implies the moral requirement for such support. Further, this moral and 
mutual support will be more efficient if it is institutionalised, and then state action can have a 
positive role for individual freedom. Thus by proposing a positive idea of freedom, Green 
justified state action as a necessary means for addressing social equality (Carter, 2003: 32-36). 
For him, social equality was an important condition through which individuals might achieve 
true freedom. Yet this required government interference to maintain social equality whilst not 
interfering in the development of a person’s moral character (Green, 1986b: 203). Hence, it is 
as one of his pupils suggested: ‘we have not abandoned our old belief in liberty, justice and 
self-help, but we say that under certain conditions the people cannot help themselves, and that 
then they should be helped by the state representing directly the whole people’ (Toynbee, 
2011: 219). Green’s thought thus entwined the concepts of social equality, individual 
freedom and state action. In addition, this argument also relates closely to his reconsideration 
of the function of modern democracy. 
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2.2. Class conflict, representative democracy and active citizenship  
One of the main problems of modern democracy in Green’s mind was related to Toynbee’s 
last sentence, quoted above, namely: ‘they should be helped by the state representing directly 
the whole people’. Ideally, as Green maintained, ‘[i]f the ideal of true freedom is the 
maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves, 
we are right in refusing to ascribe the glory of freedom to a state in which the apparent 
elevation of the few is founded on the degradation of the many’ (Green, 1986b: 200). But in 
reality, political power was still controlled by a few people, whom Green called the 
privileged classes. Genuine liberals continued to fight against this situation with various 
dimensions of social reform (Green, 1986b: 195-196). In his speech in 1867 on the 
Government Reform Bill, Green indicated that ‘four-fifths of the members of the lower 
House are either great landowners or belong to the families of great landowners. The present 
conflict, too, differs from previous ones in this respect, that the landowners have now to a 
great extent got the commercial class and that which calls itself the educated class on their 
side’ (Green, 1867b: 227). This was because many capitalists would buy estates and lands 
once they had sufficient budgets to ensure their offspring being able to purchase baronet 
status, thus gaining membership of the privileged class. In Green’s view, the social and 
political constitution of Parliament was thus leading the country towards aristocracy or 
oligarchy status, and was ‘incompatible with any healthy political life’ (Green, 1867b: 228). 
To be clear, a state with such a constitution could not represent the whole people; on the 
contrary, for Green, it would be controlled by a privileged few, and its actions and 
interventions regarding social issues would hardly be legitimate.  
      One possible solution to this corrupt situation is universal suffrage. At the time when 
Green celebrated the passing of the Reform Bill of 1867 (in his 1868 speech), with a strong 
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conviction that universal suffrage would lead to the political and social reform of Parliament, 
he said, ‘[t]he whole nation wins by a measure which makes us for the first time one people’ 
(Green, 1868a: 234). Four years later, in a speech for the Agricultural Labourers’ Union in 
1872, he referred to the Reform Bill again and urged the importance of the enfranchisement 
of all his fellow countrymen. As the Oxford Chronicle reported: 
  
... [the labourers] knew that five years ago [1867] household suffrage was granted to 
householders in towns, but the labouring poor in the country were left out. What was 
the result? Why, within the past five years more measures had been passed for the good 
of the labourers in towns than had ever been passed in the whole century before. The 
speaker [Green] made reference to several measures which had been passed, among 
which he specially mentioned the Sanitary Bill and the Licensing Bill. All this, he said 
had been done for the people in the towns, but nothing had been done for the people in 
the country, and would not be till the labouring people had votes. (Green, 1872a: 241) 
 
It is important to be clear that Green was an advocate for universal suffrage. He believed that 
once each adult had equal political rights and the freedom to express their opinions within the 
political constitution, the state could then truly represent the whole people and the political 
power of privileged few would be no longer be viable. However, the situation was not as 
Green expected. 
      The result of the general election of Parliament in 1874 was that the Liberal party was 
defeated by the Conservatives. Having been an advocate of the Liberals, Green was 
considerably upset, and remarked that ‘the country had been passing through a phase of 
sudden and unexampled commercial prosperity ... Money quickly made was quickly spent, 
and it seemed as if all classes were disposed, not exactly to rest and to be thankful, but at 
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least to take their ease, eat, drink, and be merry. In this state of things, in the middle of this 
general political inertness came the election of 1874’ (Green, 1876: 270). Green suggested 
that money and beer were the crucial factors causing the defeat of the Liberal party; in 
particular, many Conservatives were either landowners or brewers (Green, 1875b: 256; de 
Sanctis, 2005: 100-102). However, the political and social situation was much worse than 
Green surmised in the sense that corruption permeated both major political parties. 
      In 1880, the Liberal party won the general election, while Harcourt also won his 
campaign against the Conservative brewer, A. W. Hall (1838-1919), as a Member of 
Parliament for Oxford. However, Harcourt was soon appointed Home Secretary and was 
required to stand again. The result of the re-election was Harcourt’s failure, and Hall, as his 
opponent, won. But during the election, the bribery and the corruption of the Conservatives 
were exposed; they were discovered spending large amounts of money improperly. Hall was 
then unseated and a Commission of Enquiry was established, but the result of investigation 
was not good for either party. The Commission of Enquiry found that not only the 
Conservatives were involved with bribery and corruption, but also the Liberals. They 
established that during the re-election, the Liberals spent £3,275 and the Conservatives spent 
around £5,611 in ten days (John, 1990: 142). Green, as an instigator of the petition for the 
enquiry, was in an awkward position among the Liberals, but he felt confident that the 
Corrupt Practices Bill, which was brought in after this event, would make the political system 
healthier (Green, 1881: 374-375; Green, 1882: 385). As he stated in 1881, ‘[p]ublicity was a 
great cure for the sort of disease with which they had been suffering in Oxford for the last 
few years’ (Green, 1881: 374). He still believed that whether the representative system of 
modern state could be free from the bias of private interests or class interests depended on 
extending the scope of this active participation to the whole people (Green, 1986a: 93-94; 
Tyler, 2006a: 85-88). For Green, the nation would not ‘have a Parliament which had the 
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interest of the struggling and suffering classes of society at heart’ as long as the Parliament 
was still ‘a sort of club of rich men’ (Green, 1882: 382). That is to say, a legitimate 
government ought to represent the common interests of the whole nation, and the way to 
make sure of this was through universal suffrage and people’s active participation. In addition 
to this, there are further ethical implications which follow from Green’s idea of the active 
citizen. 
      As we have seen above, Green defined his idea of positive freedom as the freedom of 
self-realisation. He believed this to be equal to ‘the liberation of the powers of all men 
equally for contributions to a common good’ (Green, 1986b: 200). In terms of this definition 
of his positive idea of freedom, to secure every individual having equal opportunities is one 
condition for self-realisation, and the other condition for self-realisation is that it should make 
‘contributions to a common good’. That is to say, the realisation of one’s true and moral 
freedom requires one first having a conception of the common good, and second, partaking in 
contributions to this common good. For Green, the best way for a person to have a conception 
of the common good and to partake in it was to engage in political activities. If a person 
intended to have ‘a higher feeling of political duty, he must take part in the work of the state’, 
and only thus can he ‘learn to regard the work of the state as a whole, and to transfer to the 
whole the interest which otherwise his particular experience would lead him to feel only in 
that part of its work that goes to the maintenance of his own and his neighbour’s rights’ 
(Green, 1986a: 97). In other words, through participating in public affairs and in politics, an 
individual can develop an idea of the common interests of the whole nation. The individual, 
as an active citizen, can learn what his duty is and have the opportunity to reflect on that 
social duty as the starting-point for his moral development (Green, 1986c: 246-249). Green’s 
idea of self-realisation, as Nicholson points out, thus ‘entailed the creation of a democratic 
society in which all its members had genuine opportunities for self-realization and, as an 
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important part of that, the opportunity through the institutions of democracy to participate in 
political life and social reform. In the terms of Green’s theory, to be an informed and active 
citizen was part of the good life: it was through living this life that a person perfected him or 
herself’ (Nicholson, 1997b: xxv). 
      It is clear, then, that Green’s critical considerations of social inequality and the 
deficiency of representative democracy are underpinned by a positive idea of individual 
freedom and an ethical conception of citizen participation. Within his concerns regarding the 
practical social and political problems concerning a democratic state, Green developed his 
political and ethical ideas, and these ideas were in turn premised upon his metaphysical view 
of the human condition. 
 
3. The legacy of Christianity and the need for philosophy 
In his 1858 essay ‘The Force of Circumstances’ Green felt that ‘[t]he mere phrase “force of 
circumstances” seems to remind us that there is some want of harmony between ourselves 
and the outer world’ (Green, 1906a: 3). Thus the primary human condition is directed 
towards reconciliation within the universe. However, the prevailing naturalistic view of the 
relation between the world and mankind from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
conceived each individual as the centre of external powers and the result of the force of 
circumstances. By virtue of this view, Green indicated that ‘external suffering gets its first 
strong hold on us just when we are beginning to discover that this world is not our home’ 
(Green, 1906a: 3). Humans become slaves of the natural world, for there is no human 
freedom but only external forces and the laws regulating the operation of these forces. Green 
was as against this view as he was against Hume’s account of the idea of self: that it is 
‘nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity’ (Hume, 1969: 300; cf. Green, 1885a: 295-299). To Green, a human 
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being is not merely a natural consequence of external forces, but a being having free agency 
to strive for what he or she desires. Nevertheless, Green was also against the view of the 
world as a mere creation of the human mind. He argued,  
 
To regard this vast environment merely as the outcome of the workings of the human 
mind, seems nearly as far from the truth as to regard ourselves as its creatures or its 
slaves. Its true influence on us is to raise our thoughts in various ways to the spirit in 
whom ‘we live and move and have our being,’ while it teaches us at once that he made 
us and not we ourselves, and that he made us after his own likeness. (Green, 1906a: 4) 
 
While ‘the spirit in whom “we live and move and have our being”’ implies a notion of an 
immanent being in the world; it is important to be clear that in this early essay of Green’s, 
there was a sort of theological notion underlying his thought which had a definite influence 
on his apprehension of the human condition. Thus there appears to be some form of hyper-
being immanent in the world and in human life, which drives us to towards self-realisation 
and reconciliation with the world, and this would constitute the perfect freedom for human 
beings (Green, 1906a: 4-7). However, while Enlightenment philosophy had prevailed since 
the eighteenth century, the naturalistic view of the relationship between human beings and the 
natural world eventually overwhelmed theological notions. Without empirical evidence and 
rational explanation, theological notions were considered as mere dogma.	 
          Critics have suggested that Green was intending to philosophise theology ‘as the basis 
of a philosophy of practice’, but the project remained unsuccessful (Sidgwick, 1884: 179).10 
                                                
10 Sidgwick, as one of Green’s life-long friends, commented that Green’s philosophy, especially his moral 
philosophy, was full of confusions of theological and philosophical ideas. For Sidgwick, ‘we ought not to use 
these theological notions, while yet unpurged of such palpable inconsistencies, as the basis of a philosophy of 
practice’ (Sidgwick, 1884: 179). In his ‘Green’s Metaphysics of Knowledge’ A. J. Balfour (1848-1930) 
comments on Green’s philosophy in a similar vein, namely that Green’s doctrines ‘in their form appear rather to 
resemble theological mysteries than philosophical conclusions’ (Balfour, 1884: 85-86). However, as I will 
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Nevertheless Green was neither an apologist nor did he simply intend to restore the 
dominance of Christianity.11 In a letter to Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) in 1868, Green 
indicated that ‘religious men, who have broken with dogmatic Christianity as dogmatic, 
should come to some mutual understanding, so as to have a chance of reorganizing worship 
and religious beneficence when the present fabrics break up’ (Green, 1868b: 423). For Green, 
it had been acknowledged by intellectuals that there were dogmatic teachings in Christianity, 
but the collapse of the Christian theological and clerical system did not mean that religion as 
such should be disregarded as well. In his letter to Henry Scott Holland (1847-1918) in 1869, 
Green mentioned this idea of having ‘broken with dogmatic Christianity’ and remarked that 
‘[i]f there seems now to be a reflective morality, which yet is not religious, this is not really 
unreligious, but its religion is for the time dumb; and this dumbness mainly results from the 
action of philosophy upon the dogma of the revelation of God in Christ’. He continued: 
‘When it is found that this dogma (though in a wrong, because dogmatic, form) embodies the 
true idea of the relation of the moral life to God, the morality of speculative men will find its 
religious tongue again’ (Green, 1869: 426). That is, in Green’s view, dogmatic theology 
should be reduced, but it does not follow that there is no value in its teaching. On the 
contrary, to reflect on dogmatic theology critically can help us to reconsider the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                  
argue, Green was clearly aware of the difference between theology and philosophy, though he did intend to save 
the moral ideas in theology, with the help of philosophy, in order to restore social morality in nineteenth-century 
Britain. 
11 Green’s father Valentine Green was the rector of Birkin in Yorkshire, and his uncle David Vaughan (1825-
1905), who was close to him, was the vicar of St Martin’s, Leicester, and was also well-known as an active 
Christian Socialist. Green was raised in a clerical family and was familiar with a clerical life. However, in his 
letter to Holland in 1872, he expressed frankly his doubts regarding contemporary theology and clergy, saying 
‘[f]irst, you must not think that I have any animosity to the clerical profession, as such. All the best influences of 
my life have been due to those who belonged to it, my own strongest interests have always drawn me towards it, 
and I still regard it as an opening to a nobler life than, except by very few, can be otherwise found. Perhaps this 
sometimes causes a certain bitterness in the thought that the entrance to it is guarded by the profession of 
opinions which to me seem untenable; and the bitterness is sometimes aggravated when I find those who are 
able to pursue the calling making by word or manner sacerdotal pretensions which seem to me practically 
mischievous and a parody on the true dignity of their vocation. This is the worst of my ill feeling towards the 
clergy’ (Green, 1872b: 441-442). It seems that he was a person with religious faith but without faith in 
parochialism. As to the influences of Green’s family on his understanding of theology and morality, see Richter, 
1964: chap. 2; Leighton, 2004: 142-160. 
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between religion and philosophy. In accordance with this thought, Green engaged in the work 
of articulating a critical understanding of Christianity. 
          By adopting a critical method for his historical exploration of Christianity, something 
he learnt from the Tübingen School12 and Hegel’s philosophy of history13, Green not only 
detected critical reasons for Christianity to be identified as dogmatic theology, but also 
rediscovered the original teachings of Christian belief. On the basis of his research, there are 
different stages in the development of Christian belief. At first, it was a faith based on 
personal experiences that were the direct experiences of the twelve apostles. But then this 
faith gradually turned into an intuitive conception of God that led Christianity to be a 
dogmatic theology (for the intuitive conception of God basically forbade a reflective mind). 
As a consequence, Christianity lost its original meaning as guidance for moral practice and 
came to be an authoritative and dogmatic regime. Moreover, without being aware of the 
distortion of its own spirit, after the Reformation, Christianity, having been dogma of the 
Church, became a dogma of the individual (Green, 1906i: 163-182). 
                                                
12 The Tübingen School refers to a group of scholars who agreed with Hegel’s philosophy and developed a 
historical approach for biblical criticism. Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860), Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach 
(1804-1872) and David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874) were three important figures in this group. According to 
Richard Lewis Nettleship (1846-1892), Green was fascinated by Tübingen School theology and translated F. C. 
Baur’s Geschichte der christlichen Kirche (1859) between 1862 and 1863 (Nettleship, 1906: xxxvii). 
Nettleship’s brother Henry Nettleship (1839-1893) also recalled that he heard Green’s reading of an essay on 
Christian Dogma in The Old Mortality, a reading group in Oxford, in 1863 or 1864 (Tyler, 2008: 40-43). It has 
also been argued that Green’s familiarity with Hegel’s philosophy may also contain influences from the 
Tübingen School. See Nettleship, 1906: xxxviii-xxxix; Richter, 1964: 102-103; Vincent and Plant, 1984: chap. 
2; Vincent, 1986a: 2-5; Reardon, 1986: 40-44; Leighton, 2004: 162-165; de Sanctis, 2005: 57-60. For the 
general context of the development of historical criticism, see Stuhlmacher, 1979.    
13 According to his study, Nicholson remarks that in Green’s 1860 and 1861 Ellerton essays, ‘Life and 
Immortality brought to light by the Gospel’ and ‘The State of Religious Belief among the Jews at the Time of 
the Coming of Christ’, we can see the influences of Hegel’s Philosophy of History (Nicholson, 1997a: xvii-xix). 
Green’s explorations of the development of theological notions, such as life, immortality or the meaning of the 
coming of Christ, cover ancient religions to Platonic philosophy, and have similar patterns as Hegel’s as 
expressed in his Philosophy of History. To Hegel, the development of history in this sense is the process of a 
spirit as the God moving to actualise itself through different nations and peoples in different places and times 
(Hegel, 1975: 27-124). In Nicholson’s view, Green’s historical consideration of the development of those 
theological notions also focused on ‘how man’s ideas of God develop at particular times and in particular places’ 
towards a spiritual idea of God (Nicholson, 1997a: xviii). Meanwhile, Hegel’s influence on Green can also be 
seen in Green’s ‘Lectures on the English Commonwealth’, and ‘Lectures on Moral and Political philosophy’ as 
well, as Green utilised Hegel’s idea of history as the evolution of spirit through individuals and the world, the 
subjective and objective phases, to explore the development of the English Commonwealth and the evolution of 
moral and political philosophy from the ancient to the modern. See Green, 1867a; Green, 1906k; cf. Boucher 
and Vincent, 2000: chap. 1. 
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          In contrast with doctrines of dogmatic theology, to Green, the original teaching of 
Christianity contains a significant view of human agency that had been concealed by the 
naturalistic thinking of Enlightenment philosophy. For Green, Christian belief signifies a 
teaching of moral practice that not only affirms the importance of human agency, but also 
indicates that the ideal of human life is self-realisation. The resurrection of Christ indicates 
that every person has the capability of abandoning a carnal life and of resurrecting in a 
spiritual and moral life, which signifies that human beings have the ability to develop a moral 
life and to be self-masters, rather than being mastered by external circumstances. For, as 
Green maintains, ‘the process constituting the moral life’ is ‘according to our interpretation of 
it’, and this ‘can in consequence so set before myself the realisation of my own possibilities 
as to be a moral agent’ (Green, 1906j: 226). On the basis of the capability of conceiving an 
idea of self, there is a possibility for us to transcend sensuous and sentient life and move 
towards a moral life, which is the only source of every true theology (Green, 1906j: 223). 
          Moreover, while the Jewish idea of ‘the chosen’ was gradually transformed through 
‘[t]he break up of the nationality, followed by a very imperfect restoration and by the 
permanent isolation of many of the Jews among heathen communities’ and ‘prepared the 
people for the general adoption of those views of God’s spiritual omnipresence which had 
been consistently foreshadowed by the Prophets’ (Green, 1861: 91-92), moral resurrection 
seemed to be possible for each individual, and was not confined to a specific nation. As there 
is the ‘inner spiritual seed, which forms a specialty, a peculiarity, in all men, and which, 
when it had been quickened into life by the breath of the Holy Ghost, grew into the Church of 
Christ’ (Green, 1861: 99), the life of a better self is therefore not egoist or individualistic, but 
a practice which should be within a community. For Green, a moral person, like St. Paul, who 
‘[i]n his own body bore about the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be 
manifest therein’. ‘But’, he continued, ‘there was another body, which was his as it was 
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Christ’s, the body of Christian fellowship, where he found such reality of demonstration as 
mere introspection could not give’ (Green, 1870: 15-16). That is, a moral life implies a 
community in which the person can pursue his or her self-realisation. Christian moral 
teaching not only signifies man’s ability to attain self-transformation and self-realisation, but 
also implies an idea of community in which each individual person as a Christian citizen is 
fighting for the human spirit, universal humanity and the common good of all human beings 
(Vincent, 1986b: 60; de Sanctis, 2005: 121-125). On the basis of such views of the human 
condition, it seems that a human person is not, as many Enlightenment thinkers argued, the 
natural consequence of the force of various circumstances, but rather, there is a potentiality 
immanent in each person to go beyond what he or she is now and to actualise a better self in 
accord with his or her own will, within a communal life. Nonetheless, this original teaching 
of Christianity was not only distorted by dogmatic theology, but was also concealed by the 
rationalist and empiricist thinking of Enlightenment philosophy. By virtue of such positioning 
of the Christian belief system, Green argued that ‘Christian dogma, then, must be retained in 
its completeness, but it must be transformed into a philosophy’ (Green, 1906i: 182). That is, 
theological notions need to be clarified by philosophers and to be free from dogmatism and 
unreflective intuitions. The relationship between philosophy and theology accordingly is not 
one of rivalry, but is rather ‘as the flower to the leaf’ (Green, 1906e: 121). However, since the 
tenets of Enlightenment philosophy are against those of Christianity, there must be some 
other sort of philosophical thinking which is compatible with theology. To Green, this is the 
idealist philosophy.  
	 
4. Empiricism and idealism: an issue of the human condition 
While in both ‘The Force of Circumstances’ (1858) and ‘An Estimate of the Value and 
Influence of Works of Fiction in Modern Times’ (1862) Green showed his discontent with 
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the naturalistic and empiricist tendency of Enlightenment philosophy, it was not until his 
1868 essay ‘Popular Philosophy in Its Relation to Life’ that he made a systematic critical 
study of the Enlightenment movement in Britain. For Green, Enlightenment philosophy was 
the popular philosophy of Britain, its parent Locke beginning a process whereby his 
successors developed and transformed it into the utilitarian and hedonistic philosophy of his 
day (Green, 1906e: 93-95, 117-124). Green argued that Locke and Hume, as two of the most 
influential empiricist philosophers, developed a view of human condition on the basis of their 
theory of knowledge that furthered the dualism of matter and mind, dividing the human 
condition into two worlds, that is a being of sensibility and a being of rationality. For Green, 
‘when man has reached the further or philosophic stage of reflection on self, when he begins 
to ask himself what his own nature is, he observes and classifies them as he might things in 
the outward world, in fancied separation from the self-conscious activity in virtue of which 
alone they are there to be observed. They are put on one side as “feelings”, thought or reason 
on the other, and it is asked what is the function of each according to our inward experience’ 
(Green, 1906e: 105). That is to say, while it has been argued that there are two worlds 
confronting human beings, it has been suggested also that these are actually two sides of the 
same consciousness and are products of the constructive ability of human beings. 
Nevertheless, the ‘natural philosophy’ of man continuously separates humans into two worlds, 
conceiving of humans as passive recipients of outward irritations and active observers of 
inward sensations at the same time. Humans are therefore isolated from the natural world, on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, are natural consequences of the forces of circumstances. 
Green, however, was not satisfied with this view of the human condition. Under the influence 
of the Christian view of human life, he believed that human beings have the ability to go 
beyond circumstances rather than to be determined by them. Nonetheless, as indicated, the 
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Christian view of human life requires philosophical thought in order to transform it. The 
philosophical thought Green assimilated is German idealism. 
          In Wempe’s research, it is suggested that the first time Green studied German 
philosophy systematically, especially Hegel’s philosophy, was not before the summer of 
1861 (Wempe, 2004: 21). Leighton, agreeing with Wempe, claims that ‘[a]s early as 1861, by 
which time he was a tutor and a fellow of Balliol, Green had embarked upon serious study of 
Kant and Hegel, perhaps in continuation of Jowett’s interrupted efforts’ (Leighton, 2004: 51-
52). However, Nicholson contests the idea, maintaining that Green might already have been 
familiar with Hegel’s philosophy during the late 1850s (Nicholson, 1995: 61-62). He 
indicates that during his undergraduate period (1855 to 1859) Green’s tutor at Balliol was 
Benjamin Jowett (1817-1893), who was interested in Hegel and German philosophy and who 
encouraged his pupils to study their work (Nicholson, 1995: 61; cf. Richter, 1964: 70-71). 
Green might also have known Hegel’s thought from T. C. Sandars, another pupil of Jowett’s, 
who gave a lucid summary of the Philosophy of Right in 1855, or alternatively from J. Sibree, 
whose translation of the Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1857) was available in 
Bohn’s Library from 1858 (Nicholson, 1995: 62). Accordingly, Green’s systematic study of 
German philosophy most likely began earlier than Wempe and Leighton claim. Nonetheless, 
despite the difference between Nicholson, Wempe and Leighton regarding the point at which 
Green became familiar with Hegel’s philosophy, it has been widely acknowledged that 
German idealism was influential in his whole understanding of contemporary issues. As 
Green comments, ‘... man, above all the modern man, must theorise his practice, and the 
failure adequately to do so, must cripple the practice itself. Hitherto, except from a school of 
German philosophers, which did not make itself generally intelligible, no adequate theory has 
been forthcoming, and hence that peculiar characteristic of our time, the scepticism of the 
best men’ (Green, 1906e: 124).  
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          A difference between German idealism and British empiricism is in their metaphysical 
views of the human condition with which Green concerned himself. The empiricist and 
naturalistic view of the human condition gradually became dominant in Britain and evolved 
into a hedonist and utilitarian theory of human life, as well as a positivist psychology (Green, 
1885b: 373-385; Green, 1906e: 117, 124). Contingently, the development of the 
Enlightenment within British empiricism, via Hume’s scepticism, formed another branch in 
Germany, where Kant’s critical philosophy transformed it. When his masterpiece the Critique 
of Pure Reason was first published in 1781, Kant remarked that it was Hume’s scepticism 
awakening him from his ‘dogmatic slumber’ (Kant, 2002: 57-60). Hume’s sceptical attitude 
towards the traditional rationalist metaphysics inspired Kant to formulate his own critical 
project. This was aimed at examining the boundary of reason in order to test the legitimacy of 
metaphysics as the foundation of human knowledge (Kant, 1999: 6; cf. Green, 1886a: 13-34). 
By virtue of this critical project, Kant therefore reconfigured the human condition based on 
the distinction between phenomena and noumena, with the unknowable noumena setting a 
boundary of human reason, which our sensibility and understanding cannot cross. What 
human beings can have knowledge of are phenomena that are, by reference to the dual self-
conscious activity, products of sensibility and understanding. Nevertheless, though Kant 
implied that sensibility and understanding are related and unified within a concept of ‘self-
consciousness’, he did not explicitly claim that self-consciousness was the unifying root of 
the dual human capabilities, but rather used it as a heuristic device for expounding his 
epistemology (Henrich, 2003: 37-45). It seems that the conception of the human condition, on 
the grounds of Kant’s critical project, indicates a constructive capability on the part of human 
beings, which potentially liberates us from the bondage of circumstances. However the 
assumptions of the unknowable noumena and the duality of sensibility and understanding still 
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maintain a substantial distinction that divides human nature into a duality, a dualism that 
troubles Green.   
          For Green, Kant’s dualism of phenomena and noumena was achieved by virtue of his 
distinction between ‘the constitution of a relation between feelings’ and ‘the conception of a 
relation between them’. It separated the order of nature from the unity of experience. The 
former is seen as beyond human agency and the latter is articulated via human agency 
(Green, 1886a: 25-30; cf. Green, 2003: 42-58; Dewey, 1890; Henrich, 2003: 46-52). With an 
intention to overcome the dualism of phenomena and noumena, Green therefore sought help 
from the German idealist philosophy which developed after Kant. The reason for this was 
that philosophy in Germany did not take the concept of ‘self-consciousness’ as merely a 
heuristic device, but conversely intended to build up a theory of self-consciousness which 
might offer a way out of Kant’s dualism. To be sure, the immediate development of German 
idealist philosophy, after Kant, struggled to develop a system of philosophy from a theory of 
self-consciousness. In this manner, a philosophy of subjectivity – inexplicable from Hume’s 
perspective – was gradually unfolded. It is as Henrich says: Kant ‘really gave only the 
introduction into the critical philosophy, leaving the task of development to his students’ 
(Henrich, 2003: 43). 
          The development of the task which was to complete the critical project started by Kant 
involved the efforts of three distinctive philosophers: Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), 
Friedrich W. J. Schelling (1775-1854), and G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831).14 Though Green’s 
intellectual relationship with Fichte and Schelling remains more obscure,15 it is nonetheless 
                                                
14 In fact, many other scholars and philosophers were involved in the development of critical philosophy in 
eighteenth-century Germany, such as J. G. Hamann, F. H. Jacobi, Moses Mendelssohn, K. L. Reinhold, J. G. 
Herder, Friedrich Hölderlin and G. E. Schulze (Beiser, 1987; Henrich, 2003). Nonetheless, due to my focus is 
on the intellectual context of Green’s practical philosophy here, I have confined my discussion to Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel. As to the development of German idealism from Kant through Fichte and Schelling to 
Hegel, see Seth, 1882; Beiser, 2002. 
15 It is worth pointing out that Nettleship demonstrated that one of the last books Green read was The Journals 
and Letters of Caroline Fox (1881) (Nettleship, 1906: cxlv), and in these letters and diaries, Fox had mentioned 
other British writers’ views of Fichte’s and Schelling’s writings, as well as offering her own perspective. 
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important to introduce their thoughts before going on to address Hegel’s work, for they paved 
the way for Hegel to establish a system of philosophy. With the ambition of overcoming 
Kant’s dualism, Fichte tried to work out a theory of self-consciousness as the foundation of 
an idealistic system of philosophy in his Wissenschaftslehre, The Science of Knowledge, 
between 1794 and 1814. However, Fichte’s work reverted to the danger of the dogmatic 
subjectivism found in Berkeley’s philosophy (Green, 1885a: 155-161), namely that nature 
and the external world are viewed as objects posited by the self, rather than things in 
themselves. Thus the existence of objective things, for Fichte, is nothing but an assumption 
made by the self. The objectivity accordingly is negated, whereas the absoluteness of the self 
is affirmed (Seth, 1882: 15-51; Seth, 1888: 39-73; Henrich, 2003: 246-276). In order to 
resolve the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity, Schelling learnt the lesson of Fichte 
and started from the idea of nature as a holistic organism constituted with everything in the 
universe. For him, nature was not an object posited by a subjective self, but rather the original 
identity of object and subject. Thus for Schelling nature is the unity from which all things in 
the universe are differential products (Dunham, Grant and Watson, 2011: 131-138). From 
nature to intelligence or from matter to mind: these are aspects of the self-differentiating 
process of the unifying nature. Moreover, based on this idea of nature, Schelling contested 
that self-consciousness was not the transcendental condition of the science of knowledge, but 
rather a domain of the unconsciousness. There is always an existing thing which is an object 
prior to self-consciousness. Nevertheless, in his view, the absolute identity of object and 
subject can only be realised in the consciousness of art via ‘intellectual intuition’ (Seth, 1882: 
52-67; Dunham, Grant and Watson, 2011: 129-143). This is a consciousness in which the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Nettleship also remarked that Green read more of Fichte in his later years (Nettleship, 1906: cxxv). Following 
these clues, the influences of Fichte on Green was noticed by Paul Harris and John Morrow (1986: 7) and 
contended by Alberto de Sanctis (2005: 43, 64-65, 139, 156, 166) and Colin Tyler (2010: 29-30; 2012: 7, 34, 
129-139, 244-245). In a different context, Leighton has also signified the impact of Fichte on Green (Leighton, 
2004: 135-142). Nevertheless, there is barely direct evidence in Green’s writings in terms of substantial proof 
which might identify the role of Fichte’s philosophy in Green’s thought, with the exception of one quotation in 
Prolegomena to Ethics (Green, 2003: 222). 
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distinction between nature and intelligence or matter and mind is once again obliterated. 
Under the influence of Schelling’s view, Hegel subsequently developed a systematic 
philosophy (Beiser, 1993). 
      Similarly to Schelling, Hegel contends that the subject and the object are not separate 
and independent from each other, but are rather interdependent within the development of the 
spirit. In this view, nature is a moment or phase through which spirit transcends its abstract 
subjectivity, moving into a higher and concrete stage by negating the negation of the object 
opposing the subject. This development is therefore a dialectical process in which the spirit 
passes through its subjective and objective phases, ultimately to return to itself. It is a journey 
of the spirit’s self-consciousness and self-completion, which, in Hegel’s view, embodies itself 
in the civil state and the entire world history (Harris, 1993; Pippin, 1993; cf. Seth, 1882: 68-
88; Dunham, Grant and Watson, 2011: 144-158). The process of the reunion of the spirit is 
thus to Hegel quite different from Schelling’s ‘intellectual intuition’; instead, it is a process of 
rational self-assertion through ‘sublation’ (Aufhebung). On the basis of this ontological view 
of the universe, the human condition manifests through the dialectical process of the 
immanent spirit. An individual person is driven by the spirit towards his or her self-
realisation through reconciling with external otherness, such as the natural world or other 
people. Human action is not an act performed by an individual isolated from other individuals 
and the world. It is rather an act performed in and through an interrelating whole in which the 
world and human beings are intertwined and ultimately moving constantly towards self-
realisation (Wempe, 2004: 25-44). 
      At this point, the critical project proposed by Kant turned into a comprehensive 
philosophical system through the efforts of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and formulated a 
markedly different view of the human condition in contrast with the empiricist and 
naturalistic perspectives. The idealistic view of the human condition indicates a constructive 
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dimension of human nature and conceives otherness, such as the natural world, as an 
indispensable part of an individual person, where the otherness does not determine the person, 
but is rather the necessary interactive object. The empiricist and naturalistic view of the 
human condition, on the other hand, deprives human beings of constructive ability and 
positions us as natural consequences of external circumstances, and, in this sense, we are 
determined by circumstances. Inheriting the idealistic view of the human condition, Green 
was highly critical of the empiricist and naturalistic view and keen to undermine its influence 
on the development of social and political philosophy in nineteenth-century Britain, where 
the empiricist and naturalistic view of the human condition evolved into a hedonistic and 
utilitarian theory of human action. In this case the motive of each action was considered to 
follow the principle of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain and ultimately the maximisation of 
utility. An individual person was thus determined by sensations, experiences, feelings and 
desires; reason only functions in accordance with the hedonistic and utilitarian principle. On 
the basis of this conception of the human person, the claims for negative freedom and non-
interference in government merely promoted the idea of the self-interested individual. 
Individuals had to suffer the consequences of their own choices. Green, on the contrary, 
aimed to develop a different view of human beings on the basis of the idealistic conception of 
the human condition, and to establish an argument for justifying his claim for state action.16 
      The first major achievement of Green’s work accordingly is his ‘Introductions to 
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature’ in 1874. Nonetheless, Green did not accept the idealistic 
view of the human condition without critical reservation. Between the 1870s and 1880s, he 
continued his critical studies on both empiricism and idealism. This included his lectures on 
Kant’s philosophy (from 1874 to 1879), reviews of Edward Caird’s and John Caird’s books 
in 1877 and 1880, and the further reviews of Herbert Spencer’s and G. H. Lewes’s empiricist 
                                                
16 As indicated before, the argument is about Green’s positive idea of individual freedom and ethical conception 
of citizen participation which I will consider in subsequent chapters. 
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psychology, between 1877 and 1881. In particular, Edward Caird and Henry Sidgwick both 
identified Green’s dissatisfaction with Hegel’s philosophy. In his preface for the book 
dedicated to Green, Essays in Philosophical Criticism (1883), Caird wrote that ‘[t]o Hegel he 
latterly stood in a somewhat doubtful relation; for while, in the main, he accepted Hegel’s 
criticism of Kant, and held also that something like Hegel’s idealism must be the result of the 
development of Kantian principles rightly understood, he yet regarded the actual Hegelian 
system with a certain suspicion as something too ambitious, or, at least, premature. “It must 
all be done over again,” he once said, meaning that the first development of idealistic thought 
in Germany had in some degree anticipated what can be the secure result only of wider 
knowledge and more complete reflexion’ (Caird, 1883: 5). In Sidgwick’s 1901 essay ‘The 
Philosophy of T. H. Green’, Sidgwick noted, ‘I remember writing to him after a visit to 
Berlin in 1870, and expressing a desire to “get away from Hegel”; he replied that it seemed to 
him one might as well try to “get away from thought itself”. I remember, on the other hand, 
that in the last philosophical talk I had with him, he said, “I looked into Hegel the other day, 
and found it a strange Wirrwarr”; – the sentence startled me; and the unexpected German 
word for “chaos” or “muddle” fixed it firmly in my mind’ (Sidgwick, 1901: 19). That is to 
say, though Green assimilated the philosophical ideas of German idealism against British 
empiricism, he nonetheless learnt them in a critical way.17 In addition, Green’s leaning on 
Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, was also an important factor in his development of a 
systematic practical philosophy. 
      The influence of Greek philosophy on Green have been widely recognised by scholars 
(Richter, 1964: 200-201; Vincent, 1986a: 10-13; Thomas, 1987: 36-39; Simhony, 1993b; 
2001; Brink, 2003: 44-55; Wempe, 2004: 49-54; Tyler, 2010: 26-27). As W. L. Newman 
(1834-1923) recalled, Green greatly admired Aristotle’s Politics (Tyler, 2008: 27). He also 
                                                
17 Green’s critical views of Kant and Hegel can also be found in his reviews of Edward Caird’s, John Caird’s 
and John Watson’s books. See Green, 1906f; Green, 1906g; Green, 1906h. 
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appreciated Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethical and political theory of citizenship and the state as 
forming ‘the foundation of all true theory of “rights”’ (Green, 1986a: 36-37). Further, 
Green’s own mentor, Benjamin Jowett, had a considerable reputation for his abilities in 
Greek studies (Richter, 1964: 52-63; Turner, 1981: 414-446). Under Jowett’s guidance, 
though Green once declined the suggestion of editing a new version of Thucydides, he did 
contribute to an edition of Nicomachean Ethics (Nettleship, 1906: xxxvii; Wempe, 2004: 51). 
In sum it is clear that Green’s practical philosophy was influenced considerably by the 
Greeks. Ritchie’s comments on Green’s philosophical thought are worth noting here: ‘[i]f we 
are to connect him with any particular names of philosophers, it would be least misleading to 
say that he corrected Kant by Aristotle and Aristotle by Kant’, and ‘this is just what might 
have been said of Hegel himself’ (Ritchie, 2004: 168). However, Green did not accept Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s teaching uncritically. In the 1866 article ‘The Philosophy of Aristotle’, he 
made some weighty criticisms of Plato’s and Aristotle’s metaphysical and moral treatments 
by appropriating Hegel’s philosophical ideas (Green, 1906d). In addition in his 1867 lectures 
on moral and political philosophy, he also explored the status of the Greek philosophy in the 
history of moral and political philosophy from a Hegelian perspective (Green, 1867a). This 
suggests that, while Greek philosophy was an important intellectual resource for Green, as 
Frank Turner has noted, ‘the nineteenth-century exploration of Greek antiquity constantly 
manifested the wider intellectual life of the day and opens the latter for more complete 
consideration. Writing about Greece was in part a way for the Victorians to write about 
themselves’ (Turner, 1981: 8). For Green, as for other Victorians, Greek philosophy was like 
a mirror: through inspecting it, they were reflecting on the issues and queries in nineteenth-
century British society. In other words, it is important to bear in mind that the issues Green 
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dealt with were the questions of his age, whereas his diagnosis was often predicated on the 
influences of the Enlightenment philosophy.18 
 
5. Conclusion 
It has been argued that Green’s considerations of social and political issues are related to his 
moral and ethical ideas. Further his considerations of moral and ethical issues are correlative 
with his ontological view of the human condition and indeed human agency. His thinking on 
these diverse issues evolved into a philosophical system which includes metaphysics, ethics 
and politics, with the centre of the system concentrating on the ontology of human freedom 
and equality. Accordingly, to Green, the social and political issues arising in nineteenth-
century British society, which led to debate about the role of the state in liberal democracy, 
cannot be separated from metaphysical and moral controversies. A true reformer, for Green, 
has to rise above the atmosphere of his circumstances, ‘on which he throws the light of his 
own being, penetrating even to those who still wander beneath it’ (Green, 1906a: 10). 
Green’s ideas became a vital part of the very foundation of nineteenth-century liberal 
political philosophy, identifying Enlightenment philosophy as the root of contemporary 
issues. In this sense, Green was a critical advocate of a particular understanding of the 
Enlightenment. In the following chapter, after a preliminary view of Green’s practical 
philosophy and its general context discussed above, I will begin my exploration of his 
practical philosophy, starting with his metaphysical treatment of the human condition. This 
will aim to show how the concept of self-consciousness becomes the primary foundation of 
his philosophical system. 
 
 
                                                
18 As to the wide influences on Green’s thought, can also see Tyler, 1997: 4-7; Tyler, 2010: 24-34. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A METAPHYSICAL TREATMENT OF HUMAN AGENCY: 
GREEN’S CONCEPT OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been suggested that the critical issues in nineteenth-century British society were, in 
Green’s view, related to the metaphysical ideas and moral claims developed by 
Enlightenment philosophy. In order to establish a comprehensive and adequate treatment of 
these issues, Green concentrates on expounding a different metaphysical notion of the human 
condition from the one advocated by the mainstream Enlightenment, and in particular British 
empiricism, by adopting German idealist philosophy. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore that metaphysical foundation of Green’s philosophical system, with the focus on an 
ontological idea of human agency immanent in his metaphysics of knowledge. This is human 
consciousness understood as free agency. 
          Regarding the function of Green’s metaphysics in his thought, by and large, there are 
five perspectives among scholars. Firstly, scholars like Ann Cacoullos or Geoffrey Thomas 
conceive Green’s metaphysics as a dispensable part of his philosophical thought. For 
Cacoullos, Green’s philosophical contribution cannot be taken from his metaphysical 
doctrine, but his ethical arguments, in particular his metaphysics, may potentially undermine 
the validity of his ethical claims (Cacoullos, 1974: 34). Thomas also remarks that ‘the ethical 
theory and moral psychology which Green offers do not really depend for their interest on the 
ambitious metaphysics of PE, Book I’ (Thomas, 1987: 123). He indicates that Green’s 
metaphysics was used to justify the ideas of free will and moral responsibility against 
naturalistic determinism. But to establish that justification, for Thomas, does not require 
 
 
42 
Green’s ‘full-blown metaphysics’ (Thomas, 1987: 150). In a similar vein, Brink suggests that 
‘Green’s theory of moral personality and his claims about the role of the common good in 
self-realization, rather than his views about objectivity or epistemology, provide the resources 
for his best defence of the sort of corporate agency required to maintain extreme harmony’ 
(Brink, 2003: 66). For Brink, Green’s metaphysics and epistemology, unlike his moral 
psychology, cannot provide a consistent justification for his social and political philosophy. 
With a subtle distinction, Maria Dimova-Cookson contends that Green’s philosophical 
thought does not require the metaphysics of knowledge that he developed in the first book of 
Prolegomena to Ethics, it was not only unnecessary for Green’s philosophical argument but 
also directed him into a discussion which he did not need, that is, the discussion of the origins 
of nature. To Dimova-Cookson, while that discussion is highly contestable, Green’s 
metaphysics of moral action in the second book, offers a compelling explanation of the 
spiritual nature of human action. Hence, ‘[i]t is not that Green does not need metaphysics, but 
that he does not need metaphysics of knowledge’ (Dimova-Cookson, 2003b: 140; cf. 
Vincent, 2006: 98, n. 78).  
          Different again from these interpretations of Green’s metaphysics, the third perspective 
suggests that Green’s metaphysics implicates theological residues. Green’s contemporaries, 
such as Henry Sidgwick (1884) or A. J. Balfour (1884), argued that Green was concerned to 
philosophise theological notions in order to secularise Christian morality, creating a 
humanistic and spiritualistic moral doctrine. Nonetheless, in their views, Green’s 
philosophising work eventually failed. While Green expounded a metaphysical idea of the 
eternal consciousness, referring to God in his Prolegomena to Ethics, he could not make a 
consistent philosophical case for the relation of human consciousness with that eternal 
consciousness, namely, the one he claimed to be manifest in history (McGilvary, 1901: 492, 
495; cf. Laurie, 1897: 130). Along with this view, Richter (1964), Vincent and Plant (1984), 
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Reardon (1986), Leighton (2004), and Armour (2006) also recognise Green’s philosophical 
thought, especially his metaphysics, contains theological notions that are assimilated with 
nineteenth-century British social ideas. But they do not conceptualise this theological aspect 
of Green’s metaphysics as a failure; on the contrary, the theological aspect and the 
metaphysics are considered as indispensable for the development of Green’s moral and 
political philosophy. Sharing the view that Green’s metaphysics is indispensable for his 
moral and political philosophy, some scholars try to indicate an ontological view of the 
human person in Green’s metaphysical and theological ideas. For example, Peter Nicholson 
(2006) explicates a minimal interpretation of the eternal consciousness that indicates enabling 
social convictions for human action. Similarly, Vincent suggests an immanent reading of 
Green’s metaphysics such that ‘the philosopher can try to grasp what is and can discuss the 
relative merits of the various moral formula (as Green put it) as a way of enabling the moral 
agent, but it still remains sceptical of any full-blown injunctive argument’ (Vincent, 2006: 
99-100). He suggests, further, that Green’s metaphysics is a social epistemology proposing ‘a 
more multifaceted, anthropological view of the self’ which is ‘fluid and developing in the 
context of ordinary human conventions, social practices, and historical circumstances’ 
(Vincent, 2006: 103-104). While Simhony (1991a), Wempe (2004) and Tyler (1997; 2010) 
also develop an interpretation of Green’s metaphysics respectively, which is related to a 
conception of the human condition, their interpretations do not underscore the role of 
theological notions in Green’s thought.19 
                                                
19 In her ‘Idealist Organism: Beyond Holism and Individualism’ (1991a), Simhony develops an idealistic social 
ontology that ‘cannot be adequately viewed as either an aggregate of wholly independent individuals, nor a 
supra-personal entity with its own laws, its own development, its own life independent of its individual 
members’ (Simhony, 1991a: 522). It is a relational society in which ‘individuals help to create their own 
interpretation of a social reality which itself is the outcome of prior interaction; or, social unity which is 
constitutive of individuals, exists and operates only in and through those individuals which it binds together’ 
(Smhony, 1991a: 522). Wempe, on the other hand, introduces Hegel’s doctrine of the self-assertion of reason to 
explicate Green’s metaphysical and ontological ideas of the human condition (Wempe, 2004: 25-34, 92-105). 
And Tyler establishes a two-fold elucidation of Green’s metaphysics that is on the one side about a self-
interventionist theory of free will and on the other side about a spiritual determinism doctrine (Tyler, 1997: 
chap. 2; Tyler, 2010: chaps. 5-6).   
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          In this chapter I will pay attention to the ontological argument underlying Green’s 
metaphysics. This, I argue, indicates a specific account of human agency and is the 
foundation of his moral and social philosophy. However Green’s metaphysics does not, as 
some commentators indicate, implicate a determinist doctrine. In the first section, I will 
briefly discuss Green’s critical reviews of empiricist psychology as the starting-point from 
which he reconsidered questions of contemporary philosophy. Afterwards, I will consider 
Green’s elaboration of the idealistic theory of knowledge, which contains a notion of the 
human condition by which he delimits a concept of human agency. In this manner, I will 
consider different views of Green’s determinism and argue that even though Green’s 
philosophical language may lead to some confusion, his metaphysics is by no means a 
deterministic doctrine. 
 
2. Green’s critique of empiricist psychology and naturalistic determinism 
Green’s well-known philosophical work, ‘Introductions to Hume’s Treatise of Human 
Nature’, was first published with T. H. Grose’s new edition of Hume’s A Treatise of Human 
Nature in 1874. In it, Green articulates a philosophical context which embraces the work of 
Bacon and Descartes, through Locke, Berkeley and Hume, to Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel 
(Green, 1885a: 2-4). To him, while it is common to find Locke and Hume considered as 
empiricists rather than rationalists (such as Leibnitz, Kant or Hegel), yet they share a rational 
spirit with other philosophers in the sense that ‘the spirit ..., however baffled and forced into 
inconsistent admissions, is still governed by the faith that all things may ultimately be 
understood’ (Green, 1885a: 5). On the grounds of that faith, the nature of human 
understanding is the fundamental question of their philosophies. Interestingly, in order to 
answer the question, Locke and Hume have not begun from the point of investigating the 
nature of understanding per se, but from determining the nature of the object of human 
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knowledge. By presuming the philosophical method to be introspection, they believe that the 
object of human knowledge, on the one hand, is what we observe with our minds, and on the 
other hand, the object observed is an external thing making an impression on our mind. The 
primary issue of Locke and Hume’s approach, therefore, is to explain how the external thing 
can impress and be observed by us, and be transformed into an idea. Nonetheless, by virtue of 
that view, human knowledge does not start from our active knowing actions. Rather it starts 
from external interventions, and is a process of discovery by empirical observations and 
rational inferences, which is in order to identify the nature of the corresponding external 
world. However, in Green’s view, this empirical inquiry of human understanding and human 
knowledge confuses two essentially different questions: one is metaphysical, ‘what is the 
simplest element of knowledge’, and the other is physiological as well as psychological, 
‘what are the conditions in the individual human organism in virtue of which it becomes a 
vehicle of knowledge’ (Green, 1885a: 19). 
          Learning from Kant’s philosophical criticism as an approach to investigating human 
understanding, for Green, philosophers proceed to the investigation by delimiting the 
necessary logical conditions for human understanding and for human knowledge to be 
possible. Kant’s critical method, as David George Ritchie (1853-1903) defines it, is to 
‘discover the a priori element in knowledge, i.e., that element which, though known to us 
only in connection with sense-experience, cannot be dependent upon sense-experience for its 
validity, is the business of a philosophical theory of knowledge’ (Ritchie, 1893: 14). 
Additionally, it ‘may logically precede any or all of the special sciences, although it is only 
the advance of science that has suggested the need of such an examination’ (Ritchie, 1893: 
15). A philosophical enquiry of the nature of human understanding accordingly does not 
begin from the speculation concerning empirical objects of human knowledge, but from the 
metaphysical and logical ‘analysis of the conditions which render this experience possible’ 
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(Green, 2003: 19; cf. Tyler, 2003a: 130). Nevertheless, empiricist psychologists seem to 
ignore the metaphysical and logical question, and simply consider their primary task to 
establish how human psychological cognition functions. But, in Green’s view, that ‘inquiry 
into the subjective process through which the individual comes by his knowledge can have 
only an illusive result, for it will be assuming an answer to a question of which the bearings 
have not been considered, and will therefore be at the mercy of crude metaphor and analogy 
in it assumption’ (Green, 1885b: 377). On the other hand, by adopting Kant’s philosophical 
criticism, Green excavates three logical factors of understanding and knowledge: the object, 
the subject and the logical relation between them. The object of knowledge covers every 
different thing what we intend to understand, such as the natural world, artificial works, the 
human body or human action. The subject of knowledge refers to us, the human beings – the 
ones who perform the act of knowing and understanding. As to the relation between the 
object and the subject, Green indicates, there seems to be an agreement amongst modern 
philosophers that there ‘are certain accepted doctrines of modern philosophy – e.g., that 
knowledge is only of phenomena, not of anything unrelated to consciousness, and that object 
and subject are correlative’ (Green, 2003: 14). The object and the subject of knowledge are 
considered as correlative with each other for they are both related to consciousness. Yet there 
are different views as to how consciousness makes the object and the subject of knowledge 
related. For empiricists, the role of consciousness is taken as an actually existing medium and 
is an important empirical object for psychology and physiology to study; but for Green, 
consciousness is a concept wherein the logical condition is presupposed to make the relation 
between the object and the subject intelligible (Ferreira, 2003: 48-49). At this point, as Seth 
comments, the meaning of ‘consciousness’ is ambiguous. This is because the state of 
consciousness can be considered as either a psychological occurrence or a logical condition. 
It is therefore open to the possibility of confusion in relation to the psychological study of the 
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human cognition process and the metaphysical study of logical conditions in which human 
understanding is possible (Seth, 1883: 15-16; cf. Haldane, 1883).20 
      This confusion is the focus of Green’s critique of his contemporary empiricist 
psychologists: namely, that they confuse the object of knowledge as a logical concept with a 
self-existent thing. In ‘Mr. Spencer on the Relation of Subject and Object’ (1877) Green 
contends that empiricist psychologists misconceive the relation between the object and the 
subject. He claims Spencer ‘ascribes to the object, which in truth is nothing without the 
subject, an independent reality, and then supposes it gradually to produce certain qualities in 
the subject, of which the existence is in truth necessary to the possibility of those qualities in 
the object which are supposed to produce them’ (Green, 1885b: 388). The object of 
knowledge is taken as a self-existent reality impressing its qualities onto the subject of 
knowledge which through the deliverance of consciousness is then represented in the human 
mind. That relation between the object and the subject is conceived ‘as antithetically opposed 
divisions of the entire assemblage of manifestations of the unknowable’, and is external and 
has mutually independence (Green, 1885b: 385; cf. Spencer, 1873: 311). However, though 
psychologists have provided an explanation of how these two mutually independent entities 
can be related through consciousness and conceived qualities, this explanation in Green’s 
view is merely a deceptive assumption rather than a reasonable account (Green, 1885b: 386-
402). The psychologists presuppose the existence of consciousness and the qualities that are 
used to justify their empirical approach, while the presupposition per se cannot be empirically 
verified.  
      However, in terms of the empirical psychologists’ view, the distinction between the 
object and the subject, the natural world and human beings, is not merely reasonable but a 
                                                
20 Seth’s original point here is to indicate that when understanding transcendental philosophy as related to a 
psychology, the Kantian philosophical criticism as a criticism of conceptions is easily confused with a criticism of 
faculties. Nonetheless, in Kant’s view, rational psychology and empirical psychology are different. See Schurman, 
1898: 135-136; Ameriks, 1992: 259; Hatfield, 1992. 
 
 
48 
truism. Instead, Green’s criticism is undertaken on the basis of the denial of the existence of 
an independent reality outside the human mind which is false and against common sense. In 
‘Professor Green as a Critic’ (1880), Hodgson contends that the existence of a real world 
apart from human consciousness is the truism ‘which every step in Science takes for granted, 
and which no metaphysician ever for a moment succeeded in expelling from consciousness’ 
(Hodgson, 2004: 117). To him, to presuppose the existence of a real world outside the human 
mind is common sense, whereas it seems that idealists like Green refuse to accept it 
(Hodgson, 2004: 116-118; cf. Spencer, 2004: 134-135). However, Hodgson’s claim that the 
existence of an external world is a truism is exactly the point of Green’s criticism, which 
indicates that empiricist psychologists make such presuppositions without realising that this 
is contrary to their empirical methodology. When Hodgson asserts that the existence of a 
world outside the human mind is a truism, he is confirming Green’s criticism rather than 
refuting it. Ironically, G. H. Lewes also confirmed Green’s criticism, saying that a 
psychologist ‘has only direct knowledge of a change of feeling following some other change; 
he infers that this change originated in the action of some external cause, infers that it is 
accompanied by a neural process’ (Lewes, 1876: 159). The existence of an external world is 
thus an inference which psychologists make but cannot verify.  
      Moreover, Green does not, as Hodgson claims, deny the existence of a real world. As 
Green says, ‘[i]t certainly does not depend on ourselves – on any power which we can 
suppose it rests with our will to exert or withhold – whether sensations shall occur to us in 
this or that order of succession, with this or that degree of intensity’ (Green, 2003: 52). He 
does acknowledge that there might be a self-existent world as the cause of our sensations. But 
pertaining to a theory of knowledge, a self-existent world is not the primary logical condition 
under which human knowledge is possible. To be sure, idealistic philosophy does not deny 
the existence of a natural world, but devotes itself to delimiting the necessary logical 
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conditions for the natural world as the object of human knowledge to be intelligible. For 
Green, true idealism ‘trusts, not to a guess about what is beyond experience, but to analysis of 
what is within it’ (Green, 1885c: 449). But to conceive an external world as independent from 
human experience is going beyond experiences, while the externality of a world is only 
possible in consciousness as a conception formulated by the activity of human mind (Green, 
2003: 69-70): the object of knowledge and the subject of knowledge cannot be independent 
from each other but are correlated within consciousness. As Mander points out, ‘[s]uch an 
idealism we might denote “conceptual” as opposed to epistemological. What Green is 
offering us is an analysis of the concept of “reality” and, whatever may be said about our 
knowledge of reality, our conception of reality is not one of something fenced in by our 
current awareness of it’ (Mander, 2011: 102) (italics in original). 
      To sum up, Green believes that it is the confusion of psychology and metaphysics 
which has led empiricist psychology to advocate a false view of the human condition and 
thence a misleading moral and political philosophy. For him, that false conviction rests ‘on a 
metaphysical mistake, on an attempt to abstract the individual from his universal essence, i.e. 
from the relations embodied in habitudes and institutions which make him what he is; and 
that thus to unclothe man, if it were possible, would be to animalise him’ (Green, 1906e: 116-
117). At the time that empirical philosophy prevailed in Britain, there came to be a practical 
conviction among the general public that ‘I always do what pleases me because it pleases me, 
and it is impossible that I should do otherwise’ (Green, 1906e: 111). An individual whose 
actions and thoughts are delimited by impressions and feelings derived from an external 
world is, on the one side, separated from all other things but him or herself as an atom, and on 
the other hand, is a creature who is regulated and determined by the laws of nature, and is not 
far from an animal. In order to correct this metaphysical error and save moral and political 
philosophy, Green therefore developed a relational ontology of human consciousness. 
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3. An idealistic theory of knowledge and human consciousness as free agency 
Between the 1870s and 1880s, Green was trying to establish a new metaphysical treatment of 
the human condition by critically reconsidering both empiricist and idealistic metaphysics. 
He commented that ‘[t]he current theories about soul and mind have got too far apart from, if 
not ahead of, the question which Hume (in effect) raised and Kant took up, to be brought 
back to it by any inquiry into the antecedents which rendered it inevitable, or by any 
exposition of the logical obligations which it imposed on the next generation, but which 
English psychology has hitherto failed to recognise’ (Green, 1885b: 374). He therefore 
resumed the task of modern philosophy proposed by Hume and Kant. He conceived the work 
of metaphysics as delimiting the necessary logical conditions of human knowledge, though 
‘there can be neither proof nor disproof of such necessity’ (Green, 2003: 18). Nevertheless, 
while he contested empiricist philosophy’s founding on a false metaphysics, as indicated 
above, he also intended to advance Kant’s achievements in idealistic metaphysics. His 
contention was that Kant had not solved the dualism of the object and the subject. 
      While the concepts of experience and the existence of a real world are not repudiated 
by the idealist philosophy, there remains a dualism in Kant’s metaphysics in that he makes a 
sharp distinction between the object and the subject. Kant claimed that the source of feelings 
is the unknowable things-in-themselves and thought develops via human reason. However the 
things-in-themselves, as unknowable, subsist in an antithetical relationship with human 
reason. Kant therefore maintained the duality of the self-existent world and human mind. 
Regarding this dualism in Kant’s philosophy, Green contended that it stems from Kant’s 
failure to apprehend that ‘the constitution of a relation between feelings’ and ‘the conception 
of a relation between them’ are not two different functions of human consciousness, but one 
act of the consciousness (Green, 1886a: 25, 28-30). For Green, by conceiving that the 
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constitution of a relation is from external things and the conception of relation is from human 
reason, Kant concealed his actual philosophical achievement. The distinction between the 
object and the subject is implied in the idea of thought per se as two complementary factors 
in the whole of self-consciousness. As Green argued, ‘thought cannot be conscious of itself 
except in distinction from an object’ (Green, 1886b: 181, 182; cf. Green, 1885b: 400). By 
identifying Kant’s failure, Green contended that feelings and thoughts are ‘inseparable and 
mutually dependent in the consciousness for which the world of experience exists, 
inseparable and mutually dependent in the constitution of the facts which form the object of 
that consciousness’ (Green, 2003: 55). However, from another perspective, Green’s 
metaphysics of knowledge seems to surrender objectivity to the constructive power of human 
consciousness, for he claims on a number of occasions that the world of experience exists in 
consciousness. 
      Nonetheless, as indicated, Green did not repudiate the existence of a natural world 
outside of human awareness. Rather he intended to delimit the necessary logical conditions 
for human knowledge. While he claimed that the distinction of the object and the subject 
stems from self-consciousness, he went on to explore how transient sensations and feelings 
can be the object of knowledge. Since the main attribute of sensations is appearing in time, 
which means that the sensation we perceive at this moment will vanish in the next second, 
there has to be a combining agency to detain successive sensations and to present them 
simultaneously for human understanding to be possible. And that agency in Green’s view was 
human intelligent consciousness: 
 
With such a combining agency we are familiar as our intelligence. It is through it that 
the sensation of the present moment takes a character from comparison with the 
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sensation of a moment ago, and that the occurrence, consisting in the transition from 
one to the other, is presented to us (Green, 2003: 33). 
 
Hence, it is ‘the action upon successive sensations of a consciousness which holds them in 
relation, and which therefore cannot itself be before or after them, or exist as a succession at 
all’ that sensations and feelings can be intelligible as the starting-point of human knowledge 
(Green, 2003: 81). Yet it is implied that there is a concept of relation as a logical condition 
for sensations and feelings to be intelligible experiences as well (Green, 2003: 33-37, 62-78; 
Mander, 2006: 196-201). For Green, as for Locke, each sensation or feeling will remain 
indeterminate and unknowable without comparison, but by comparison an idea of relation 
among sensations is constituted. In other words, for sensations and feelings to be intelligible 
objects of human knowledge, logically there has to be a consciousness presenting them 
simultaneously and constituting a relation among them. For Green, this meant delineating the 
necessary logical conditions for human knowledge to be possible and intelligible, and did not 
entail denying the existence of a natural world. 
          However, though Green’s metaphysics of knowledge did not refute the existence of an 
external world outside the human mind, the truth or the falsity of knowledge was not 
dependent upon whether an idea corresponded with the external world or not. In the first 
place, our consciousness of the external world is derived from the act of self-consciousness, 
and it would be tautological if we asserted that the criterion of truth is the external world.21 
For Green, objectivity subsisted in relation to a consciousness: it is ‘through [this] ... there is 
for us an objective world; through it that we conceive an order of nature, with the unity of 
which we must reconcile our interpretations of phenomena, if they are to be other than 
                                                
21 The so-called correspondence theory of truth, which empiricists and naturalists generally adopt, maintains that 
knowledge as the work of human mind is not real and its truth or falsity is dependent on whether it corresponds 
to the objective world or not. Nonetheless, this theory of truth is in opposition to the idealistic understanding of 
the truth, a coherence theory of truth. For the discussion about these two theories of truth and its relation to 
idealism, see Boucher and Vincent, 2012: 38-42. 
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“subjective” illusions’ (Green, 2003: 18) (italic in original). Moreover, as Green indicated 
here, the distinction between subjective illusion and objective truth lies in how to ‘reconcile’ 
our different and diverse conceptions of the external world. 22  While the contents of 
knowledge comprise the relations among diverse experiences and ideas, the truth or the 
falsity of knowledge in Green’s view was dependent on whether those relations constitute a 
coherent system. The criterion for judging the system is coherent or not is an idea of a single 
and unalterable order of relations. As he holds,  
 
The terms “real” and “objective”, then, have no meaning except for a consciousness 
which presents its experiences to itself as determined by relations, and at the same time 
conceives a single and unalterable order of relations determining them, with which its 
temporary presentation, as each experience occurs, of the relations determining it may 
be contrasted. (Green, 2003: 17) 
 
For him, the idea of a single and unalterable order of relations is ‘the presupposition of all our 
enquiry into the real nature of appearances’ (Green, 2003: 31). It is the reference against 
which we consider whether the relations between an individual experience and other 
experiences are unalterable or not. Nonetheless, ‘[t]here may always remain unascertained 
conditions which may render the relation between an appearance and such conditions of it as 
we know, liable to change’ (Green, 2003: 31). That idea of a single and unalterable order of 
relations is accordingly a regulative principle. It enables us to reconcile experiences and ideas 
into a coherent system in which each experience or idea is interlocked with others (Tyler, 
                                                
22 The concept of reconciliation here is related to the idea of the truth and indicates a danger when Green’s 
metaphysics evolves into ethics and politics; that a person’s self-realisation is in relation to his idea of the true 
self and is about the reconciliation of his reason with will, while self-realisation and reconciliation are also 
correlative with the composition of a political society and the employment of political powers. In this sense, the 
concept of reconciliation is in relation to truth and the power and is the reason for Isaiah Berlin’s claim that 
Green’s idealistic metaphysics has the potential to lead liberal politics towards totalitarianism. Nonetheless, I 
will argue that Green avoided that danger. See my discussions in chapter four and chapter six. 
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2010: 60-65; Tyler, 2012: 10-11). In Green’s view, it also indicated that if a related system of 
ideas was more complete than others in the sense that its colligation explains more 
phenomena and contains more ideas and experiences as a coherent whole, this system would 
be truer than the others (Green, 1886c: 295). That is, Green did not build human knowledge 
on mere subjective perspectives, but rather a coherence theory of truth.23 Hence, while Green 
elevated the constructive ability of the human mind and claimed that the object of knowledge, 
such as the natural world or sensations, was conceived and constituted by human 
consciousness, he did not argue that human knowledge is purely subjective. By referring to a 
coherence theory of truth, Green believed that he could determine the truth or the falsity of 
human knowledge. At this point, therefore, by refuting the notion of the human condition 
implicated in empiricist philosophy and in Kant’s misconceived metaphysics, Green 
developed an idea of the human condition in which human beings are not determined and 
regulated by natural circumstances, but instead are capable of conceiving and transforming 
the circumstances by reference to ‘self-consciousness’. We are our own ‘free causes’. We are 
not conditioned or determined by an outward or external world (Green, 2003: 85). However, 
when Green remarked that there is an intelligent consciousness ‘implied in the existence of 
the world; but what it is we only know through its so far acting in us as to enable us, however 
partially and interruptedly, to have knowledge of a world or an intelligent experience’ 
(Green, 2003: 58), he then proposed the idea of an eternal consciousness. This appears to 
signify a consciousness not only different from, but directing human consciousness towards 
the end determined by it, concealing human free agency once again. 
 
4. Criticisms of Green’s determinism 
                                                
23 A classical elucidation of the coherence theory of truth is H. H. Joachim’s The Nature of Truth: an essay 
(1906). That the truth is an organic unity or significant whole ‘such that all its constituent elements reciprocally 
involve one another, or reciprocally determine one another's being as contributory features in a single concrete 
meaning’ (Joachim, 1906: 66). Nonetheless, Bertrand Russell is against Joachim’s account for the truth. See 
Russell, ‘On the Nature of Truth’ (1906). 
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To Green, the empiricist account of the external relation between the subject and the object 
implies that human beings (as the subject) are restrained and conditioned by an external 
world. We do not have the free agency to construct our unique characteristics on the basis of 
our will. It is also argued that the human condition is therefore prescribed by natural laws; 
however, if we have full knowledge of these laws, we can have the knowledge by which to 
achieve happiness (Green, 2003: 3-11). Against this naturalistic and deterministic view of the 
human condition, Green developed a metaphysical account of the human condition in which 
the world and each object of human knowledge is constituted by human consciousness. By 
virtue of such an account, he therefore restored human agency, moving away from 
naturalistic determinism. However, when he concluded his metaphysics of knowledge with a 
spiritual principle, which indicates a consciousness that ‘not only presents related objects to 
itself, but at once renders them objects and unites them in relation to each other by this act of 
presentation; and which is single throughout the experience’ (Green, 2003: 37), it seems that 
he depicted a different consciousness that was subtly distinct from humans’. With respect to 
that consciousness, Green further remarked that ‘[w]e must hold then that there is a 
consciousness for which the relations of fact, that form the object of our gradually attained 
knowledge, already and eternally exist; and that the growing knowledge of the individual is a 
progress towards this consciousness’ (Green, 2003: 80). Further, ‘[h]uman action is only 
explicable by the action of an eternal consciousness, which uses them as its organs and 
reproduces itself through them’ (Green, 2003: 93). It is then clear that Green employs a 
concept of ‘eternal consciousness’, and this eternal consciousness seems to be an invisible 
being behind the world directing humanity to the realisation of its end.24  At this point, 
                                                
24 Green admittedly employs different terms to signify the conception that ‘the eternal consciousness’. For 
example, when he criticises Locke’s empirical philosophy, he remarks that ‘[t]aking for his method the 
imaginary process of “looking into his own breast”, instead of the analysis of knowledge and morality, he could 
not find the eternal self which knowledge and morality pre-suppose’ (Green, 1885a: 115) (italic added). In his 
lectures on Kant’s metaphysics of knowledge and on logic, he uses different terms, such as ‘eternal self’, 
‘eternal subject’ or ‘eternal mind’, to refer to the logical presupposition of knowledge and morality (see Green, 
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Green’s metaphysical treatment of the human condition seems to be lapsing into a distinct 
form of determinism, which various commentators have criticised and discussed.  
          Pertaining to Green’s determinism, commentators have elaborated at least three 
different kinds of argument: a rational determinism, a theological determinism and a spiritual 
determinism. I will elucidate these deterministic interpretations of Green’s metaphysics 
briefly in sequence. The first kind of deterministic reading of Green is not closely related to 
his idea of the eternal consciousness, but is related rather to the rationalistic inclination of his 
idealism. Ben Wempe, in his T. H. Green’s Theory of Positive Freedom, argues that while 
Green contends that there is an eternal and unalterable system of relations by reference to 
which we can differentiate the truth and falsity of human knowledge, his metaphysics of 
knowledge implies accordingly ‘an essentially closed and therefore a priori conception of 
human knowledge’ (Wempe, 2004: 105; cf. 102-104). Human knowledge in this sense is 
predetermined by a presupposed eternal and unalterable system of relations. Meanwhile, 
following her criticism of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Dimova-Cookson also claims 
that Green makes an argument, in his theory of knowledge, that the existence of reality is 
constituted and predetermined by a doctrine of ‘pure thought’ (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 31-
32; Dimova-Cookson, 2003b: 140-143). For Green, as for Kant, there is a sharp distinction 
between feelings and thought, and this leads to the supposition that we cannot have any 
knowledge independent of rational categories which predetermine our perceptions and 
conceptions of the reality and then our behaviour (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 27-53). 
According to Wempe and Dimova-Cookson, therefore, Green’s metaphysics of knowledge 
contains a rational determinism. This embodies the idea of an a priori concept, that is an 
                                                                                                                                                  
1886a: 28-29; Green, 1886c: 178-179, 182). In the Prolegomena to Ethics, meanwhile, Green also utilises the 
term ‘eternal intelligence’ once to indicate the presupposition ‘realised in the related facts of the world, or as a 
system of related facts rendered possible by such an intelligence, partially and gradually reproduces itself in us, 
communicating piece-meal, but in inseparable correlation, understanding and the facts understood, experience 
and the experience world’ (Green, 2003: 41). Discussions in relation to the idea of the eternal consciousness are 
not only confined to the determinism issue, however. Another important issue is that of the eternality of the idea 
of the question of ‘time’. See, for example, Armour (2006); Mander (2006). 
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eternal and unalterable system of relations or ‘pure thought’ which determines human 
knowledge and human practice. 
          On the other hand, Sidgwick’s theist reading and Tyler’s spiritualistic interpretation of 
Green’s determinism are both related to the idea of eternal consciousness. As mentioned, 
when Green makes the claim that the eternal consciousness is the underlying principle in 
human consciousness, directing our actions towards the end it wills, he seems to substitute 
the will of an invisible and highest being for that of human free agency. In Sidgwick’s view, 
this eternal consciousness actually refers to God and is an intellectual by-product of Green’s 
work in philosophising theological notions. Sidgwick contends that the ultimate end of 
human action, to Green, is to realise the end of the eternal consciousness. This envisages the 
human mind as ‘a self-realisation of the divine principle in man’ (Sidgwick, 1884: 170; 
Sidgwick, 1902: 8). Thus the annulment of human agency is but a consequence of Green’s 
failure to complete the work of philosophy (Sidgwick, 1884: 171-179). Meanwhile, as 
distinct from the theist reading of Green, Tyler argues that Green’s metaphysical treatment 
nonetheless implicates a spiritual deterministic argument. Human consciousness and human 
action are thus seen to be driven by an innate spirit towards the most coherent system of 
beliefs and ideas as the telos of human nature (Tyler, 2010: chaps. 4-6). For Tyler, Green’s 
metaphysics, in this reading, maintains an idea of human agency similar to Bosanquet’s in 
that it is ‘the self-generation of particular actions from the interaction of the individual’s mind 
with circumstances’ (Tyler, 1997: 35; Tyler, 2010: 90-91). With the intention to de-
anthropomorphize Green’s idea of eternal consciousness, which is considered as a weakness 
of Green’s philosophy, Tyler therefore tends to stress the concept of ‘the unconscious’ in 
Green’s metaphysics (Tyler, 2010: chap. 4; cf. Tyler, 2003a: 133-137). He believes that ‘the 
unconscious’ is a significant but missing part in comprehending Green’s idea of the eternal 
consciousness. He asserts that while the eternal consciousness signifies an innate spirit of 
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human nature, the unconscious indicates ‘the realm of instinct’ and ‘the realm of inchoate 
rational mental processes ... in which human nature begins its struggle for self-expression’ 
(Tyler, 2010: 106). However, by addressing a possible intellectual connection between Green 
and the philosophy of the unconscious (developing in Germany), Tyler’s spiritual 
determinism interpretation of Green is actually a doctrine of psychological mechanism in the 
interpretation of the human mind (Tyler, 2010: 98-107). 
          Throughout these varying readings of Green’s determinism, the underlying contention 
is nonetheless related to different perspectives on Green’s notion of human agency. For 
instance, when Sidgwick contests Green’s idea of eternal consciousness – as requiring 
humans to realise the end to which a higher being is directing them, not only disregarding the 
significance of desires and impulses in the moral issues but also concealing human autonomy 
– his contention is made on the grounds that the significance of morality is confined to the 
notion that human beings are responsible for their behaviour (Sidgwick, 1902: 15-22, 62-63). 
He implies, though, that Green’s religious belief has led him to dismiss human agency. 
Meanwhile, Wempe and Dimova-Cookson respectively indicate a rational determinism in 
Green’s metaphysics of knowledge, but their purpose is to stress the importance of Green’s 
metaphysics of moral action. As Wempe claims, ‘the point of a number of arguments in 
Green’s pure metaphysics only emerges when they are considered in the light of the 
analogous argument which he seeks to defend in his metaphysics of morals’ (Wempe, 2004: 
85; cf. Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 40-53; Dimova-Cookson, 2003b: 143-146). For preserving 
Green’s notion of human agency with no taint attached to it, the metaphysics of knowledge 
that Green establishes is a dispensable part of his philosophical thought. Tyler, on the other 
hand, intends to maintain Green’s metaphysics of knowledge, but he also underscores the 
idea that there are two possible readings of Green’s metaphysical treatment of human agency. 
One is spiritual determinism, and the other is a self-interventionist theory of free will 
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signifying that ‘once certain minimum social conditions are met, the agent can choose 
whether or not to develop a virtuous character and then to act virtuously’ (Tyler, 2010: 90). In 
other words, there is a dual line of argument lurking in Green’s thought. 
          So far, I have explored three kinds of deterministic reading of Green’s metaphysics, 
and also indicated that these readings of Green relate to different perspectives of the relation 
between Green’s metaphysics of knowledge and his notion of human agency. Up to this 
point, scholars have contended that Green’s metaphysics contains a notion of the human 
condition and human agency. Green, contrary to the tenets of empiricist philosophy, develops 
a theory of human consciousness in which human beings are not determined by the natural 
world and the laws of nature, and are instead capable of conceiving and transforming the 
world. In other words, though Green has not directly stated a theory of moral action here, his 
metaphysics of knowledge, in terms of this view, prepares the ground for his systematic 
practical philosophy. Further, Green’s metaphysical treatment of human agency also connotes 
an important feature of his thought: that is, immanence. In the next section, in the context of 
my responses to the above deterministic readings of Green, I will argue that Green’s 
metaphysics is by no means a deterministic doctrine, but is rather immanentist. 
 
5. Philosophy, theology and human agency 
While a rational deterministic reading contends that Green’s metaphysics of knowledge 
implicates an a priori concept by which human knowledge and human practice are 
determined, Green’s philosophical thought nonetheless should not be viewed as deterministic 
in this context. In the first place, the term ‘a priori’ here has two meanings for Green, but 
neither of them is inherently deterministic. Firstly, the term refers to a necessity, indicating in 
mathematics a principle ‘which renders observation of nature possible can’t itself be derived 
from such observation, but such observation exhibits it’ (Green, 2005a: 61). The a priori 
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necessity in this sense indicates that there is a principle, understood as a logical 
presupposition, for what concerns the intelligible and conceivable, such as ‘two straight lines 
can’t enclose space’ of a triangular form (Green, 2005a: 59-60). Secondly, it refers to a 
necessity, as a given disposition, that is ‘involved in maintenance of institutions and habits’ 
and is ‘found necessary to organization of society’ (Green, 2005a: 60; cf. Green, 1906d: 58). 
The a priori necessity, in this latter sense, is used to indicate that there are prior and 
indispensable conditions for enabling human consciousness and human action, such as social 
habits and moral conventions. In either sense, a priori does not imply a deterministic 
argument, but signifies the necessary logical conditions, or the indispensable enabling 
dispositions presupposed in knowledge and action.25 Hence, Green’s metaphysical inquiry is 
not to suggest a rational deterministic doctrine; rather, it is to assure the necessary conditions 
for human knowledge and human action to be possible. In this sense, it is instead an 
immanentist treatment.26 
          Moreover, by virtue of Green’s contra-intellectualism position, it is hard to claim him 
as a rational determinist. In Green’s essay ‘Life and Immortality brought to light by the 
Gospel’ (1860), he shows a suspicion of overt intellectualism. He contests that whilst 
Platonic philosophy elevates an idea of ‘spirit’ and develops it into a doctrine of ‘emanation’, 
                                                
25 For Green, ‘it cannot be said that you first act morally by consideration of results of action and then gradually 
come to have the conception. As facts to a priori speculative conception, so are determinations of will to a priori 
practical conception. Consideration of what is involved in “facts” makes us aware of former: consideration of 
what is involved in determination of will makes us aware of latter’ (Green, 2005a: 60). 
26 For this immanentist reading I am indebted to Professor Vincent’s account of Green’s metaphysics. As 
indicated before, he suggests that ‘the philosopher can try to grasp what is and can discuss the relative merits of 
the various moral formulae (as Green puts it) as a way of enabling the moral agent, but it still remains sceptical 
of any full-blown injunctive arguments’ (Vincent, 2006: 99-100), that Green’s metaphysical treatment of the 
human person is ‘the “grey on grey” argument, which adopts a more multifaceted, anthropological view of the 
self – fluid and developing within the context of ordinary human conventions, social practices, and historical 
circumstances’, this perspective ‘sees reason as immanent within human practices and institutions, and subject 
to historical contingency and fallibility – although it also considerably weakens the spiritual teleology’ (Vincent, 
2006: 103-104). Green himself also explicitly argues that ‘[i]deas do not first come into existence, or begin to 
operate, upon the formation of an abstract expression for them. This expression is only arrived at upon analysis 
of a concrete experience which they have rendered possible’ (Green, 1986a: 15). An idea as such is not existent 
a priori but comes into existence by the very act of self-consciousness which distinguishes it from a chaotic and 
indeterminate but concrete mass of perceptions and feelings. Each idea, speculative or practical, in this sense, is 
immanent in unknown experiences. 
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by reference to Plato’s ‘ideal forms’, this is purely intellectual and contemplative and does 
not relate to a practical life (Green, 1860: 64-72; Green, 1861: 90-91, 94-95). Moreover, in 
‘The Philosophy of Aristotle’ (1866), Green’s contra-intellectualism position is clearly 
manifest when he argues that the most practical of philosophers, Aristotle, is actually 
advocating a contemplative and self-contained life rather than a practical life. He claims that 
Aristotle, adopting Plato’s ‘ideal forms’, exalted a doctrine of pure thought, which is fixed, 
final and eternal. This implied a self-contained life that could only be reached by accessing 
‘pure thought’ as a process of appropriation without the need for others (Green, 1906d: 88-
90). The tenet of intellectualism espoused in Greek philosophy that, ‘if a person knows what 
is right, he cannot do what is wrong’, in Green’s view, however, undermines the importance 
of human agency and free will. It encourages a self-contained and self-conceited 
contemplative life (Green, 1867a: 120-121; Green, 1906d: 90). Against this overt 
intellectualism, Green claims that theoretical human activity, particularly philosophy, must 
endeavour to ‘disentangle the operative ideas from their necessarily imperfect expression, and 
to explain that the validity of the ideas themselves’ in order to advance humans towards the 
freedom of perfect understanding (Green, 2003: 383). As Lamont notes, for Green, ‘the 
business of the philosopher is not to create – not even to advocate – moral ideals, but simply 
to understand them, analysing their nature and demonstrating their implications’ (Lamont, 
1934: 20; Boucher and Vincent, 2012: 88). 
          On the basis of these general features of Green’s perspective on philosophy, his 
metaphysics of knowledge does not, as Wempe or Dimova-Cookson argues, imply a rational 
determinism doctrine. Firstly, with his criticism of Kant’s dualism, Green does not adopt the 
Kantian transcendental method to deduce an a priori doctrine of thought and to predetermine 
human knowledge and human practice. On the contrary, he stresses the mutual independence 
of feelings and thought, experiences and ideas, and develops a notion of the human condition 
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in which the relation between the object and the subject, the world and human beings, is 
dependent on the way in which we human beings conceive and constitute. Human knowledge 
and human action are not determined a priori by a ‘pure thought’; instead, they are dependent 
upon our articulation of our unknown experiences and feelings, and on the way we achieve a 
coherent view of the world. On the other hand, Green’s metaphysics of knowledge does not, 
as Wempe claims, presuppose an a priori and enclosed conception of human knowledge. As 
indicated previously, Green’s idea of a single and unalterable order of relations is the logical 
presupposition for human knowledge to be possible and is a regulative principle guiding the 
advance of our knowledge. This is not to assert that there is an a priori and unalterable 
system of relations determining how human knowledge will be; it is but a working hypothesis 
and a heuristic device (Tyler, 2010: 65, 80, 147; cf. Wempe, 2004: 79-80).  
          With respect to the theist and the spiritual determinisms, there is one common feature 
in that they both conceive of the eternal consciousness as ‘something’ transcendent beyond 
human beings or innate in human nature (cf. Brink, 2003: 19). Theist determinism claims that 
Green’s idea of the eternal consciousness is the God whose will determines human 
knowledge and human action, while spiritual determinism assumes that the idea of eternal 
consciousness indicates an innate spirit in human nature prescribing the end of human 
activity. Nevertheless, firstly, eternal consciousness to Green is not equal to God, although he 
does make an analogy between the two: 
 
... if ‘nature’ is at the same time thought of, as it almost inevitably is, under attributes 
only applicable to the world of phenomena, and thus as excluding the spiritual principle 
which that world indeed implies, but implies as other than itself. In that case, to ascribe 
independence or self-containedness to it – if for a moment the use of theological 
language may be allowed which it is generally desirable to avoid – is to deify nature 
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while we cancel its title to deification. It is to speak of nature without God in a manner 
only appropriate to nature as it is in God. (Green, 2003: 62)  
 
However, as the quotation shows, Green is obviously aware of the difference between the 
eternal consciousness as the absolute presupposition for human activity to be possible, and 
God as the omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent being worshiped in religion and 
theology.27 He also claims explicitly that employing the term ‘spiritual’, rather than the 
‘natural’, to indicate the underlying principle for human activity to be possible is to prevent 
its confusion with naturalistic philosophy and ‘must only be on a clear understanding of its 
metaphorical character’ (Green, 2003: 61). 28  For Green, this does not suggest any 
supernatural idea, but articulates the concept of nature as the necessary logical condition 
(Nicholson, 2006: 146-149). Further, eternal consciousness should not be interpreted as an 
innate spirit or the unconscious. 
          On the one hand, if the spirit innate in human nature, a notion Tyler identifies as 
present in Green’s thought, is not ‘something’ existing in human beings, it seems to be an 
indicative term used to signify a probable principle of human activity, or, as mentioned 
above, a spiritual principle – the logical presupposition for human activity to be possible – 
                                                
27 To be sure, Green does not conceive God as an anthropomorphic presence or an external highest being 
determining what each human being has done and will do. Against a hypostatized mystical and external 
conception of God, to him, God is immanent in us; ‘a God present in the believing love of Him and the brethren, 
a Christ within us, a continuous resurrection, – these are mere thoughts of our own; they are not “objective”’ 
(Green, 1870: 32). The divinity exists in our consciousness and manifests in our will to be good; it is not a gift 
bestowed upon us by a mystical and external being. Nonetheless, he knows clearly that it will be hard for us to 
conceive of God when discarding ‘the anthropomorphic formulae in which we have been used to express to 
ourselves the presence and action of God as an external person moulding nature to His purposes and intervening 
in it when and how He will’ (Green, 1877a: 93-94). 
28 As Green suggests in his essay ‘The Value of the Argument from Analogy’ when using analogies, we ‘must 
be master of them’ and not they of us (Green, 1997: 44); in using analogy, we are comparing and connecting 
different ideas with each other and assuming that there is some resemblance between them. However, we cannot 
forget that these ideas are ultimately different. He reminds us, then, that some rhetorical fallacies can be 
‘derived from the metaphorical character of language’ (Green, 1997: 44). Nonetheless, when he discusses how 
to express metaphysical conceptions, he does claim that using metaphor might be possible, while the more 
legitimate way is through practical action (Green, 1886b: 175-176). In terms of this view, however, while Green 
employs the term ‘the eternal consciousness’ in his metaphysics of knowledge to signify the underlying 
principle of human activity, it is nothing but a metaphor and should not be conceived of uncritically as God. 
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rather than a term suggesting a deterministic argument. However, on the other hand, if innate 
nature is a thing existing in the human mind, but different, it seems to be contradictory with 
Green’s claim that ‘[w]e have not two minds, but one mind’ (Green, 2003: 79). For Green, 
the eternal consciousness does not signify a mental phenomenon in time as each human 
consciousness, but a logical and metaphysical concept which takes account of ‘the system of 
thought and knowledge which realises or reproduces itself in the individual through that 
process, a system into the inner constitution of which no relations of time enter’ (Green, 
2003: 79). There is only one mind, but it offers two different perspectives, metaphysical and 
psychological. Meanwhile, to suppose that Green’s idea of the eternal consciousness 
connotes a realm of the unconscious accordingly seems equally inadequate, given that the 
unconscious in Green’s usage refers to a state of mind in which we have not been aware of 
the conceptions and ideas immanent in our perceptions and behaviours. When he uses the 
term ‘unconscious’ experiences to indicate our unreflective and habitual thoughts and actions, 
he makes a clear distinction between unreflective thinking, and natural instinct and nervous 
reflex. That ‘the word “unconscious” ... is sometimes applied in a strict sense to a process 
which is not one of consciousness at all, but merely nervous or automatic, sometimes in a less 
strict sense to a process of consciousness not attended to or reflected upon’ (Green, 2003: 
114, n.1). For Green, nonetheless, there is no perception or behaviour without consciousness 
at all. The reason that ordinary people would conceive a state of mind in which there is no 
consciousness, Green suggests, is because they are unaware of ‘any activity of thought 
having contributed to constitute the things of which they have experience’ (Green, 1886b: 
194). ‘The unconscious’ is therefore a state of mind to which we are so accustomed, with its 
process for chaotic and indeterminate perceptions, and feelings transformed into intelligible 
experiences by the act of self-consciousness, that we are not aware of this process and we do 
not make any reflection on it. The unconscious in this sense, however, is nothing but our 
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habitual and conventional thoughts and actions internalised as constituent parts of us. To this 
point, it is as Green says: ‘an unconscious always precedes a conscious morality; that men act 
on moral principles, embodied in law and custom, which have never distinctly become part of 
their individual consciousness’ (Green, 1906d: 58). What is implicit in Green’s concept of the 
unconscious is a process of self-examination by which to articulate immanent principles. It is 
not, then, a deterministic argument. 
          Meanwhile, while Green’s metaphysical treatment is not deterministic, it is an 
immanentist doctrine: ideas are immanent in unconscious experiences as unreflective 
perceptions or feelings. Moreover, by adopting the Kantian philosophical criticism as an 
approach through which to reconsider empiricist and idealist metaphysics, Green depicts a 
view of the human condition and articulates the necessary conditions for human knowledge 
and human action to be intelligible and explicable. He then reaches the idea of eternal 
consciousness, as the underlying spiritual principle in diverse human activities. Nonetheless, 
the idea of eternal consciousness is just a philosophical language through which to express 
the common principle immanent in human activities, just as the ideal in aesthetics and the 
notion of God in theology expressing a similar spiritual principle (Green, 1877a: 86-88; 
Green, 1906b: 14; Green, 1906d: 90). For Green, as for Hegel, among diverse and different 
human activities, philosophy, art and religion are peculiar and peculiarly significant, for the 
absolute fusion of thought and things is represented in them (Green, 1906c: 22-23; cf. Taylor, 
1979: 19-21). As Green claims, 
 
[Burke] saw the rottenness in which the ‘metaphysics’ of the eighteenth century 
resulted, but had nothing with which to replace them. The practical reconstruction of 
moral ideas in England was to come, not directly from a sounder philosophy, but from 
the deeper views of life which the contemplative poets originated, from the revival of 
 
 
66 
evangelical religion, and from the conception of freedom and right, which Rousseau 
himself popularised, and which even in his hands had a constructive as well as an 
anarchical import. (Green, 1906e: 117) 
 
Art, religion and philosophy are important for human beings to articulate and to retain the 
spiritual principle away, as distinct, from materialism and naturalism. Nevertheless, since 
visionary poetry and practical religion seem to be in conflict with scientific beliefs, in 
Green’s view, philosophy is the most important field of human knowledge, in the sense that 
‘anything calling itself philosophy should seek to systematise them [poetry and religion] and 
to ascertain the regions to which they on the one side, and the truths of science on the other, 
are respectively applicable’ (Green, 2003: 2). The results of Green’s philosophical work are a 
metaphysical treatment of the human condition and human agency, and a spiritual principle 
as the absolute presupposition of human activity. In this manner, he refutes empiricist 
philosophy and its naturalistic determinism, and advances idealist philosophy such that he 
ensures a concept of free agency without lapsing into dualism. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored Green’s metaphysical treatment of the human condition and human 
agency, which is the primary foundation of his practical philosophy. In the first place, I 
introduced his critique of empiricist psychology and indicated that Green focused on its 
misconception of the relation between the objective world and the human subject. On the 
basis of that critique, Green also tried to improve the idealistic metaphysics developed 
initially by Kant. What Green therefore achieves is an affirmative perspective of human 
agency at the core of which is a theory of human consciousness. I have also considered the 
determinism issue in Green’s metaphysics, which includes rational, spiritual and theist forms. 
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In indicating that these deterministic readings are inadequate, I also argued that Green’s 
metaphysics is actually an immanentist doctrine: ‘to gain, or rather perhaps to regain, such a 
view of things as shall reconcile us to the world and to ourselves’ (Caird, 2004: 26). That 
metaphysical treatment of human agency is to clear the ground, for Green, in order to build 
up a more adequate theory of humanity. On the basis of the treatment of human agency, in 
the next chapter, I will discuss Green’s idea of ethical self and his moral philosophy the 
centre of which is the quest for the reconciliation of human consciousness and human action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
PERFECT FREEDOM AND THE ETHICAL SELF: 
GREEN ON THE DYNAMICS AND THE MORALISATION OF 
HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw that opposing a naturalistic and empiricist view of the human 
condition, Green developed a metaphysical treatment of the human condition and human 
agency; he advanced Kant’s philosophy by overcoming the dualism between a world of the 
things-in-themselves and the human mind. Green’s metaphysics of knowledge therefore 
ensures a firm foundation for developing his moral claims against the utilitarian and 
hedonistic moral philosophy. In this chapter, my exploration of Green’s practical philosophy 
turns to the latter dimension in that he developed an account for the moral development of 
human consciousness and proposed a perfectionist ethics with a positive idea of human 
freedom, while the ideal of human morality was conceived as the actualisation of human 
perfection in a reconciliatory world.  
          However, before going on to discuss Green’s view of the moralisation of human 
consciousness, it should be noted that Green’s liberal philosophy so formulated has been 
challenged by Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997), one of the most influential liberals in the twentieth 
century. In his famous lecture ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (1958), Berlin asserts that Green’s 
liberal ideal implies a philosophy of objective reason that espouses a holistic and monistic 
view of the world and has an intellectual affinity with totalitarianism. For Berlin, the 
philosophy of objective reason maintains the Platonic ideal: ‘in the first place that, as in the 
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sciences, all genuine questions must have one true answer and one only, all the rest being 
necessarily errors; in the second place that there must be a dependable path towards the 
discovery of these truths; in the third place that the true answers, when found, must 
necessarily be compatible with one another and form a single whole, for one truth cannot be 
incompatible with another – that we knew a priori’ (Berlin, 2013: 6). Philosophers who have 
faith in that ideal accordingly believe that there is a universal truth of the world that human 
reason can acquire, and by reaching that universal (and rational knowledge), we can then 
achieve happiness by following its instructions (Berlin, 2002: 178-200). While Berlin himself 
is against the philosophy of objective reason, he argues that Green not only shares the holistic 
and monistic philosophical ideal, but also has faith that there is a true self as the very end 
(innate in human rational nature) for every individual person to pursue. In Berlin’s view, 
while Green distinguishes the true self from the empirical self, he proposes a positive idea of 
freedom, namely that ‘the ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of 
human society alike to make the best of themselves’. This ‘entails that if a man chose some 
immediate pleasure – which ... would not enable him to make the best of himself ... – what he 
was exercising was not “true” freedom: and if deprived of it, he would not lose anything that 
mattered’ (Berlin, 2002: 180, n. 1; cf. Green, 1986b: 200). However, to Berlin, though 
Green’s intention is to indicate the importance of individual freedom, that account of human 
freedom can easily become the excuse by which a tyrant might justify her oppression and 
coercion in the name of ‘the universal rational truth’. On the grounds of a metaphysical 
doctrine of the two selves, a genuine liberal like Green unfortunately obscures the value of 
free choice for each individual by means of the rational ideal of the true self (Berlin, 2002: 
41, n. 1, 53; cf. Weinstein, 1965; Bellamy, 2000: chap. 2). 
          Regarding Berlin’s criticism of Green’s liberal thought, Simhony has made an 
excellent and lucid point: 
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Berlin’s argument about totalitarian theories of positive freedom proceeds in three 
steps. The first step relates to a shift from freedom as doing as one likes to do to what 
one really wants to do. ‘The metaphysical doctrine of the two selves’ underpins that 
shift. The second step is the claim that positive freedom is realizable only in a certain 
kind of society with which one identifies oneself as one’s wider social self - ‘the 
individual streams versus the social river in which they should be merged’ - as in the 
case of Rousseau. The third step is to claim that that kind of society is excessively 
oppressive in the name of freedom. (Simhony, 1991b: 305) 
 
On the basis of this analysis, Simhony contests that Green does not propose a certain kind of 
society oppressive to the concept of freedom, but rather that it is enabling (Simhony, 1991b: 
305, 316-318). The function of social institutions is to maintain equal opportunities for each 
individual in pursuit of their self-realisations, thus Green’s idea of human freedom indicates a 
conception of freedom as ability. For Simhony, instead of implying the danger of justifying 
totalitarianism, Green’s challenge to the separation of freedom and ability marks an important 
difference in Green’s idea of freedom versus Berlin’s idea (Simhony, 1993a). In a similar 
vein, Dimova-Cookson also draws upon the conception of freedom as ability in Green’s 
thought. She indicates that Green’s positive freedom contains two meanings. One is freedom 
as ability that signifies the capability of human beings to choose and to contribute to a social 
good in pursuit of self-perfection, and the other is the true freedom that ‘does not contain 
choice and opportunity’ but indicates ‘the experience of achievement and completion’; the 
former is the capability of being a moral agent and the latter is the ultimate achievement of 
the moral agency (Dimova-Cookson, 2012: 151; cf. 146-150). As to the juristic/negative 
freedom, this signifies the social and political circumstances under which human agency 
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might develop. With this distinction between the different senses of freedom in Green’s 
thought, Dimova-Cookson indicates that Green’s theory of freedom not only maintains the 
value of free choice but also implies a justification for liberty as welfare (cf. Dimova-
Cookson, 2003a; Simhony, 2005: 140-144). 
          According to Simhony’s and Dimova-Cookson’s interpretations of Green’s theory of 
human freedom, Green is not, as Berlin claimed, providing a dangerous philosophical 
argument. The distinction between the empirical self and the ideal self, and freedom as ability 
and the true freedom in Green’s thought, is to indicate a developmental account of human 
morality (cf. Nicholson, 1990: 116-131). Meanwhile, though Wempe and Tyler also indicate 
the internal relation of different senses of freedom in Green’s thought, their responses to 
Berlin’s criticism focus on Green’s ontology of human consciousness instead. In Wempe’s 
view, Green’s theory of positive freedom is profoundly influenced by Hegel’s doctrine of the 
self-assertion of reason, whereby ‘the essentials of his political and ethical theory may be 
derived from an analysis of the structure of human consciousness’ (Wempe, 2004: 118, 141-
151). Negative freedom and positive freedom, in Green’s thought, are not two dichotomous 
ideas but rather two dimensions of human consciousness, that is an empirical self with an 
impulsive desire and an ideal self with a universal law.  
          On the other hand, Tyler argues that Berlin ‘presupposes a sharp distinction between 
the latter two conceptions (‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedom), whereas Green recognised 
what he calls true freedom as including in its logical structure the notion of freedom from 
interference by others (juristic freedom)’ (Tyler, 2010: 117). Hence, he claims that it is futile 
to employ Berlin’s distinction of negative and positive freedom to analyse Green’s discussion 
of freedom. Meanwhile, regarding the criticism of Green’s monism, Tyler contests that in 
Green’s view plural and diverse ideas and values as such are not incompatible; instead, it is 
the imperfection of human beings which lead us to believe so. He comments that ‘[t]he 
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ultimate harmony of true beliefs and values is an assumption each of us is driven to make 
instinctively, in order to give hope and direction to our efforts to understand more clearly 
ourselves and our world’ (Tyler, 2010: 147; cf. 145-146). Green’s ontology of human 
consciousness indicates that there is an innate drive in human nature directing us to express a 
holistic and monistic notion of the ideal harmony.  
          What we can see clearly in these discussions is that, firstly, Green’s liberal philosophy 
contains a developmental view of human morality, and secondly, this view of human 
morality is in relation to an ontology of human consciousness. However, though the 
connection of Green’s ontology of human consciousness with his two conceptions of the self 
and theory of freedom has been addressed, the developmental account he offers in relation to 
human consciousness has not been sufficiently considered. Wempe has remarked that there is 
a ‘developmental logic of human consciousness’ underlying Green’s view of the 
development of human morality, but his elaboration of that logic is overwhelmed by use of 
Hegel’s philosophy of consciousness (Wempe, 2004: 116-120; cf. 25-46).29 For this reason, 
Wempe seems to overlook an important difference between Green and Hegel: the 
actualisation of absolute freedom for Hegel is attainable, but for Green, it is not. With his 
exploration of the development of human consciousness, Green establishes an idea of the 
ethical self which he substitutes for Hegel’s concept of the ethical state. 
          In this chapter, my exploration of Green’s liberal ethics will thus centre on his view of 
the moralisation of human consciousness, addressing the ways in which Green develops his 
ideas of the ethical self and human freedom on the basis of that view. In the meantime, I will 
argue that Green’s establishing of a developmental view of human consciousness in his 
metaphysics of moral action completes his human ontology. To establish the connection 
between Green’s concept of human consciousness and his liberal ethics, I will first introduce 
                                                
29 As to Tyler’s view of Green’s ontology of human consciousness, see my discussion in chapter three and 
Tyler, 2010: chaps. 4-6. 
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Green’s criticism of hedonism and utilitarianism, in particular his debate with Henry 
Sidgwick. I will then explore his developmental view of human consciousness through which 
he confronts hedonist moral psychology. In the process of the latter argument Green 
formulates a philosophical ethics that depicts a dialectical process focusing on the 
moralisation of human consciousness. In this latter context individual freedom and social 
institutions are envisaged as two dimensions of a single process in which a self-conscious 
human agent strives for the actualisation of a reconciliatory world. Finally, I will argue that 
though Green proposes that the ideal of human life is our perfection and reconciliation with 
the world, his remarks on the ultimate true good as ‘an end in which the effort of a moral 
agent can really find rest’ is the very epitome of his entire vision of human life (Green, 2003: 
195-196). With that thought in mind, Green substitutes an idea of the ethical self for Hegel’s 
ethical state. 
	 
2. Against hedonism and utilitarianism: freedom and the concept of self 
While Green was establishing his metaphysical treatment of the human condition, by 
critically reconsidering empiricist and idealistic metaphysics between the 1870s and 1880s, 
his main purpose was to develop a solid and justifiable moral argument against the prevailing 
hedonistic and utilitarian moral philosophy. As Wempe maintains, ‘[i]n Green’s opinion the 
social condition of his times was characterized by a discrepancy between theory and practice. 
The practice of social reform was ahead of the social theory by reference to which these 
reforms were defended. The sort of affairs Green saw as desirable could not well be defended 
on the basis of an argument proceeding from utility’ (Wempe, 2004: 155). The thinking in 
terms of the principle of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, or the maximisation of utility, is 
in the final analysis defective for supporting the demands of social and political reforms. To 
Green, utilitarian philosophy has a practical function in that it ‘furnishes a test by which the 
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competing claims of the different laws, or those of law on one side and individual conviction 
on the other, may be put on the test’ (Green, 2003: 398). It has done a great work ‘in 
rationalising the order of social and political life’ and propagating the idea of the equal status 
of each person, from which there are some social reforms proceeding (Green, 2003: 402-
403). However, regarding individual morality, the utilitarian philosophy ‘is likely to be 
abused in order to justify selfish conduct’ (Wempe, 2004: 165; cf. Green, 2003: 398-399). 
Pleasure is a transient feeling as an appendage of an object which is the conclusion that an 
individual’s action is intended to achieve, and utility is a manipulative notion reliant on the 
idea of the good defined as pleasure; they are merely excuses for an individual making 
decisions in favour of his or her private interests. Hence, Green acknowledges the practical 
value of the utilitarian and hedonistic philosophy but fears that ‘it may itself induce practical 
evils, from which deliverance must be sought in a truer analysis of the ultimate good for man’ 
(Green, 2003: 402-403). That definition of a moral good, in Green’s view, cannot be 
encapsulated by pleasure and utility. However, in terms of Sidgwick’s view, the hedonistic 
and utilitarian principles are justifiable and tenable.  
          Green and Sidgwick were both educated at Rugby. After they graduated from the 
school, they continued to correspond from time to time; they also visited Germany together 
with other friends in 1862 and 1863, and appear to have been close friends. However, after 
Green’s introductions for T. H. Grose’s edition of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature 
published, Sidgwick wrote three critical reviews of Green’s comments on empiricism and 
hedonistic utilitarianism philosophy between 1874 and 1875, in which he implied that 
Green’s comments were confusing rather than illuminating (Sidgwick, 1874; Sidgwick, 
1875a; Sidgwick, 1875b). Although Green noted Sidgwick’s disagreement and expressed his 
sorrow for failing to convince Sidgwick in 1874 (Green, 1874b), the dispute between them 
continued to cause tension in 1877. In the article ‘Hedonism and Ultimate Good’ Sidgwick 
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contests that though pleasure as a feeling is transient, as an idea, it is the good that each 
individual seeks. For him, there may be conditions under which pleasure is conceivable, but 
‘we can perfectly well compare a pleasure felt under any given conditions with any other, 
however otherwise conditioned, and pronounce it equal or unequal’ (Sidgwick, 1877: 36). 
Sidgwick accordingly contends that the utilitarian principle (the greatest amount of pleasure 
for the greatest number of people) is intelligible and can be a practical criterion for making 
public decisions. It is not, as Green claims, the case that hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy 
will cause a practical evil in that it might justify selfish conduct; on the contrary, the principle 
can provide justifications for public action to protect the interests of the majority. Up to this 
point, the hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy had established a rational and universal 
argument for each individual to test existing moral and social rules. Nonetheless, as indicated, 
Green does not disagree with such a point of view, but emphasises the potential problems 
implicit in such philosophy. 
          In Green’s view, in the first place, the hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy embodies 
certain inconsistencies by virtue of its empiricist and naturalistic metaphysics and 
psychology. In his reply to Sidgwick’s 1877 article, Green indicates that, if pleasure as a 
mere feeling, can stimulate the will to act without being represented in idea, there is no notion 
of good as pleasure represented in an individual’s consciousness. Thus the action is merely 
instinctively following the laws of nature, no matter whether we act consciously on an idea of 
good or not. On the other hand, even though pleasure can be conceived by us and is an idea 
of goodness that we consciously pursue, it is just one definition of good that we conceive and 
define and is not the ultimate criterion (Green, 1877b: 267-268). To Green, it is as if pleasure 
were not a transient feeling but rather an intelligible idea; it has to be an objective idea that 
the act of self-consciousness produces and is a product of human thought. However, while 
pleasure is conceived as an idea in the hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy, the philosophy 
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obscures the function of self-consciousness in operation and thus confuses pleasure as an idea 
with pleasure as a feeling that is taken as the natural inclination for human beings to 
determine what is good.30 Nonetheless, at this point, the hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy 
lapses into a naturalistic determinism, as empiricist philosophy implies. A human being, in 
this reading, is not the person or agent who makes decisions and choices consciously and 
autonomously, but is conversely a creature whose conduct and behaviour is in accordance 
with natural inclinations and the laws of nature. There is therefore no free will involved in 
making decisions and human actions. In brief, though the hedonistic and utilitarian 
philosophy in Sidgwick’s view provides a rational and universal argument through which to 
explain what is good for human beings, it nonetheless conceals the fundamental fact of 
human agency. 
          Against that hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy, Green, on the basis of his 
metaphysical treatment of human agency, argues that an idea of good is related to how a 
person conceives an objective for which he or she strives, because that objective is related to 
how the person projects an ideal state of his or her self. As Tyler indicates, human ‘agents 
seek the attainment of a state of their own being through the attainment of their object, rather 
than simply seeking the object itself’ (Tyler, 2010: 110). Human beings, as self-conscious 
agents, are not necessarily creatures following the guidance of the laws of nature and 
pursuing pleasures alone, but are also capable of reflecting on whether their objective is truly 
                                                
30 It is what Green calls ‘the privilege of self-consciousness’ which also brings with it ‘the privilege of self-
deception’ in his 1868 ‘Popular Philosophy in Its Relation to Life’ (Green, 1906e: 105). He comments, ‘[i]t is 
only as fixed by relation to a permanent subject, that passing acts and sufferings are substantiated in language, 
but as thus substantiated they seem to have a separate reality of their own apart from this relation. ... They are 
put on one side as “feelings,” thought or reason on the other, and it is asked what is the function of each 
according to our inward experience. ... Thus, as constituents of knowledge, they are assumed either to be copies 
of, or to be themselves, permanent cognisable things. As sources of moral action (‘passions’ or ‘emotions’), they 
are taken to be either permanent objects of consciousness, or to be consciously caused by such objects, or to 
involve the idea of them ... as Hume announced in a formula that sticks to one, “reason is and ought to be only 
the slave of the passions”’ (Green, 1906e: 105). Empiricism, hedonism and utilitarian philosophy all assume the 
function of self-consciousness to explicate how human knowledge and moral action as possible, but these 
philosophies also omit this assumption in their arguments and this fact then leads the arguments into 
inconsistency. These latter ideas form the foundation for Green to make more far-reaching criticisms in his 
‘Introductions to Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature’. 
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good by reference to an ideal state of themselves. The very act of self-consciousness enables 
an individual to distinguish the object from the subject, as others distinguished from his or 
her own self. The definition of good is therefore reliant on emerging human thought, and is 
not dependent upon pleasure. In Green’s view, pleasure is an appendage to the good object 
which a person strives for. It can be an intelligible idea, but to confine the definition of the 
good to pleasure is misleading and will cause human morality and human agency to be 
concealed. In particular, that hedonistic and utilitarian conception of the good obscures the 
distinction between the personal good and the moral good and disguises human selfishness in 
the name of social utility (Green, 2003: 397-402). Nonetheless, before considering this point 
further, it will be necessary to first explicate Green’s view on the development of human 
consciousness. This explication will furnish us with a more comprehensive view of Green’s 
discussion of the relation between the concept of the self and the concept of good. The 
mutual debate between Sidgwick and Green ended with Green’s death in 1882. However 
Green’s posthumous book, Prolegomena to Ethics, offered a substantive discussion of 
Sidgwick’s hedonistic utilitarian doctrine. Further Green’s philosophical ethics remained a 
topic for study for Sidgwick until his death in 1900.31 
 
3. The development of human consciousness and the rational will 
As indicated, Green’s moral arguments against hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy are 
correlative with his metaphysical treatment of human agency and the distinction between the 
object and the subject. In particular, the ability to define an object as good in his view is 
related to an ideal state of the human self. Human consciousness as free agency and the 
                                                
31 Between 1884 and 1900, Sidgwick published several articles and lectures on Green’s metaphysics and ethics 
which are collected in his two posthumous books – Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer, 
and J. Martineau (1902) and Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant and other philosophical lectures and essays 
(1905). His last philosophical lecture delivered on 21st May in 1900 was also on ‘the philosophy of T. H. 
Green’. 
 
 
78 
concept of the self are therefore the centre of his liberal moral philosophy. However, though 
Green’s metaphysical treatment of human agency provides a preliminary view of the relation 
between the concept of the self and the concept of freedom, it is his developmental account of 
human consciousness that completes his human ontology and advances his moral arguments. 
This latter account, which contains in his metaphysics of moral action, signifies a dialectical 
relation between individual freedom and social institution in pursuit of human perfection. 
Accordingly, I shall now turn to Green’s discussion of the development of human 
consciousness. 
          Green’s metaphysics of moral action has been taken by Dimova-Cookson as a 
compelling theory of human practice (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: chap. 1; Dimova-Cookson, 
2003b: 140). Meanwhile, Thomas comments that Green’s moral psychology contains more 
valuable insights than his metaphysics of knowledge (Thomas, 1987: 1-5; 123). Nevertheless, 
in terms of the ontology of human consciousness, Green’s metaphysics of knowledge and 
metaphysics of moral action are complementary. The former establishes a treatment of 
human agency against empiricist and naturalistic philosophy by virtue of a concept of human 
consciousness, and the latter explicates a dynamics of human consciousness, understood as a 
development from intellect (theoretical reason) and desire, to will and practical reason. 
         In Green’s thought, a self-conscious human agent has four distinctive capabilities: 
desire, intellect, will and practical reason. Intellect is the theoretical reason we take part in the 
knowing activity as ‘the effort of such consciousness to take the world into itself’, and desire 
is the reflected impulses of the effort of the consciousness ‘to carry itself out into the world’ 
(Green, 2003: 154-155; 162). While impulse as such is different from desire, it is the animal 
instinct driving us to fight for survival (Green, 2003: 97-105). The intellect and desire, 
though they are different modes of human consciousness, have a significant common feature, 
for there is a consciousness of the opposite distinction between the self and the world in 
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intellect and in desire both, and this causes human beings to feel out of place in the world 
(Green, 2003: 147). The efforts along with the two modes of human consciousness are 
therefore finally directed towards reconciling human beings with the world, making us feel at 
home, which is to say that the desire and intellect urge us to transform and improve ourselves 
to accommodate our circumstances and also to make the circumstances more suitable for us. 
As human agents, we are therefore constantly striving for reconciliation with the world. 
Meanwhile, the intellect and the desire in Green’s view accompany each other in each human 
thought and action. When we are learning, it must indicate that we desire to know, and on the 
other hand, when we desire something to satisfy our impulses, a discursive function is also 
essential to present an idea of an object for us to desire (Green, 2003: 151-152). Human 
activity in this sense is the coordination of desire and intellect, while its ideal is the 
reconciliation of human beings with the world. 
      With respect to the will, for Green, this is a mode of human consciousness in which the 
intellectual object is an idea of self which is also the object of desire. We represent ourselves 
as an object in relation to certain circumstances, or other persons, as a unity through the effort 
of intellect. This unity is determined through the effort of desire as an object to strive for 
(Green, 2003: 150-151, 154-155). In this sense, the will is a crucial mode of human 
consciousness in which we come to take ourselves as an object, without limiting the objects 
of the intellect or the desire to non-self things. Moreover, there is a significant difference 
between the will and the coordination of desire and intellect. In willing, we identify ourselves 
with a desired object as an ideal state of ours, but in the mere coordination of desire and 
intellect, the object is not an idea of the self. Green indicates that desires ‘are influences or 
tendencies by which the man, the self, is affected, not a motion proceeding from him. They 
tend to move him, but he does not move in them; and none of them actually moves him 
unless the man takes it into himself, identifies himself with it, in a way which wholly alters it 
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from what it was as a mere influence affecting him’ (Green, 2003: 163) (italic in original). In 
theoretical thinking we consider and study an external object, the object as non-human, not an 
ideal state of ourselves. But in willing there is, as Green observes, ‘a new principle that 
supervenes upon them [impulses] through the self-conscious subject’s identification of itself 
with one of them, just as a perception is not a sensation or congeries of sensations, but 
supervenes upon certain sensations through a man’s attending to them, i.e. through his taking 
them into self-consciousness and determining them, as in it, by relation to others of its 
contents’ (Green, 2003: 164) (italics added). The significant difference between the will and 
the coordination of desire and intellect accordingly is self-identification. In willing, an 
individual identifies a certain desired object with an ideal state of his or her own self. That is, 
as Green says, ‘[t]he will is simply the man’ and ‘it is only the feeling, thought and desire 
represented by the act of will, that the man recognises as for the time himself’ (Green, 2003: 
173). The will thus represents an empirical self that is what we actually are at a certain time 
and in a certain place. 
      In addition, Green claims that the willed object which a person for the time being 
identifies his or her self as a good thing for him or her is an object relating to an ideal state of 
the person in that the person’s certain desire can be satisfied (Green, 2003: 158-159). 
Nonetheless, though the satisfaction of desires can bring pleasure for the person, which 
hedonistic and utilitarian philosophers conceive as the ultimate criterion of good, Green does 
not share this same view. He argues that, ‘[w]e cannot think of an object as good, i.e. such as 
will satisfy desire, without thinking of it as in consequence such as will yield pleasure; but its 
pleasantness depends on its goodness, not its goodness upon the pleasure it conveys’ (Green, 
2003: 194). The pleasure is only an appendage of the willed object for which we strive. It is 
not the good itself. For Green, instead, the ultimate criterion of good is immanent in human 
agency and is related to our capability of practical reason. 
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      As a matter of fact, an object we conceive as good in the end may not really satisfy us, 
and therefore we continue to strive for other objects. To Green, that ‘practical struggle after 
the Better, of which the idea of there being a Best has been the spring, has taken such effect 
in the world of man’s affairs as makes the way by which the Best is to be more nearly 
approached plain enough to him that will see’ (Green, 2003: 197). In the meantime, through 
our constant efforts towards achieving a better state of ourselves, we can acquire a plain 
conviction that being the Best is the ‘ultimate moral good to guide our conduct’, that there are 
such things as the true self and the true good, and that they are best for us (Green, 2003: 197). 
The peculiar capability of a self-conscious agent, which makes constant efforts continuously 
seek the ‘better way of life’, is in point the core of practical reason. It is a capacity ‘on the 
part of such a subject to conceive a better state of itself as an end to be attained by action’ 
(Green, 2003: 201).32 Hence, while Green contends that the ultimate ideal of human morality 
is the state in which our empirical self is identical with the true self, it is the state in which 
practical reason and will are reconciled with each other. The ultimate criterion of good is the 
self-realising principle immanent in each human person directing human activity towards the 
perfect freedom. That freedom is the state in which human beings are living with the world in 
harmony. They feel at home in the world because the subject and the object of consciousness 
are reunited and the opposition of the world and human beings is overcome (Green, 1986c: 
242-244; Thomas, 1987: 187-188).  
      At this point, it is obvious that Green interlocks the dynamics of human consciousness, 
the doctrine of the two selves and the concept of freedom with each other, that practical 
reason and will, as two modes of human consciousness, refer to an ideal self and an empirical 
                                                
32 Thomas indicates accurately that the centre of Green’s theory of moral action is a reply to Hume’s claim that 
practical reason is only slave of passions and desires (Thomas, 1987: 160). For Green, an individual’s action is 
not under the reign of passions and desires alone, but is capable of acting on a practical reason. On the other 
hand, Tyler’s claim, that once the intellect formulates an object, the will will automatically direct itself at that 
object and this leads to action, seems to swing the pendulum back too far (Tyler, 2010: 128-129). For the 
function of practical reason in this latter point of view is assimilated with intellect, the theoretical reason, and 
this is distinct from Green’s point of view. 
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self respectively. The reconciliation of practical reason and will is therefore the identity of the 
ideal self and the empirical self, and that reconciliation and identity indicates the perfect 
freedom of human beings. Accordingly, Green’s human ontology is thus enclosed by a 
developmental view of human consciousness, from a self-distinguishing and self-objectifying 
consciousness to a self-improving and self-realising agent. 
      To summarise, Green’s discussion of the development of human consciousness 
signifies four kinds of capability of a self-conscious human agent: intellect (theoretical 
reason), desire, will and practical reason. The distinction, meanwhile, between intellect and 
desire is the different objects towards which the effort of self-consciousness directs us. The 
will refers to the mode of human consciousness which encourages self-identification with an 
idea of the object, and practical reason refers to the mode of evaluating the willed objects as 
the true good to strive for. Hence, Green’s developmental view of human consciousness 
indicates that the perfect freedom of humans is the reconciliation of practical reason and will 
and the reconciliation of human beings with the world. The underlying theme of his idea of 
positive freedom is, as Simhony and Dimova-Cookson claim, related to a conception of 
freedom as ability. Nonetheless, Green’s definition of freedom, in the positive sense, is about 
‘the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a common good’ (Green, 
1986b: 200). That process of the reconciliation of practical reason and will towards perfect 
freedom in his view is a dialectical relation between the individual and the society. As he 
claims, 
 
The moral progress of mankind has no reality except as resulting in the formation of 
more perfect individual characters; but on the other hand every progress towards 
perfection on the part of the individual character presupposes some embodiment or 
expression of itself by the self-realising principle in what may called – to speak most 
 
 
83 
generally – the organisation of life. It is in turn, however, only through the action of 
individuals that this organisation of life is achieved. (Green, 1986c: 247) 
 
The actualisation of the perfection of freedom and the ideal state of human beings is 
inseparable from certain social and cultural conditions in which human consciousness 
initiates its moralisation. 
 
4. The moralisation of human consciousness and the ethical self 
As mentioned, Green’s critique of the hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy is two-fold. On 
the one side, he indicates the inconsistency in the philosophy that, by confusing the pleasure 
as an idea and the pleasure as a feeling, it tends to conceal human morality and human agency 
rather than to uphold them. On the other side, the empiricist and hedonistic psychology 
conception of what is good for human beings obscures the significant distinction between 
personal good and moral good. It has been shown that Green’s first questioning of the 
hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy is premised on the grounds of his ontological theory of 
human consciousness; that is, the ultimate criterion of good is immanent in human 
consciousness and human agency as such. In this section, I revert to Green’s second aspect of 
the hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy, namely that its conception of the good obscures the 
distinction between the personal good and the moral good as well as heteronomy and 
autonomy. 
          In Green’s view, by virtue of the good being exclusively defined as pleasure, the good 
must be personal and private. The pleasant feeling is always private and cannot be 
transferred. Whereas pleasure as an idea is to be conceived as comparable, the good is 
therefore to be measurable and transferable. At this point, a psychological account of a 
personal approbation or disapprobation of what is good and valuable underpins an 
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assumption for social and moral claims. Since the goodness so defined is always private and 
personal, the reason that an individual cooperates and lives with others is in accordance with 
the principle of maximising the greatest amount of his or her own pleasures. The most 
important social virtue in this context is expediency, while the principle is referred to the 
concept of social utility (Green, 1867a: 156-158; Green, 2003: 255-268; Green, 2005a: 53-
59). Thus if the constitution of society is conducive to the maximisation of an individual’s 
pleasures, the maintenance of the society is reliant on the maximisation of most individuals’ 
pleasures. However, Green argues that, despite the fact that it is claimed that pleasure as an 
idea is comparable and measurable, this cannot change that each pleasant feeling per se is 
always personal. To define the good exclusively as pleasure has already confined the good to 
the personal and private realm from the outset. While a person may follow the hedonistic and 
utilitarian guidance to calculate his or her own well-being with others’, and intends to help 
others in accordance with the concept of social utility, what the person can provide to others 
is not pleasure, but a certain determinate object, such as food, drink or shelter. As Green 
indicates, 
 
[h]e seeks to help them in attaining objects which he supposes to be common to them 
with him, and these objects, not being pleasures in his case, cannot be pleasures in 
theirs. In the realisation of the objects there must be pleasure for the others, on 
supposition of their interest in the objects, as for himself, and in anticipating their 
realisation of the objects he will doubtless also anticipate the pleasure incidental to it; 
but it is primarily the objects which he seeks to help them in gaining, the pleasure only 
as incidental to the attainment of particular objects. (Green, 2003: 277-278) 
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That pleasure is always personal and private, so the person who helps others cannot share her 
altruistic pleasure with them, but can only help others with the projection of her own pleasant 
experiences, and then anticipate that these others may feel pleasant if they acquire some 
particular and determinate objects. By identifying the good with personal pleasure, hedonistic 
and utilitarian philosophy therefore advocates that a person who can choose what he or she 
prefers without interventions entertains perfect individual freedom. The main spirit of 
individual freedom is to do what a person prefers.  
          However, in Green’s view, that personal good is not good in the moral sense, for the 
moral good implies a normative ideal by which to distinguish the good from the bad, and ‘the 
distinction between the good and bad will must lie at the basis of any system of Ethics’ 
(Green, 2003: 175). To him, hedonistic and utilitarian philosophy fails to set an adequate 
moral standard. Since the ultimate criterion of good is pleasure, our thoughts and actions 
accordingly should proceed to the end of maximising pleasures, as that is the desirable ideal 
in absolute terms. However, by virtue of that moral standard, ‘[m]an or society would alike 
be only perfect in relation to the production of feelings which are felt, with whatever 
differences of quantity, by good men and bad, by man and brute, indifferently’ (Green, 2003: 
224). For no matter what ends or means we chose and applied, the morally good simply 
becomes that which produces most pleasure. But such comprehension of the moral good and 
the moral ideal, to Green, is heteronomous. It is not treating human beings as ends in 
themselves (Green, 2003: 224; cf. 175-177). 
          Against this heteronomous moral standard, Green contends that a moral standard 
should have a distinctive feature. It is irrespective of our particular and transient inclinations 
or desires, but is rather the absolute desirable end immanent in human agency (Green, 1986a: 
92; Green, 2003: 222). That absolutely desirable end immanent in human agency, to him, is 
the ideal of human perfection. He argues, 
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... the goodness of man lies in devotion to the ideal of humanity, and ... the ideal of 
humanity consists in the goodness of man. It means that such an ideal, not yet realised 
but operating as a motive, already constitutes in man an inchoate form of that life, that 
perfect development of himself, of which the completion would be the realised ideal 
itself. Now in relation to a nature such as ours, having other impulses than those which 
draw to the ideal, this ideal becomes, in Kant’s language, an imperative, and a 
categorical imperative. It will command something to be done universally and 
unconditionally, irrespectively of whether there is in any one, at any time, an 
inclination to do it. (Green, 2003: 225) 
 
And that moral standard for judging what is good or bad and immanent in humanity is the 
ideal of human perfection. This is the reconciliation of practical reason and will that we have 
discussed earlier. Nonetheless, the ideal of human perfection so defined lacks concrete and 
determinate contents, and is a formal condition of the moral standard (Green, 2003: 331). 
Green’s account of the moral ideal is therefore empty and indeterminate (Sidgwick, 1902: 72-
76). It seems that Green’s notion of the moral ideal encounters a difficulty here in that if the 
moral ideal concerns autonomy and this is immanent in human agency, it will be empty and 
indeterminate. But if the moral ideal is concrete, it will be heteronomous and refers to 
something external to human agency, such as pleasure.33 However, Green is clearly aware of 
the emptiness charge. He argues that since the moral ideal is human perfection and the 
reconciliation of practical reason and will, the concrete and determinate content of the moral 
                                                
33 This point can be compared with Green’s note on Kant’s moral philosophy, that ‘[f]reedom is internal not 
external; you are not less free because you can’t control the physical world; your will and the state of it are in 
your own power. ... Freedom is meaningless except as involving duty; the correlative of I can is I ought. ... But 
duty is a form requiring a content; and so this I ought or I can must have a concrete. As this is abstract or self-
determined it is the autonomy of the will. The other element is like and dislike; pleasure and pain are the 
heteronomy of the will, different in different men. These two elements contain the springs of action’ (Green, 
1867a: 170-171). 
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ideal can only be completely known when the ideal is actually realised. Prior to that, ‘[w]e 
know it only according to the measure of what we have so far done or are doing for its 
attainment’ (Green, 2003: 225). Consequently, ‘the gradual filling up and definition of the 
idea of human perfection’ are in social institutions, recognised duties and actual virtues 
(Green, 2003: 204, 228). 
          The charge of emptiness in Green’s notion of the moral ideal has a practical 
consequence – namely that it cannot provide the determinate guidance and instruction for 
individuals to make judgement and to take action. However Green’s account of moral agency 
articulates an elementary notion of normativity which is implicit in the capability of practical 
reason. Practical reason provides a person with a ‘better’ idea of the self for his or her will to 
identify with. This makes the person feel that he or she should desire the actualisation of that 
idea (Green, 2003: 204). But this elementary notion of normativity can only come to be 
concrete in a society. To Green, the moral standard with the determinate normative efficacy is 
a common good embodied in social institutions and conventional morality. He indicates: 
 
a prior morality, founded upon interests which are other than the pure interest in being 
good, and governed by rules of conduct relative to a standard of goodness other than 
that which makes it depend on this interest, is the condition of there coming to be the 
morality of a character governed by interest in an ideal of goodness. Otherwise this 
ideal would be an empty one; it would be impossible to say what the good actions were, 
that were to be done for the sake of their goodness; and the interest in it impossible, 
since it would be an interest without an object. (Green, 1986a: 14) 
 
And a prior morality here refers to a recognised common good that expresses itself in a form 
of social requirement, such as a moral law by which individuals can judge what is good and 
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bad (Green, 2003: 232). For Green, the moral law signifies a primitive morality that ‘consists 
in the observance of rules established for a common good, yet this “outward” morality is the 
presupposition of the “higher”’ (Green, 1986a: 92). As to the formation of the idea of a 
common good, this is brought about by the unity of practical reason and natural sympathy of 
human beings. While a person can exercise the capability of practical reason to conceive a 
good, the affection to care about others is based in natural sympathy. Green indicates that it is 
‘an ultimate fact of human history ... that out of sympathies of animal origin, through their 
presence in a self-conscious soul, there arise interests as of a person in persons’ (Green, 2003: 
231). The function of rational self-consciousness is to formulate an idea of the good, but it is 
through the operation of natural sympathy that an idea of a common good is able to be 
conceived (Green, 2005a: 56-57). A common good is therefore founded on a unity of rational 
self-consciousness with natural sympathy which is recognised by each individual who lives in 
the same community as the absolute desirable object (Green, 2003: 232-233). It seems, then, 
that, on the basis of such an idea of a common good, Green maintains the distinction between 
personal good and moral good without making any empty claim. 
          At the same time, Green does not therefore omit the importance of the personal good. 
According to Dimova-Cookson, because Green is eager ‘to reject entirely the hedonistic 
utilitarian theory of pleasure’, he ‘effectively disqualifies the ordinary good from being good 
at all’ (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 97). She argues that this ‘devaluation of the ordinary good is 
related to his neglect of the importance of the self-centred framework of general human 
practice’ (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 97). A person’s idea of a common good is incapable of 
the same interest as others, and it is impossible to equalise the idea of a common good as the 
moral ideal for each person (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 92-97; Skorupski, 2006). For her, a 
person’s idea of a common good is always subjective and is personal; in other words, it is a 
sort of personal good as well. It cannot be the true good equally for each individual person, 
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but an ordinary good for them as ‘a group of people buy a house and each contributes an 
equal share of money’ (Dimova-Cookson, 2001: 100). Nevertheless, Green, on the one hand, 
does not ignore the importance of the personal good, and on the other hand, does not 
conceive a common good in the way that Dimova-Cookson claims. As he says, ‘[o]ur 
ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth’ (Green, 2003: 210), a good common 
to a person with others is the person’s own good no doubt, and the good can bring a 
satisfactory feeling as pleasure for the person indeed. However, these are not the reasons why 
Green claims that a common good is the moral law and the absolute good for each individual 
in the same society. For him, it is when a good common to individuals has been recognised 
that that recognised common good is to be absolute for them. Even though a person may 
conceive diverse ideas of a good common to others, it does not mean that these ideas will be 
the absolute good for them. The distinction of a common good as the moral good with the 
personal good is not dichotomous, but is rather a good with different attributes. In this sense, 
as Simhony indicates, Dimova-Cookson’s separation of the moral good from the ordinary 
good ‘is bold since it goes against Green himself by introducing a duality to his view of the 
individual which he denies’ (Simhony, 2005: 135). 
          Nonetheless, an individual person’s recognition of a common good in Green’s view is 
neither trying to ‘create’ a common ground for each individual nor ascertaining whether he or 
she will concur with it or not. For him, 
 
[i]t has become a common-place among us that the moral susceptibilities which we find 
in ourselves, would not exist but for the action of law and authoritative custom on many 
generations of our ancestors. ... The most elementary moralisation of the individual 
must always have arisen from his finding himself in the presence of a requirement, 
enforced against his inclinations to pleasure, but in an interest which he can recognise 
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as being his own, no less than the interest of those by whom the requirement is 
enforced. The recognition of such an interest by the individual is an outcome of the 
same reason as that which has led to the maintenance of the requirement by the society 
he belongs to. All further development of morality – all articulation of duties, all 
education of conscience in response to them – presupposes this primary recognition. 
(Green, 2003: 237) 
 
A common well-being recognised by individuals is immanent in their social duties and social 
conventions. It is ‘only so far as we are members of a society, of which we can conceive the 
common good as our own’ (Green, 2003: 209). Accordingly, Brink’s claim that Green’s 
emphasis on the role of conventional morality ‘displays a disappointing form of moral 
complacency’ seems to be misleading (Brink, 2003: 73). While Brink suggests an 
individualistic interpretation of Green’s idea of a moral self and claims that individuals define 
the idea of a common good separately, he omits the importance of conventional morality in 
Green’s thought. Instead, he proposes a deliberative and prudent idea of the individual self. 
This self invents an idea of the common good, by measuring the compensations from caring 
for others, on the basis of his or her psychological bonds with them (Brink, 2003: 42-69; 
Simhony, 2005: 137-138). Nonetheless, Green’s idea of a common good is not conceived and 
recognised in this ‘creation’ sense, but is rather immanent in the conventional morality. 
Outside the context of a conventional social life, an individual person is incapable of 
conceiving a common good. It is living in a society that enables the person ‘to give that effect 
to the idea of himself as the object of his actions, to the idea of a possible better state of 
himself, without which the idea would remain like that of space to a man who had not the 
senses either of sight or touch’ (Green, 2003: 218). Conventional morality is thus essential to 
an individual person’s conception of a recognised common good. However, since a common 
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good as the moral law regulating individuals is embodied in social and cultural institutions, 
the question therefore arises – is it not heteronomous rather than autonomous as well? 
          The short answer to the above question is no. For Green, on the one hand, an individual 
can only form his own personality by living within a society, and that individual person who 
is grown and educated in a society inclines to follow the instructions and requirements of the 
society. To fulfil the duties of a station is a primary aim for the person, for it makes what he 
or she is (Green, 2003: 209-210). On the other hand, as a self-conscious human being, the 
person also has the capability to reflect on what his empirical self is at present and to 
conceive a better state of that self. But the conception of a better self may be in conflict with 
his current social duty and the recognised common good in the current social and cultural 
institutions. Hence, the individual person can reflect on the current conception of common 
goods through his or her self-reflection. Green’s idea of a common good as the moral law, 
therefore, is concerned with autonomy, present within practical reason, and is not absolute 
but conversely transformable. In the meantime, it is precisely by virtue of that self-conscious 
capability that the moralisation of human consciousness can be initiated. 
          It has been shown that in opposition to the hedonistic and utilitarian conception of the 
good as pleasure, Green develops an alternative conception of moral good in accordance with 
the concept of a recognised common good, whereby he situates the moral ideal within human 
agency, and this also embodies individual autonomy. Nonetheless, individual autonomy is not 
a project which can be completed; instead, it is a perpetual process of striving for an 
individual. For Green, individual autonomy is therefore an achievement drawn from the 
moralisation of human consciousness. 
          With regard to the moral development of an individual person, as Harris indicates, 
Green distinguishes three stages (Harris, 1989: 546-547). At first, an individual person is 
following the instructions and requirements of a society habitually and uncritically, whereas 
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‘a direction of a man’s will to the highest possible realisation of his faculties is the common 
ground of every form of true virtue ... but the habit even in its earliest and least reflective 
stage was to be under the direction of reason, as embodied in law or acting through a personal 
educator’ (Green, 2003: 298; cf. Nicholson, 2006: 151-152). That individual’s primitive 
consciousness of moral ideas is imbued with the conventional morality as ‘the a priori 
furniture’ of his or her mind (Green, 2003: 387-388). Nonetheless, the motive of the 
individual, in following the cultivation and discipline of social and cultural institutions, is still 
self-interested (Harris, 1989: 546). But after a process of reflecting on this conventional 
morality, the individual will come to have an idea ‘of something that universally should be, 
of something absolutely desirable, of a single end or object of life’ (Green, 1986c: 247). The 
individual can come to an awareness of the distinction between the particular moral ideas 
embodied in the current social and cultural institutions and the universal and absolute moral 
ideal.  
          For Green, this is a critical moment in the moral development of the individual. On the 
one hand, before the individual recognises the social requirements and expectations of him as 
the duties in the fulfilment of which he can satisfy himself and contribute to the society and 
other individuals, he will still consider the conventional morality as imposed from without, 
whereas the individual in this scenario is inclined to revolt against its strictures. On the other 
hand, if the individual can reconcile the turbulence in his mind, and seek an ideal object the 
realisation of which can contribute to the advance of human perfection, he will then achieve 
the third and highest stage of this process of moralisation as well as maintaining his 
autonomy. At such a stage the individual person not only reconciles his practical reason with 
will, but also reconciles the objective reason embodied in the conventional morality with the 
individual’s subjective reason. Green indicates that ‘the objects to which the will is directed 
are not merely determined by customs and institutions which are due to the operation of 
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practical reason in previous ages, but are embodiments or expressions of the conception of 
what absolutely should be as formed by the man who seeks to satisfy himself in their 
realisation’ (Green, 1986c: 249). That is to say, what has been expressed in conventional 
morality are the ideal objects that previous people conceived as contributory to the 
achievement of human perfection: ‘the systematic custom & law of society [is] really [a] 
projection or expression of the universality of [the] self though never fully adequate. In being 
determined by it, man is determined by [the] self. Thus [he] realizes [the] idea of duty. But 
this implies conformity to custom &c, be loyal i.e. for its own sake, & according to [the] 
spirit not to [the] letter’ (quoted from Wempe, 2004: 141). Nonetheless, the individual who 
questions conventional morality by reference to the ideal of human perfection can suggest 
different conceptions of the object: ‘[h]e is like a judge who is perpetually making new law in 
ostensibly interpreting the old. He extracts the higher meaning out of the recognised social 
code, giving reality to some requirements which it has hitherto only contained potentially’ 
(Green, 2003: 360). The individual person who is capable of suggesting a new ideal object 
for the society in pursuit of human perfection, for Green, is ‘a conscientious man’ (Green, 
2003: 354-355). Thus, the moralisation of human consciousness has three stages in Green’s 
view: the first is an unreflective consciousness in which an individual just follows the 
instructions and expectations of a society to think and to act; the second is a turbulent 
consciousness in which an individual encounters a choice between acknowledging social 
conventions voluntarily and giving new moral ideas to the society; the third is a 
reconciliatory consciousness in which an individual finds a way to reconcile new moral ideas 
with existing social conventions. While conceptions of the common good embodied in social 
and cultural institutions are the representations of previous ideal objects, an individual person 
as a self-conscious agent is capable of reflection on both embodiments and representations, 
and can conceive a different version within altered circumstances. 
 
 
94 
          Nonetheless, though Green indicates that a person with doubts about the existing social 
and cultural institutions is regarded as conscientious, he does not advocate a sceptical 
atmosphere. Firstly, the person’s moral conscience is cultivated by social and cultural 
institutions, from which he develops a moral ideal that has not been expressed perfectly in the 
current society; it is a consciousness of a moral principle derived from social convention and 
moral habit (Green, 1997: 36-37; Green, 2003: 387-389).34 Accordingly, in Green’s view, 
before the person can critically examine conventional morality, he should first have a 
comprehensive and coherent understanding of the moral ideas expressed in the society. 
Secondly, Green remarks that the people who are focused on questioning social and cultural 
institutions, and are proud of themselves for so acting, are worse than a person who does not 
question at all. This kind of person is self-conceited and merely intends to earn his or her own 
reputations through criticism (Green, 2003: 355-356). For Green, then, ‘[a] man’s approach 
to the ideal of virtue is by no means to be measured by the clearness or constancy of his 
reflection upon the ideal’ (Green, 2003: 355). Thirdly, while scepticism has constantly 
challenged our practical moral ideas, as embodied in the current social and cultural 
institutions, these ideas are still the furniture of our conscience, which can assist us in making 
judgement and action. To Green, the task of moral philosopher is ‘in counteracting the 
advantage which scepticism may otherwise give to passion against duty’ (Green, 2003: 385). 
A philosophical criticism aims to disentangle the current imperfect expressions of moral ideas 
and to explain the validity of the ideas coherently against absolute scepticism. 
 
It may be doubted, whether the apparent mischief, which arises in a speculative age 
from the habit of asking a reason why for the rules of respectability, does more than 
affect the excuses made for acts of self-indulgence of which men, innocent of criticism 
                                                
34 For more considerations of Green’s notion of conscience see Richter (1964) and also Leighton, 2004: chap. 4; 
de Sanctis, 2005: chap. 2; Tyler, 2012: chap. 4. 
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or speculation, would equally be guilty. But ... it remains true that the value of the 
Dialectic which asks and gives such an account of ideal good as at once justifies and 
limits obedience to practical authorities, is conditional upon its finding in the individual 
a well-formed habitual morality. (Green, 2003: 395-396) 
 
The dialectical processing of individual conscience and social institution towards the ideal of 
human perfection is inseparable from a habitual and conventional moral life, in Green’s view. 
It is a dynamics of human consciousness in that an individual self engages in self-
examination and self-assertion within a social life in pursuit of the perfect reconciliation with 
the world.35 With such a developmental and, to a certain extent, optimistic view of human 
moral life, on the basis of a human ontology, Green’s liberal moral philosophy thus proposes 
an idea of ethical life with an idea of the perfect freedom. Nonetheless, there is a sceptical 
element in Green’s vision of human life, in that he does not share the same faith in the ethical 
state with Hegel. Consequently the ideal of human perfection after all is unattainable.36 
 
5. History, freedom, and the human ideal 
So far I have given an account of Green’s view on the moralisation of human consciousness 
and his ideas of the ethical self and human freedom by reference to his developmental 
account of human consciousness. I have also indicated that Green’s main intention – to 
establish such a system of ethics on the ground of a metaphysical and ontological treatment 
of the human person – goes against the prevailing hedonistic utilitarian philosophy in 
nineteenth-century Britain. In order to expound that comprehensive philosophical doctrine of 
                                                
35 That ‘[t]he whole moral life is, in fact, a process in which, though it be sometimes like a stream that seems to 
run backward, man, as an unrealised self, is constantly fusing the skirts of the alien matter that surrounds him, 
and fashioning the world of his desires to a universe adequate himself’ (Green, 1906d: 86). 
36 Regarding to Green’s criticism of Hegel’s concept of the ethical state, Nicholson has developed an inspiring 
and lucid argument. See Nicholson, 1995. 
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human morality, Green learnt much from Kant and Hegel, and critically adapted their 
arguments. In the preceding chapter, it has been shown that Green advanced Kant’s 
philosophy by overcoming the dualism between a world of the things-in-themselves and 
human mind that Kant left. Nonetheless, Green also tries to advance on Hegel’s moral and 
political philosophy by substituting an idea of the ethical self for Hegel’s concept of the 
ethical state.  
          Green’s attitude towards Hegel has been mentioned before. He claimed the 
philosophical work of Hegel’s should be done over again (Caird, 1883: 5). Nettleship also 
indicates that Green was taking Hegel’s systematic thought to be ‘the last word of 
philosophy’, but he ‘did not occupy himself with the exposition of it, but with the 
reconsideration of the elements in Kant of which it was the development’ (Nettleship, 1906: 
lxxxv-lxxxvi). A significant result of that critical consideration of Hegel’s philosophy is 
Green’s comment on Hegel’s concept of the state. In 1867 lectures on moral and political 
philosophy Green explicates Hegel’s concept of the state. He notes that (1) ‘In society first 
arise those distinctions which are recognized by others besides the two parties. Wealth is 
unequally distributed and difference of ranks arises, as step to forming a state’ (Green, 1867a: 
176); (2) ‘The society without the state is a mere body ... and the state is the reason and soul’ 
(Green, 1867a: 177); (3) ‘The state is an individual, a society is not. Societies differ from one 
another in point of number. But states like men have not their individuality in their bodies or 
organism. Individuality is negative; in being an individual you must be determined by 
negation of others, and hence states stand in a negative position to other states’ (Green, 
1867a: 178); (4) ‘States pass into history. One state asserts its principle over another and then 
disappears. So history gives a representation of moral philosophy’ (Green, 1867a: 178); and 
(5) ‘The realization of freedom is the establishment of a perfectly free state. At first sight you 
might say you are not free, for your individuality is repressed. But this is to lose sight of what 
 
 
97 
is the highest in man. When a man grasps a truth theoretically and practically as duty, he 
ceases to care for himself and becomes a part of the state’ (Green, 1867a: 181). That is to say, 
according to (1) (2) (3) and (5), Hegel’s concept of the state, in Green’s understanding of it, is 
the actualisation of the spiritual, rational and perfect freedom, and reigns over society and the 
individual person.37 
          However, according to such an apprehension, Green argues that ‘Hegel’s account of 
freedom as realised in the state does not seem to correspond to the facts of society as it is, or 
even as, under the unalterable conditions of human nature, it ever could be’ (Green, 1986c: 
233). For him, Hegel obscures the difference between the ideal and the actual, and therefore 
ignores the fact that ‘under the best conditions of any society that has been such realisation of 
freedom is most imperfect’ (Green, 1986c: 233). At the same time, an important distinction 
between Green and his view of Hegel is that the state for him does not reign over individuals, 
but rather protects and ensures the necessary conditions in which the individuals can actualise 
their ideas of the best self. Nonetheless, Green’s comments on Hegel’s concept of the state 
are to some extent misleading, as Hegel’s concern in the Philosophy of Right is not to justify 
the reign of any current state, but rather to give a philosophical account for the raison d’être 
of the modern state. It ‘is not a description of any one actual state, although it is full of 
empirical detail, but of the inherent rationality of the modern state as such’ (Forbes, 1975: 
xxiii). Forbes argues that the actualisation of freedom in Hegel’s ethical state is not final and 
absolute. It is conversely the objective side of freedom which will reconcile with the 
                                                
37 The five distinctive features of Hegel’s concept of the state that Green identified are not far away from what 
Hegel himself expounded. In Philosophy of Right: ‘[t]he state is the actuality of the ethical Idea - the ethical 
spirit as substantial will, manifest and clear to itself, which thinks and knows itself and implements what it 
knows in so far as it knows it. It has its immediate existence ... in custom and its mediate existence in the self-
consciousness of the individual ... in the individual’s knowledge and activity, just as self-consciousness, by 
virtue of its disposition, has its substantial freedom in the state as its essence, its end, and the product of its 
activity’ (§ 257); ‘The state is the actuality of the substantial will, an actuality which it possesses in the 
particular self-consciousness when this has been raised to its universality; as such, it is the rational in and for 
itself. This substantial unity is an absolute and unmoved end in itself, and in it, freedom enters into its highest 
right, just as this ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals ... whose highest duty is to be 
members of the state’ (§ 258) (Hegel, 1991: 275). 
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subjective side in the absolute of art, religion and philosophy, and ultimately, the absolute is 
realised in history (Forbes, 1975: xxiii). A state as ‘[t]he “earthly God” is seen to suffer the 
fate of everything mortal and finite in what appears at first glance to be a realm wholly given 
over to the play of the contingent and the unforeseen. International law between sovereign 
states is no more than an “ought”; there is no higher court of judgment than history – the 
world’s court’ (Forbes, 1975: xxiii). As Hegel himself claims, ‘[w]orld history is the 
expression of the divine and absolute process of the spirit in its highest forms, of the 
progression whereby it discovers its true nature and becomes conscious itself’ (Hegel, 1975: 
65). Green’s apprehension of Hegel’s concept of the state is accordingly not correct and leads 
to his criticism being misleading (cf. Nicholson, 1995: 67-70). 
          Hence, while Green has identified that the modern state in Hegel’s thought is doomed 
and will pass into history (4), he nonetheless ignores this point and misinterprets Hegel’s 
concept of the state. But this misconception of Hegel discloses a significant insight into 
Green’s view on the ethical life, suggesting that the perfect freedom which each individual 
strives for is, after all, unattainable. An exogenous reason is, as mentioned, the necessary 
social conditions for the individual to achieve the realisation of the perfect freedom are 
always imperfect. However, the more important reason for human imperfection is the human 
condition, as such. Tyler contends that that imperfection stems ‘from the fact that the process 
via which each of us individually instantiates this principle involves the medium of our 
animal body: that is, each of us is a spiritual being with a physical existence that brings its 
own needs and limitations’ (Tyler, 2010: 95). Nonetheless, he argues, there is an abstract and 
indeterminate drive innate in human nature moving us towards the ultimate harmonious 
system of values and ideas as the apotheosis of human perfection (Tyler, 2010: 87, 128-129). 
In Tyler’s view, therefore, the animal and instinctive part of human beings for Green is the 
cause of our finitude and imperfection in relation to real freedom. 
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          Yet animal impulses and desires are not a sufficient reason to explain Green’s claim 
that the human ideal is unattainable. On the one hand, the impulses and desires are not 
limitations on human beings in pursuit of the perfect freedom, but an indispensable condition 
of ethical life. For Green, the exercise of rational will is inseparable from desires and 
feelings. They are necessary constituents of our conception of goods and ideas. Without that 
animal part, we human beings are incapable of realising the distinction between vices and 
virtues (Green, 2003: 199-200). On the other hand, the reason for that ideal of human 
perfection to be unattainable is inherent in the very capability of being a moral agent per se. 
As Green observes, 
 
... regarding the good generically as that which satisfies desire, but considering the 
objects we desire to be by no means necessarily pleasures, we shall naturally 
distinguish the moral good as that which satisfies the desire of a moral agent, or that in 
which a moral agent can find the satisfaction of himself which he necessarily seeks. 
The true good we shall understand in the same way. It is an end in which the effort of a 
moral agent can really find rest. (Green, 2003: 195-196) (italics added) 
 
It is when intellect, desire, will and practical reason, all these modes of human consciousness, 
are finally at rest that we achieve the human ideal. If moral agency is still in action, the ideal 
objects and the moral goods so conceived cannot be the absolutely desired object. 
Nonetheless, if the moral agency is at rest, the distinctive condition for us being human will 
vanish. It is precisely because human beings are moral agents, as well as animal organisms, 
that the reformation and amelioration of human society is in demand (Green, 2003: 360-363). 
The reason that Green claims that the political state is always failing to meet the necessary 
 
 
100 
social conditions in which individuals achieve perfect freedom is accordingly inherent in the 
very conditions necessary to being human. 
          By virtue of this point – that the ideal of human perfection is after all unattainable – 
Green’s idea of moral progress in history is obviously not as optimistic as some 
commentators assert in that the progress of human history is inevitable as the manifestation of 
the will of God (Richter, 1956: 458-460; Lewis, 1962: 36-41; Hoover, 1973: 556; Armour, 
2003). Instead, it is as Tyler indicates: ‘progress is something we must work for and not wait 
for’ (Tyler, 2012: 169). The idea of progress in Green’s view is but ‘a hermeneutic principle 
for studying past societies and ... a critical standard whereby they could be judged’ (Bellamy, 
1990: 136). As Green claims, the task of moral philosophy ‘is to find a criterion of moral 
categories’ and ‘[t]he best criterion proposed is that of historical succession: the category that 
comes after is better than that which comes before’ (Green, 1867a: 117). An idea of progress 
is to provide us with the guidance for having a better understanding of what the moral ideal is 
from human history (Green, 1867a: 117; cf. 108). It is not to suggest that there is a 
metaphysical force directing the process of history, but to remind us that there are practical 
moral ideas immanent in history, which contains diverse instantiations of the idea of a 
common good conceived and recognised by past generations (Boucher, 1985: 48; Tyler, 
2006a: 88-90; cf. Green, 2005c). Nonetheless, the motivation for an individual to study 
human history and to comprehend the manifestations of the moral ideal is one of self-
examination and self-improvement whereby the dialectical progress between the individual 
and the society may be initiated. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Thus far it has been argued that in order to establish a liberal moral philosophy contrary to 
hedonistic utilitarian philosophy, Green begins with the ontology of human consciousness 
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and depicts a dialectical development of individual freedom and social institution moving 
towards the ideal of human perfection, the reconciliation of practical reason with will as well 
as the reconciliation of human beings with the world. Nonetheless, the ontological condition 
for us to be human prescribes the boundaries of what our rational will can achieve. Hence the 
ideal of human perfection is nothing but an unattainable future which indicates that the 
development of human history is endless. With this sceptical notion in his mind, Green 
therefore developed an idea of the ethical self to substitute for Hegel’s concept of the ethical 
state, though social and political institutions in his view still have the task of providing and 
ensuring a certain necessary condition which allows individuals to pursue their own self-
realisation. In the next chapter accordingly I will move to Green’s social and political 
thought, in which he explores an idea of ‘the common good’ in society based on his 
philosophical ethics. We will see that the divergence of social consciousness causes 
persisting conflicts and inequalities in human society. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SOCIAL CONFLICT AND STATE ACTION: 
GREEN’S IDEA OF THE COMMON GOOD SOCEITY 
 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, I have demonstrated that contrary to hedonistic utilitarian 
philosophy, which is founded on the empiricist and naturalistic metaphysics, Green 
established his own philosophical ethics on a metaphysical and ontological conception of the 
human person, and a moral and developmental theory of human freedom. The moral 
perfection that each human person strives for is the ideal, leading to the dialectics of 
individual freedom and social institution. As a self-conscious agent, the individual is capable 
of developing his or her own abilities within a social community in pursuit of a better life, 
while the social and political institutions established in that community require 
transformations and reformations constantly, as the necessary provisions that institutions 
should provide for individual self-realisation are, unfortunately, always imperfect. The focus 
of this chapter, then, turns to the necessary internal contradiction in Green’s idea of the 
common good society, which is the result of his human ontology: the gap between social 
conflicts and the ideal social harmony. 
          Green’s idea of the common good has been located at the centre of his social and 
political philosophy. As Harris and Morrow say, ‘[t]his idea of common good is absolutely 
central to Green’s theory. It provides the basis on which he discusses the social and political 
structures and conditions necessary to the realisation of human potentialities, and the extent 
to which political authority could be used to facilitate the pursuit of self-perfection’ (Harris 
and Morrow, 1986: 6; cf. Simhony, 2009a: 31). To Nicholson, it is ‘Green’s ultimate moral 
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criterion’ for state intervention and moral dispute (Nicholson, 1986: 82). Focusing on the 
relationship between the right and the good, Grygienc, on the other hand, indicates that, 
Green’s idea of the common good has a procedural and a teleological nature suggestive of the 
formulation of political rights (Grygienc, 2012: 74-75), that Green’s idea of the common 
good is used to signify a moral principle concerning the reconciliatory and well-ordered 
society. But, Milne argues, when Green suggests that the common good, as the foundation of 
a society, is non-competitive, he seems to omit the effort and the sacrifice each individual 
person has made for the society. He also underestimates the impact of differences and 
conflicts between persons in reality (Milne, 1986). In a similar vein, Horton also indicates 
that Green overemphasises the non-competitive feature of the common good and ignores the 
conflicts existing in reality (Horton, 2010: 74-76). Countering these criticisms, Tyler contests 
that Green does recognise that there are conflicts and competitions between social members, 
while the non-competitive ideal of the common good is not philosophically untenable (Tyler, 
2012: 58-60). He argues that to take the common good principle as an ideal is not to assert 
that there is no conflict in reality; on the contrary, the concept of conflict in Green’s thought 
provides an account of the ‘inevitable and potentially progressive political phenomenon’ 
(Tyler, 2006a: 73-74). Nonetheless, Tyler’s response retains a gap between the practical 
reality and the theoretical ideal in Green’s idea of the common good. 
          In this chapter, I will argue that Green’s idea of the common good society does imply 
ideas of conflict and diversity, and it provides a justification for social and state action to 
intervene and to reconcile that conflict and diversity in human society. In the following 
sections, I will first introduce Green’s organic view of society in order to indicate that, to 
Green, having an idea of the common good is a necessary condition for the formation of 
human society, and this idea also signifies a universal moral principle that can only be 
embodied and achieved in and through the transformation and the development of each 
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particular society. I will then explicate the notion that though the idea of the common good as 
a universal moral principle regulates an ideal just and liberal society for which human beings 
strive, according to Green’s rights recognition thesis, conflicts and inequalities will persist in 
human society and will always require collective actions in order to maintain a system of 
rights. Green therefore develops a justification for state action. Nonetheless, I will suggest 
that, while Green underscores the importance of collective action, he does not abolish 
individual and social differences. The divergence of social and moral ideas, in his view, is 
inherent in the ontological condition of the human person, and conflict and diversity are 
indispensable factors to the development of human society. 
 
2. Social organism and the common good 
It has been argued that Green’s idea of society is organic (Simhony, 1991a). For Simhony, 
among British idealists the idea of society is mainly one of a non-holistic relational organism. 
It is not a mere aggregate of individual persons or a holistic whole in which differences are 
demolished and assimilated (Simhony, 1991a: 520-523). In her view, the relational organism 
idea of society maintains the notion that individuals and social institutions are interdependent. 
They are constituents of an interactive structure of social relations in pursuit of the ideal of 
self-realisation and common good. With this organic view of society, with which L. T. 
Hobhouse would concur, it is the conception of society ‘towards which Mill worked through 
his career, and which forms the starting-point of T. H. Green’s philosophy alike in ethics and 
in politics’ (Hobhouse, 1994: 60). Nevertheless, Hobhouse reminds us that the term 
‘organism’ is easily abused, for the term has also been adopted by naturalists and 
evolutionists, such as Herbert Spencer, whose work Green is set against (Hobhouse, 1994: 
60). Recently, Tyler has also suggested that there is a danger in applying the term ‘organic’ to 
Green’s social ontology, as it may lead us to believe that in Green’s view individual persons 
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can only achieve true freedom ‘by referring to the impersonal meta-perspective of society 
conceived as a single, integrated mechanism’ (Tyler, 2012: 33; cf. 27-32). Cacoullos, 
meanwhile, claims that Green’s theory is not organic at all, for the social community in 
Green’s thought exists to promote the moral development of its individual members and is 
purely instrumental (1974: 14). 
          Thus, there are three issues: first, the distinction between the relational and the holistic 
view of organism; second, the relation between the means and the end; lastly, the difference 
between natural and spiritual organisms. Henry Jones (1852-1922) has made a lucid response 
to these issues in terms of idealist argument. He contends in his ‘The Social Organism’ 
(1883) that the main point of the organic conception of society is to signify that ‘an individual 
has no life except that which is social, and that he cannot realise his own purposes except in 
realising the larger purposes of society’ (Jones, 1997: 9). But the relation of the individual to 
society is not merely a means to an end (Jones, 1997: 7-8), as the individual and society are 
mutually constituent: together they contribute to the realisation of an end. Meanwhile, ‘the 
social organism’, as Jones argues, ‘is not only “sensitive” in every part, but it is self-
conscious in every part’ (Jones, 1997: 15). It is not a natural organism in which each 
individual part cooperates with others mechanically without consciousness. It is rather an 
organism in which each individual voluntarily and consciously devotes themselves to a 
common purpose.  
          In a similar vein, Green adopts the term ‘organism’ in Prolegomena to Ethics to 
address the ways in which an organic whole and its constituent parts interrelate with each 
other in contributing to an end, suggesting that ‘the constituent elements of an organism can 
only be truly and adequately conceived as rendered what they are by the end realised through 
the organism’ (Green, 2003: 90). Meanwhile, Green continues that the idea of social 
organism is used to signify a condition in which each individual person ‘voluntarily’ lives 
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with other persons by reference to a social purpose, which therefore unites them. In other 
words, this is not a claim that there is an ultimate end for which human beings naturally and 
mechanically struggle (Green, 1986a: 98-99, 119; Simhony, 1991a: 532-533). Hence, though 
the term ‘organism’ has been applied in physiology and biology, for Green, it is still possible 
for it to be used in a social and moral sense without confusion. The social purpose for which 
the individual strives is a consciousness of the absolutely desirable object shared by all social 
members, namely the common good. 
          Grygienc has identified two important characteristics of Green’s common good. On the 
one side, it is objective in a historical and geopolitical sense, and on the other side, it is 
normative and absolute as the telos innate in human nature (Grygienc, 2012: 74). From a 
historical and geopolitical point of view, there are different forms of social community at 
different points in history, such as the family, tribe, city-state, civil association, kingdom, 
confederation, empire and the modern state. But the primitive reason for persons to live with 
each other is simply a question of natural sympathy and survival (Green, 2003: 229-231). 
Nonetheless, though an individual person needs to cooperate with others to survive from time 
to time, it does not mean that he will not disown this social life if the situation changes. There 
has to be a practical reason for an individual person to remain in the society and to care about 
the subsistence of this form of life (Diggs, 1973: 289). In Green’s view, this reason is an idea 
of good as an absolute desirable common interest shared and recognised by individual 
persons. It is an idea of a common good immanent in social institutions and conventional 
morality which, as indicated before, is the expression of the dominant interests identified by 
previous generations. The idea of the common good in this sense is therefore historical and 
particular. 
          On the other hand, Green’s idea of the common good in the absolute and normative 
sense indicates that the formulation and the organisation of a social community is necessarily 
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undertaken with reference to a universal interest, rather than any particular interests. For 
Green, ‘neither trade nor conquest by themselves would have helped to widen the 
comprehension of political union, to extend the range within which reciprocal claims are 
recognised of man on man, and ultimately to familiarise men with the idea of human 
brotherhood’ (Green, 2003: 332-333). To unite individuals within a community requires an 
intellectual and spiritual object willed jointly. It is ‘a good in the effort after which there can 
be no competition between man and man; of which the pursuit by any individual is an equal 
service to others and to himself’ (Green, 2003: 335). Although each individual who lives in a 
community may be not conscious of that good as that which he or she contributes to, a shared 
interest as the common good ‘must have been pursued in order to the formation of the most 
primitive tribal or civil society’ (Green, 2003: 336). The idea of the common good in this 
view is therefore immanent and fundamental as the necessary logical condition underlying 
every form of social life. 
          Regarding the normative aspect of Green’s idea of the common good, Tyler suggests 
that it is close to Kant’s categorical imperative in that it is the true and objective moral law 
which denotes a kingdom of ends (Tyler, 2012: 54-58), because individuals living in the 
society, as suggested, are in harmony with each other, and are ‘interested in each other as 
persons in so far as each, being aware that another presents his own self-satisfaction to 
himself as an object, finds satisfaction for himself in procuring or witnessing the self-
satisfaction of the other’ (Green, 2003: 218). Accordingly, it is a society in which each 
individual is treated as an end in itself. However, though the common good principle, in this 
sense, is related to Kant’s categorical imperative, as Green himself indicates the two concepts 
are still different. While the categorical imperative discloses the universal and absolute 
principle operating and immanent in the process of social organisation (which is formulated 
by individuals), it nonetheless ignores the concrete and determinate embodiments in social 
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institutions and conventional morality (Green, 2003: 249-250). Pertaining to the principle of 
the common good, Green postulates that: 
 
We convey it in the concrete by speaking of a human family, of a fraternity of all men, 
of the common fatherhood of God; or we suppose a universal Christian citizenship, as 
wide as the Humanity for which Christ died, and in thought we transfer to this, under 
certain analogical adaptations, those claims of one citizen upon another which have 
been actually enforced in societies united under a single sovereignty. (Green, 2003: 
238) 
 
This suggests that the principle of the common good is an abstract ideal gradually disclosed 
in social practices and individual articulations. Tyler argues, therefore, that the universal 
feature of the common good is denoted by its logical and philosophical attributes rather than 
any sense of a universal compelling moral law which pays no regard to an individual’s 
endorsement. It is thus not the true and absolute moral law, but ‘a heuristic fiction’ by which 
a critical citizen might articulate a better idea of his moral self (Tyler, 2012: 71; cf. 58, 60). 
The common good principle in this sense is not normative, but is rather a logical reference 
point with which the individual can examine critically existing social and moral ideas (Tyler, 
2012: 46, 69-76, 87-90). 
          However, Green’s common good principle connotes two normative features: non-
exclusive and non-competitive (Nicholson, 1990: 80; Simhony, 1991b: 317-319; Simhony, 
2009a: 33). It has been indicated that for Green the idea of the common good is a spiritual 
and ideal object after which there is no competition between individual persons and each 
individual person is equal as the end in him or herself. Green’s idea of the common good 
principle, as the moral ideal driving the development of human society, is accordingly with 
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two normative features, non-competitive and non-exclusive. However, while the principle of 
the common good in this sense is a universal moral ideal of human society, it is nonetheless 
abstract. Green therefore provides two complementary arguments with which to remedy this 
abstractness. Firstly, while he notes the abstract nature of Kant’s categorical imperative as 
drawn from Hegel’s criticism, he emphasises the determinations of the common good 
principle in historical development. For Green, ‘Kant’s ethics seem unpractical; this is only 
because he gives a mere schema, a form: his ethics are entirely abstract and formal, not 
concrete’ (Green, 1867a: 172). Nonetheless, ‘by Hegel’s moral philosophy we can explain 
Kant’s. The philosophy of history is the succession of abstract conceptions, each becoming 
more and more universal’ (Green, 1867a: 173). Drawing on Hegel’s idea of how an ethical 
community comes to be, the idea of the common good as a normative principle can explain 
and guide the development of human society towards ideal harmony. But this can only be 
seen in the concrete manifestations of this principle in human history. Secondly, despite the 
fact that Green adopts Hegel’s critical view of Kant’s abstract moral principle, with his 
doubts over Hegel’s concept of the ethical state, Green absorbs the Greek ethics of virtue into 
his account of the common good principle. He remarks that ‘a direction of a man’s will to the 
highest possible realisation of his faculties is the common ground of every form of true 
virtue. This direction of the will, according to both Aristotle and Plato, was to be founded on 
habit’ (Green, 2003: 298). That habit, in Green’s view, is ‘of qualities that make the good 
member of a family, or good tribesman, or good citizen’ and cultivates individual persons to 
be interested in social good and social merits (Green, 2003: 287-288, 290-291). The 
embodiment of the common good principle is an ethical self-realisation of an individual 
person in a good and social life. It is not the actualisation of absolute freedom in an ethical 
state. In brief, Green’s idea of the common good is embodied in the development of social 
institutions, which form the moral standard by which each individual distinguishes good from 
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bad. It is neither abstract nor egoistic, but is manifested in concrete social activities 
(Nicholson, 1990: 61-64; Simhony, 2009a: 39-44). To Green, ‘... if it is only the conscience 
of the individual that brings the principle of human equality into productive contact with the 
particular facts of human life, on the other hand it is from the embodiment of the principle 
laws and institutions and social requirements that the conscience itself appropriates it’ 
(Green, 2003: 249). Thus, the principle of the common good is that the moral ideal regulates 
the development of society, contributing to the progress of human perfection. The 
embodiment of the ideal is in and through a dialectical relationship between the social and the 
individual, and relates to the moralisation of human consciousness.38 That is to say, the 
common good principle does have normative efficacy, but this efficacy is not derived from an 
abstract, formal and universal logical argument, it is rather embedded in concrete, substantial 
and particular social practices. 
          In contest with the normative feature of Green’s common good, Milne argues that this 
principle ignores the inevitable conflicts happening between individuals, and the sacrifices 
these individuals have made in order to maintain social harmony. For him, the finitude of 
human beings and the scarcity of resources limit what each individual person can have and 
achieve in an unequal manner. Hence, he claims that ‘[t]he implications of finitude which 
Green manifestly failed to grasp, preclude optimism about universal human wellbeing’ 
(Milne, 1986: 75; cf. Sidgwick, 1902: 68-74; Vincent, 1986a: 13). However, Green is by no 
means an optimist, suggesting that social life is ‘a war, indeed, in which the neutral ground is 
constantly being extended and which is itself constantly yielding new tendencies to peace, but 
in which at the same time new vistas of hostile interests, with new prospects of failure for the 
weaker, are as constantly opening’ (Green, 2003: 289). The ideal society for which the 
common good principle prompts us to struggle is not achievable ‘so long as anything else 
                                                
38 See my discussion of Green’s view of the relation of individual autonomy and social convention in section 
four of chapter four. 
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than self-devotion to an ideal of mutual service is the end’ (Green, 2003: 288). To Green, 
there is a distinction between the actual determinations of the idea of the common good and 
the common good principle itself (Green, 2003: 431-432; cf. 227-228). As Carter says, 
‘Green used the notion of common good to mean the final satisfaction of our potential or the 
true fulfilment of our being. He also used common good to mean an interest or value that is 
shared by members of a community. The distinction appears to be put by Green as the 
difference between the common good (being the true end) and a common good (one version 
or attempt at it)’ (Carter, 2003: 28; cf. Smith, 1981: 194-198; Dimova-Cookson, 1999). The 
principle of the common good is not merely an abstract ideal, but is also immanent and 
manifest in concrete historical and social conditions, and in individual practices, although it 
requires a well-organised society to ensure the condition for that particularisation is possible. 
 
3. Green’s rights recognition thesis and social inequality 
The above discussion indicates that Green’s common good principle is immanent in every 
form of social community as a condition necessary to maintaining a united community. 
Through the development of social life, the principle gradually discloses itself and instils the 
ideas of equality and freedom into each social member’s mind. In this sense, the principle of 
the common good is a normative ideal regulating the progress of human society in 
contributing to human perfection. However, the finite nature of human beings and the 
scarcity of resources nonetheless may lead to wars and competitions where human selfishness 
is the primary impediment to the achievement of the social harmony. Hence, for Green:  
 
unless a discipline and refinement of the natural impulses, through the operation of 
social institutions and arts, went on pari passu with the expression of the idea of 
perfection in such institutions and arts, the direction of the impulses of the individual by 
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this idea, when in some form or other it has been consciously awakened in him, would 
be practically impossible. (Green, 1986c: 247)  
 
Since the moral progress of an individual person relates to the development of the person’s 
rational will, and this may be different for each individual, social regulations are a necessary 
condition to guard against human selfishness.39 The task of social and cultural institutions is 
to reconcile the divergence of individual consciousness with the idea of the common good 
and to ensure each individual is given equal opportunities to achieve his or her self-
realisation. The practical result – so formulated in the development of human history – is 
therefore a general fabric of rights maintained by a social community. However, according to 
Green’s rights recognition thesis, a system of rights itself entails conflicts and inequalities in 
reality, and there are inevitably some people who will be excluded from the system. In the 
case of nineteenth-century British society, the primary exclusion related to the franchise 
(Carter and Mears, 1953: 795-811, 867-869; Cowling, 2005).40 
          As we have seen, Green concerned himself with the inequality prevalent in the 
nineteenth century, and in particular with the inequalities between labourers and capitalists, 
farmers and landowners. To him, ‘[t]he civilisation and freedom of the ancient world were 
                                                
39 Regarding the issue of human selfishness in Green’s thought, Tyler has given a comprehensive discussion. 
See Tyler, 2012: 61-69, and also Dewey, 1893: 661-662; Greengarten, 1981: 38-39; Simhony, 2005: 131-132; 
Simhony, 2009a. 
40 After the 1832 Reform Act passed, the qualification for a voter was lower and the number of people who were 
entitled to vote was therefore increased. Nonetheless, the extension of franchise only covered landowners and 
the wealthy, such as landlords or capitalists. Most of the workers and farmers still did not have the right to vote. 
The situation changed in 1866, after Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) died in 1865, and the radicals in the Liberal 
party came to be more active. Meanwhile, the Conservative Lord Derby (1799-1869) came to be Prime Minister 
in 1866 and the government was under the lead of the Conservative party, which was against a new reformation 
of the parliament. Nonetheless, when the demonstration organised by the Reform League in Hyde Park, which 
was supported by radical liberals, drew the attention of the whole nation to the issue, Lord Derby and the 
Conservatives could not but forward a new reform bill, under such social and political pressure. The bill was 
eventually passed by Parliament. The number of voters was further extended to each householder in towns and 
this was considered a win for the radical liberals. However, the reformation of the British government at this 
stage still left many people behind, for example, women or the labourers who did not live in towns. This meant 
that there were still people who could not fully enjoy and practise their citizenship and civil rights. This civil 
inequality for Green was one of the most urgent issues in nineteenth-century Britain (Tyler, 2003b; Tyler, 
2006a: 59-100). See my discussion in chapter two. 
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short-lived because they were partial and exceptional. If the ideal of true freedom is the 
maximum of power for all members of human society alike to make the best of themselves, 
we are right in refusing to ascribe the glory of freedom to a state in which the apparent 
elevation of the few is founded on the degradation of the many, and in ranking modern 
society, founded as it is on free industry, with all its confusion and ignorant licence and waste 
of effort, above the most splendid of ancient republics’ (Green, 1986b: 200). In order to 
eradicate the inequalities persisting in society, Green advocated the importance of the 
extension of franchise, whilst urging the necessity of repealing unjust social regulations in 
order to ensure equal opportunities for each individual person. His justification for this 
intervention claim began from his innovative perspective on the constitution of individual 
right. 
          Green’s well-known definition of ‘right’ is ‘a power claimed and recognised as 
contributory to a common good’ (Green, 1986a: 79). In opposition to the natural rights 
tradition, Green claims that humans do not entertain individual rights by nature, but rather 
powers and capabilities that can be claimed and recognised to be rights in a social 
community. For him, ‘[n]o one ... can have a right except (1) as a member of a society, and 
(2) of a society in which some common good is recognised by the members of the society as 
their own ideal good, as that which should be for each of them’ (Green, 1986a: 25). While the 
natural right theorists believe that before the existence of human society there must be a 
natural law prescribing human activity and giving the right to each individual person to 
exercise his or her natural powers, Green asserts that ‘[t]here can be no right without a 
consciousness of common interest on the part of members of a society. Without this there 
might be certain powers on the part of individuals, but no recognition of these powers by 
others as powers of which they allow the exercise, nor any claim to such recognition, and 
without this recognition or claim to recognition there can be no right’ (Green, 1986a: 29). A 
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right in his view indicates a normative domain that an individual person has power over, on 
which others should not trespass. This can only be formed by mutual recognition that the 
power is contributory to a shared common good among the society.41 
          However, since a right is not naturally held by an individual and cannot be held by a 
mere self-assertion without social recognition, it seems that an individual cannot entertain 
and enjoy his or her rights until the society authorises him or her to do so. Green’s right 
recognition thesis therefore seems to be a justification for social oppression rather than for 
social reform. Sir W. D. Ross (1877-1971) has commented that ‘it is plainly wrong to 
describe either legal or moral rights as depending for their existence on their recognition, for 
to recognize a thing (in the sense in which ‘recognize’ is here used) is to recognize it as 
existing already. The promulgation of a law is not the recognition of a legal right, but the 
creation of it, though it may imply the recognition of an already existing moral right’ (Ross, 
2002: 50-51; cf. Richter, 1964: 164-165). To Ross, though the creation of legal rights may 
require social recognition, the existence of moral rights comes before the institution of legal 
rights. There has to be ‘something’ there before we come to recognise it, otherwise, ‘[i]t 
would imply that slaves, for instance, acquired the moral right to be free only at the moment 
when a majority of mankind, or of some particular community, formed the opinion that they 
ought to be free, i.e., when the particular person whose conversion to such a view changed a 
minority into a majority changed his mind’ (Ross, 2002: 51). Gerald Gaus, meanwhile, 
argues that to recognise a person having a right does not require presuming something 
existing first, but to create a new status for that person. To him, Green’s idea of recognition 
‘seems more akin to a chair at a meeting who, in recognizing a speaker creates a status; to 
recognize that someone has the floor just is to give him the floor’ (Gaus, 2006: 211). Further, 
Gaus claims that Green’s rights recognition thesis indicates that ‘one can have a right against 
                                                
41 As to Green’s consideration of natural rights tradition, Rex Martin has made a clear and comprehensive 
discussion. See Martin, 2011. 
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a person only if that person’s rational deliberations lead her to recognize the correlative moral 
duty’ (Gaus, 2006: 224). However, this rational mutual recognition in Gaus’s view is just an 
ideal, for an irrational person may not recognise the correlative duty with a right-claim. To 
Gaus, this is the reason why the rights of the slave may not be recognised socially. It is not 
because the rights of the slave cannot be rationally justified, but because the others are not 
sufficiently rational as to recognise them. 
          Nonetheless, such rational and conceptual analysis of right as a right-creation thesis is 
unfortunately unsatisfactory. First of all, as David Boucher indicates, when Gaus remarks that 
the rational recognition creates a right, he nonetheless presumes there is something existing 
before the right is created, because ‘something has to be recognised to give it the status of a 
right’ (Boucher, 2011: 758). To Boucher, there are already some moral ideas and claims 
existing in a society waiting to be justified and recognised as rights, and to be 
institutionalised. A right is not a product of rational deliberation, but is immanent in social 
practices and ordinary dealings, though we may not notice their existence.42 In a similar vein, 
Rex Martin indicates that ‘[a] way of acting or of being treated, so secured, through some 
such form of mutual acknowledgement, is a right. When identified in law and protected by 
legal devices it is a civil right; when underwritten by mere collective conscientiousness, 
without color of legal status or enforcement, it is a natural right’ (Martin, 2011: 98). A right 
in the first place presents in moral habits and social conventions as a collective 
conscientiousness rather than in positive laws. It is ‘a moral claim that becomes a right in 
being recognised and acknowledged as a power that ought to be accepted as necessary to the 
                                                
42 Boucher gives us an interesting and illuminating example: ‘Two people are in the habit over two years of 
meeting every Friday evening at 7:00 p.m. in the same bar. Neither feels it necessary to make any arrangements; 
it is simply assumed that they will see each other the following week. One week one of the friends fails to turn 
up and conveys no apology. Up to this point each has been acting as if they have rights and obligations in 
relation to each other, but neither had explicitly thought about it. It is at this point when expectations are not met 
that at least one of the friends feels that the other has not fulfilled an obligation, and at least in principle the 
other can be persuaded to acknowledge this. In other words, he is recognising a right and expects his friend to 
do so too ... The social practice creates the right, or recognises it in the first of Green’s senses, and the 
acknowledgement of it occurs in this example, when it is somehow violated and has to be addressed’ (Boucher, 
2011: 758). 
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promotion of the common good’ (Boucher, 2011: 758). Nevertheless, though Martin and 
Boucher both acknowledge that in Green’s rights recognition thesis the distinction between a 
moral claim and a right is crucial, they are different in the sense that Martin conceives the 
recognition of a collective conscientiousness as a rational justification for a moral claim to be 
a right, but Boucher contests that the recognition is not a rational justification, consciously 
made, but is instead implicit and immanent in social practices. The right exists in 
conventional and habitual action and gradually emerges into human consciousness via 
contingency (Boucher, 2011: 758-759; cf. Martin, 2011: 92-101). 
          In summary, according to the above interpretations of Green’s rights recognition thesis, 
the constitution of a legal right for Green requires, firstly, a moral consciousness that there is 
a power contributing to a recognised common good, and secondly, that individual persons 
recognise that contribution of the power and accept it as a right for all. In the meantime, a 
right so formulated implies two conditions for a person to acquire the right: (1) whether the 
person has been recognised as capable of exercising that power in contributory to the 
common good, and (2) whether the person’s right-claim has been acknowledged and accepted 
by the public.43 As Green himself asserts, ‘[t]he fact that the individual would like to exercise 
the power claimed as a right does not render the exercise of a right, nor does the fact that he 
has been hitherto allowed to exercise it render it a right, if social requirements have newly 
arisen under changed conditions, or have newly come to be recognised, with which its 
exercise is incompatible’ (Green, 1986a: 112). A social recognition of a power as 
contributory to a shared common good in society is necessary for the power to be a right. 
 
                                                
43 Ann Cacoullos has distinguished three meanings of recognition in Green’s thought: (1) the recognition of a 
claim of a kind of action to be a right; (2) the recognition of a common good in the sense of being ‘conscious’ of 
it; (3) the mutual recognition between people. For Cacoullos, these three meanings of recognition represent 
different aspects of constituting rights, but they together compose the idea of a right. See Cacoullos, 1974: 88-
89. 
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Thus, just as it is not the exercise of every power, properly claimable as a right, that is a 
right in the full or explicit sense of being legally established, so it is not every power, of 
which the exercise would be desirable in an ideal state of things, that is properly 
claimable as a right. The condition of its being so claimable is that its exercise should 
be contributory to some social good which the public conscience is capable of 
appreciating – not necessarily one which in the existing prevalence of private interests 
can obtain due acknowledgement, but still one of which men in their actions and 
language show themselves to be aware. (Green, 1986a: 113) 
 
However, according to this rights recognition thesis, there will be people in a society not 
taken as right-holders, such as slaves or immigrants. They are parts of society and have a part 
in contributing to a common good shared by all social members, and accordingly they are not 
only capable of a social life but also members of the society, but if they are not recognised 
and entitled to be competent right-holders, they cannot have equal opportunities to strive for 
self-realisation. That is, while there are rights that can protect and provide fair opportunities 
to people in pursuit of self-realisation, a person who is not recognised by others will not share 
these opportunities. As Vincent indicates, the ‘[l]ack of recognition is the root to all injustice, 
inequality, unfreedom, and oppression’ (Vincent, 2010: 182; cf. Nesbitt, 2001: 429-431). 
Since not every individual person has been recognised as a right-holder sharing the same 
opportunities, civil inequality persists. Hence, as Green claims, ‘rights have no being except 
in a society of men recognising each other as isoi kai homoioi [equals]’ (Green, 1986a: 108). 
A person who is not recognised as equal as others fails to meet the requirements of a right-
holder. The primary task for actualising the principle of non-exclusivity in practice, 
accordingly, is to recognise every human person as a competent right-holder (cf. Nicholson, 
1990: 84-93; Tyler, 2012: 143-146). 
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          Nonetheless, though non-exclusion is an important condition for a human society 
moving towards the ideal harmony, Green is cautious about the potential consequences 
following rapid social and political changes, such as the destruction of the social order 
(Green, 1986a: 116). To him, the practical condition under which an immanent moral idea 
can come to be claimable as a right, as indicated, is conditioned by the development of a 
public conscience through social practice, and cannot be settled by radical movements or 
compelling forces (Green, 1906k: 330). He contends that it is more important to maintain the 
current system of rights if the overthrow of unfair social regulations and the 
institutionalisation of new rights will lead to anarchy, which is ‘not merely in the sense of the 
dissolution of this or that form of civil combination, but of the disappearance of conditions 
under which any civil combination is possible’ (Green, 1986a: 116). Hence, according to 
Green’s rights recognition thesis, a system of rights in practice is not always non-exclusive 
and there are civil inequalities in a society that can lead to social conflicts. Not until the 
divergence of social consciousness among individual persons has achieved its identity can the 
necessary transformation be achieved. 
          In addition, there is a reasonable inequality in society that Green acknowledges. To 
Green, a society may provide and ensure each individual person has fair and equal 
opportunities in pursuit of his or her own ideal self, but it is each individual’s freedom to 
choose the manner and purpose of his or her self-realisation. He notes that ‘[i]f we leave a 
man free to realise the conception of a possible well-being, it is impossible to limit the effect 
upon him of his desire to provide for his future well-being, as including that of the persons in 
whom he is interested, or the success with which at the prompting of that desire he turns 
resources of nature to account’ (Green, 1986a: 172). Since an artist, a labourer, a soldier and 
a philosopher have different functions and require different conditions to fulfil their functions 
in contribution to society, their free efforts will not be equal. By means of different stations 
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and duties in society, each person can have the number of resources and possessions due to 
them, but that number will vary. In Green’s view, enforcement that gives each individual 
person the same number of possessions and quantity of resources transgresses individual 
autonomy rather than enables it. 
 
The artist and man of letters require different equipment and apparatus from the tiller of 
land and the smith. Either then the various apparatus needed for various functions must 
be provided for individuals by society, which would imply a complete regulation of 
life, incompatible with that highest object of human attainment, a free morality; or we 
must trust for its provision to individual effort, which will imply inequality between the 
property of different persons. (Green, 1986a: 172) 
 
In other words, Green does ‘not concern [himself] with the equal ownership of resources or 
equal distribution’ (Boucher and Vincent, 2012: 93).44 However, since the task of social and 
cultural institutions is to ensure each individual has access to equal opportunities in pursuit of 
self-realisation, natural and social resources will unavoidably be reallocated and redistributed 
through the social organisation to maintain basic conditions of life (Plant, 2006: 31-32). The 
question here comes to be whether the reallocation and redistribution will transgress the 
individual right of property or not. 
          A classical account for the right of property, as Green indicates, is given by Locke: 
‘[b]y the same law of nature and reason by which man has “a Property in his own Person”, 
“the Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands ... are properly his” too’ (Green, 1986a: 
167) (italics in original). The property is that in which a person invests his or her labours, be 
                                                
44 Boucher has indicated that the concept of equality can be distinguished into the equality of outcome and the 
equality of opportunity, and the British idealists in general incline to apprehend the concept of equality in the 
latter sense. On this point, their conception of equality is different from what Rawls advocates in his A theory of 
Justice to contemporaries. See Boucher, 1998. 
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it a thing or a work. According to this view, society cannot appropriate an individual’s 
property unless he or she consents to it. Property is not just a thing but also a work impressed 
with the individual’s labours, and is thus an extension of his or her personality. Nonetheless, 
for Green, property is a determination and actualisation of a personal will, but it is a will 
which ‘at once explains the effort to appropriate, and the restraint placed on each in his 
appropriations by a customary recognition of the interest which each has in the success of the 
like effort on the part of the other members of a society with which he shares a common well-
being’ (Green, 1986a: 168; cf. Hegel, 1991: 73-103). Thus, the right of property is correlative 
with a recognised common good, as is every type of right. The action to reallocate and 
redistribute resources in a society, which is in accordance with the common good, does not 
transgress the individual right of property, since the right is not inherent in human nature as a 
law of nature and God, but a power claimed and recognised as contributory to a common 
good. The property right in this sense exists to ensure that each individual can appropriate 
needful resources in order to pursue self-realisation and to contribute the society. 
          However, by virtue of his acknowledgement of the economic inequality and the 
individual right of property in a free society, Green’s social and political theory is taken as a 
defence ‘justificatory, not merely of the social legislation of nineteenth-century England, but 
of the capitalist market system itself’ (Greengarten, 1981: 6). Following MacPherson’s view, 
Greengarten argues, Green’s social and political theory is based on a dual conception of 
human person (Greengarten, 1981: 10, 100-106; cf. MacPherson, 1973: 114, 175). On the one 
hand, a human is an appropriative individual with unlimited desires, but on the other hand, a 
human is also striving for the perfect realisation of human capacities. The former is a self-
interested individual looking after the maximisation of utility, and the latter is a self-realising 
individual chasing human perfection. For Greengarten, ‘Green’s concept of man, therefore, is 
of two fundamentally antagonistic aspects, or natures, coexisting within one being, one 
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organism’ and ‘[h]uman history is for Green the history of the subordination of man’s animal 
self, of the gradual accession of his spiritual nature, his rationalization and moralization’ 
(Greengarten, 1981: 101). That is, it is because Green’s retention of the utilitarian notion of a 
desiring subject with the moral idea of a self-realising agent that a free market system and 
social legislation are both essential to the actualisation of human perfection. As a result, 
Green ‘held fast to the belief, not merely that capitalist forms no serious impediment to the 
actualization of his democratic ideal, but also that it is a condition of its attainment. This 
belief rendered his analysis inherently short-sighted and his vision ultimately self-defeating’ 
(Greengarten, 1981: 129). 
          In response to this claim, Tyler argues that the reason Green supports the right of 
property is for self-realisation, and not for the maximisation of utility or pleasure. Neither 
Greengarten nor MacPherson is able to conceive an idea of right which is not related to the 
maximisation of utility. They consequently misunderstand Green (Tyler, 2012: 219-220). The 
property right is to protect a power which is claimed and recognised as contributory to a 
common good by individuals, and in this sense the exercise of the right requires a sense of 
common interest. It is not driven by unlimited personal desires (Green, 1986a: 169-170; 
Nicholson, 1990: 100-102). Tyler further argues that ‘although market transactions can be 
used to exploit the poor, it is not inevitable that such transactions will be anything except the 
facilitators of a truly just distribution of resource’ (Tyler, 2012: 225). He claims that the 
social distribution in Green’s view could occur by two methods: one is by society and the 
other, as indicated before, is to trust individuals to acquire the resources and means they need. 
For Tyler, Green’s conception of a free market system signifies an ideal of economics; as 
Green claims, ‘[t]he institution of property being only justifiable as a means to the free 
exercise of the social capabilities of all, there can be no true right to property of a kind which 
debars one class of men from such free exercise altogether’ (Green, 1986b: 200). Yet Green 
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knows that the practical function of a market system is always imperfect, and urges the 
necessity of state action to remedy the dysfunction of the society to ensure and to provide 
equal opportunities for its members (Green, 1986a: 170-178; Leighton, 2004: 119-120). He 
indicates that ‘[a] man who possesses nothing but his powers of labour and who has to sell 
these to a capitalist for bare daily maintenance, might as well, in respect of the ethical 
purposes which the possession of property should serve, be denied rights of property 
altogether’ (Green, 1986a: 170). Thus, though each individual has different talents and 
different conditions to live in a society, state action is indispensable to the actualisation of the 
common good principle in order to achieve the ideal harmony of human society. 
 
4. The well-organised society: state action and value diversity 
Now it is clear that Green’s idea of the common good indicates a moral ideal regulating the 
organisation of a society, yet his rights recognition thesis maintains inequalities and conflicts 
in social practice. While the task of a social regime is to assist individuals in pursuit of self-
realisation within a harmonious environment, the dysfunction of social and cultural 
institutions requires reformations from time to time. In the meantime, since that dysfunction 
supports inequalities and conflicts in society, state action is a remedial measure. Nonetheless, 
the claim that state action is a remedy for social dysfunction was not welcome in the 
nineteenth century. 
          As we have seen, the intervention of collective action into the distribution of social and 
natural resources without consent was considered as a transgression of the individual right of 
property, while in Green’s view the intervention is not a transgression. Nevertheless, besides 
this concern, there is a claim on the grounds of a popular moral conviction against state 
action in nineteenth-century British society. That is, moral merits were seen as reliant on an 
individual’s own efforts alone, and consequently the society or the government should not 
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intervene. While social conflicts were intensifying in society, some liberals, such as Richard 
Cobden (1804-1865), Samuel Smiles (1812-1904) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), insisted 
on the importance of self-restraint, self-cultivation and self-reliance for a person to be 
independent and respectable. On the basis of this libertarian notion of individual virtue, for 
them, social conflicts were but a competition of individual development. Meanwhile, with the 
influence from the empiricist and naturalistic philosophy, a liberal ideology involving with 
this moral idea is what has been often taken as the main feature of Classical Liberalism and 
‘laissez-faire’ (Greenleaf, 1983: 24-29, 30-102). Social conflicts will then be settled naturally 
once the society reaches its ideal harmony, as there is an invisible hand directing the 
operation of the society. In this context, conflicts are part of a process of human society 
towards its ideal state, which regulates itself by the law of nature. 
          Mill and Green, meanwhile, developed an argument that could justify state action and 
reconcile this with individual virtue at the same time. Mill, often identified as the founder of 
modern liberalism (Gray, 1993: 285), argues that no political authority or sovereign can 
rightfully compel an individual to do things against his will, even if it claims to be for the 
good of the individual. For him, the moral merit of virtue is reliant on an individual’s own 
efforts as long as he or she does not deprive others of their freedom; each individual is the 
sovereign over his or her own body and mind within the domain that only concerns him or 
her self (Mill, 1989: 13). Nonetheless, Mill attempts to reconcile state action with individual 
freedom by virtue of utilitarian thinking. Being capable of rational calculation, an individual 
can formulate a hierarchy of pleasures as his or her happiness and choose different means to 
achieve it. However, firstly, not every individual person has competent talents and 
instruments with which to pursue happiness. Secondly, even if there are sufficient conditions 
for individuals to pursue happiness, each may have different conceptions of happiness and 
this may lead to conflict between them. To Mill, non-intervention and laissez-faire are 
 
 
124 
general principles, but individuals may be too selfish to care about each other, and conflicts 
and competitions would be overwhelming. He therefore indicates that ‘[i]n the particular 
circumstances of a given age and nation, there is scarcely anything really important to the 
general interest, which it may not be desirable, or even necessary, that the government should 
take upon itself, not because private individuals cannot effectively perform it, but because 
they will not’ (Mill, 1965: 970; cf. Bellamy, 2000: 31). Government intervention accordingly 
is important for social harmony and individual freedom, for ‘embarking on the reforms 
necessary must require the action of government’ because ‘peasant proprietorship and 
industrial cooperatives will not spring up spontaneously’ (Greenleaf, 1983: 121). But the 
justification for the intervention nevertheless is the maximisation of social utility. To Mill, 
the intervention of government is confined to advance utility for the majority in society, and 
to ensure the conditions for the most people to entertain their maximum satisfaction 
(Nicholson, 1990: 140-147; Bellamy, 2000: 30-33). It is a means to the end of individual 
happiness and aims ‘to maximize utility by protecting the security of tangible, divisible 
goods’ (Krouse, 1982: 516; cf. 513-515). 
          Nonetheless, while Mill’s utilitarian philosophy has the practical function of supporting 
necessary government intervention, Green warns us of the potential danger in the utilitarian 
argument. According to the hedonistic utilitarian assumption of individual behaviour, 
whether an individual person will obey the instructions and regulations of state action or not 
is dependent upon the expediency of it in their perception. He notes that ‘[i]t must be a 
pleasure or pain which he looks for from the agency of others, who have power to reward or 
punish him – to reward or punish him, if with nothing else, yet with an approval or 
disapproval to which he is so sensitive that the approval may in his imagination outweigh 
every other pleasure, the disapproval every other pain’. ‘Thus’, he continues, ‘the 
consciousness “I ought to do this or that” must be interpreted as equivalent to the 
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consciousness that it is expected of me by others, who are “stronger” than I am in the sense 
that they have power to reward or punish me – whether these “others” are represented by the 
civil magistrate or by some public opinion...’ (Green, 2003: 421). This is to say that the 
utilitarian justification of state action has the potential to lapse into an argument for 
authoritarianism, either by the will of the majority or by the will of the stronger. Hence, 
though Green acknowledges the practical function of Mill’s argument, he nonetheless 
suggests a different one.45 
          Regarding Green’s claim for state action, it has been shown that he urges the necessity 
of practical actions to remedy the potential issues left from the dysfunction of social 
institutions. Contrary to the view of classical liberals, in Green’s view, to leave a person in a 
severe and distressful situation, whilst claiming that it is his or her own responsibility to 
struggle free of it, cannot be moral.46 For him, the realisation of true freedom is a harmonious 
society where every individual person can enjoy his or her life with others, jointly 
contributing to a shared and recognised common good. Thus, objecting to the principle of 
laissez-faire, Green claims that the fundamental spirit of liberalism is not to elevate an 
atomistic idea of individual freedom, but rather to fight for social equality against class 
interests (Green, 1986b: 195-196). State action is accordingly needed to reform the current 
social organisation and to remedy inequalities existing in it. Instead of being a night 
watchman, the modern state as ‘the society of societies’ is the supreme ‘reconciler and 
                                                
45 Instead of that comment made by Green, scholars have considered Mill’s liberal democratic theory implies a 
paternalist and elitist tendency. That Mill, with his concern with the tyranny of the majority, on the one hand 
advocates the importance of education to enlighten the public, and on the other hand, grants the necessity for the 
government to be led by the “instructed minority”. Nonetheless, it has also been claimed that Mill’s ideas of 
social expediency and social utility indicate a way for him to avoid the paternalist and elitist tendency. See, for 
example, Holloway, 1960; Arneson, 1982; Strasser, 1984; Nicholson, 1990: 140-157; Bellamy, 2000: 26-33; de 
Sanctis, 2005: 35-51. 
46 As Green urges, ‘[t]he justice of the punishment depends on the justice of the general system of rights – not 
merely on the propriety with reference to social well-being of maintaining this or that particular right which the 
crime punished violates, but on the question whether the social organisation in which a criminal has lived and 
acted is one that has given him a fair chance of not being a criminal’ (Green, 1986a: 146). To Green, the social 
distress and the moral corruption in a society are not natural consequences of the competition between human 
beings but the sign of the dissolution of a society. As to Green’s theory of punishment, see Brooks, 2003; Tyler, 
2012: 151-156. 
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sustainer of the rights that arise out of the social relations of men’ (Green, 1986a: 111). It 
maintains and accommodates diverse types of rights deriving from different forms of social 
community, such as families, tribes, civil associations, by appealing to laws as its primary 
means. In a word, the business of a state ‘is to maintain certain conditions of life – to see that 
certain actions are done which are necessary to the maintenance of those conditions, others 
omitted which would interfere with them. It has nothing to do with the motive of the actions 
or omissions, on which, however, the moral value of them depends’ (Green, 1986a: 19). It 
cannot and will not directly improve and advance an individual person’s moral character and 
freedom, but it can ensure the necessary conditions for the person to develop (Green, 1986a: 
20-22, 161-162). However, state action in practice cannot advance non-competitive and non-
exclusion principles directly; the task of an empirical state is to remedy the social dysfunction 
and to maintain the existing system of rights, while the ideal state fulfils the duty to ensure 
each individual citizen has rights to fair opportunities in pursuit of self-realisation (Tyler, 
2012: 171-172). The filling of this gap between the empirical state and the ideal state is 
achieved by social practice. The actualisation of the common good principle in effect relies 
upon the advance of the collective moral consciousness in society, and this in turn is 
dependent upon the moral development of each individual person. Nonetheless, based on his 
conception of the ideal state, Green has made a theoretical justification for state action. 
          By virtue of this advocacy for state action, Green’s social and political philosophy has 
been considered as collectivist (Greenleaf, 1983: chap. 4; Arblaster, 1984: chap. 16; Bellamy, 
1992: 9-57). But some scholars have not fully appreciated this collectivist inclination in 
Green. Lewis has remarked that Green’s moral and political philosophy suggests ‘the view 
that the rights of all, being mainly negative, are strictly identical and “non-competitive”, 
brings us to the same collectivist conclusion which has little respect for the variations of 
individual opinion or the distinctive needs and rights of individuals’ (Lewis, 1962: 89). In 
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Lewis’s view, when Green emphasises the necessity of state action, the central meaning of 
individual rights shifts from enabling the self-realisation of individuals to regulating and 
prohibiting behaviours. To him, Green’s thought ‘is apt to come full circle from an 
unqualified individualism to a rigid and intolerant collectivism’ (Lewis, 1962: 89). Richter, 
meanwhile, claims that it is not correct to consider Green’s social and political philosophy 
simply as ‘collectivist’, for the term, which is employed by A. V. Dicey (1835-1922), has 
obscured the intellectual connection between Green and the Manchester school (Richter, 
1964: 341-342). He thinks nonetheless that Green’s social and political philosophy has an 
oppressive tendency. For him, since an individual person’s rights and self-realisation require 
social recognition and a recognised common good to enable them, the individual’s thought 
and action are confined to a certain type of moral character. Green’s social and political 
philosophy implies, then, ‘the danger of allowing a government to aim consciously at the 
creation of a particular kind of human being.’ (Richter, 1964: 258). 
          However, as Green argues in his ‘Lecture on “Liberal Legislation and Freedom of 
Contract”’, 
 
[w]e are often warned nowadays against the danger of over-legislation; or, as I heard it 
put in a speech of the present Home Secretary in days when he was sowing his political 
wild oats, of ‘grandmotherly government’.47 There may be good ground for the 
warning, but at any rate we should be quite clear what we mean by it. The outcry 
against state interference is often raised by men whose real objection is not to state 
interference but to centralisation, to the constant aggression of the central executive 
upon local authorities. (Green, 1986b: 202) 
 
                                                
47 It is referring to the speech given by W. V. Harcourt (1827-1904) in 1873. See my discussion in chapter two. 
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That is, the opposition to the state action claim in Green’s view implies two different 
concerns. He indicates that ‘[i]t is one question whether of late the central government has 
been unduly trenching on local government, and another question whether the law of the 
state, either as administered by central or by provincial authorities, has been unduly 
interfering with the discretion of individuals’ (Green, 1986b: 202). To the first question, 
Green’s solution is to advocate citizens’ participation in local politics. Since the justification 
of state action is drawn from the recognised common interests in a society, and the 
recognition of the common interests is based on social practices, the best measurement for 
centralisation is citizen participation in local politics. On this point, Hobhouse, who 
appreciated Green’s work of transforming the moral and political claims of Liberalism, has 
explicated the idea that ‘[t]he development of social interest – and that is democracy – 
depends not only on adult suffrage and the supremacy of the elected legislature, but on all the 
intermediate organizations which link the individual to the whole’ (Hobhouse, 1994: 112). 
For Hobhouse, though citizen participation in local politics may be crushed by a centralised 
bureaucracy, it is essential that democracy extends the intelligent interest to all manner of 
public things and assists the formation of a common will as the unifying mind in society 
(Hobhouse, 1994: 111-112). To entertain the franchise and to participate in public affairs are 
therefore both important ways in which individuals can supervise the operation of central 
government, and maintain concrete social interests shared with each other in local 
communities as the actual basis of the unity of a society (Tyler, 2012: 191-196). Self-
examination and self-assertion in social and political life is thus the best way for individuals 
to prevent centralisation. 
          Furthermore, based on this contention of the importance of citizen participation, 
pertaining to the second question, Green’s justification for state action does not transgress 
individual freedom. Firstly, while state action is necessary for remedying social dysfunction 
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and to ensure fair and equal opportunities for individuals to pursue their self-realisations, the 
vitality of a civil and public life, as indicated, is drawn from each individual citizen’s 
participation (Green, 1986a: 94-96). Secondly, since rights require social recognition as 
contributory to a common good, state action cannot prevent that recognition being made by 
individuals jointly, for it is an intellectual and voluntary action performed by each individual 
and cannot be prohibited or promoted by external interventions (Green, 1986a: 113-115).48 
Thirdly, since state action cannot intervene in an individual’s discretion, it means that what 
the individual conceives as his or her ideal self-realisation will not necessarily be confined to 
a certain type of moral character regulated by the state. On the contrary, as a self-conscious 
agent, each individual’s conception of the best self will be different, and accordingly, there 
are diverse conceptions of the best self as the ultimate good. Green claims that ‘under any 
conditions possible, so far as can be seen, for human society, one man who was the best that 
his position allowed, would be very different from another who was the best that his position 
allowed’ (Green, 2003: 220) (italic in original). Having different talents and different social 
conditions, each individual person can therefore have different values and ideas. The task of 
the state is to reconcile and to accommodate these diverse ideas and values in the society 
rather than to restrict them. Nevertheless, whether these values can be protected and 
maintained in a system of rights or not is dependent upon the social recognition of their 
contributions to a shared common good immanent in existing social conventions and moral 
habits. For this reason, Green’s social and political philosophy does have a conservative 
inclination.49 In brief, for Green, there are diverse values and ideas in a society that a dutiful 
and rightful state has to reconcile, and it must reallocate social and natural resources in order 
                                                
48 A state may use its compelling power to prevent individual citizens from reaching such necessary recognition; 
however, as I will suggest in the next chapter, Green indicates a certain measurement for citizens to use in 
supervising the exercise of state power. 
49 Green distinguishes the true spirit of conservatism from conservatism in an ideological sense: (1) it is a 
general political principle which emphasises a reverence of the past; (2) it is a political ideology, the tenet which 
the British Conservative party espouses (Green, 1997: 28). Regarding the conservative inclination of Green’s 
thought, see Green, 1906e: 116-117; MacCunn, 1910: 229-230; Nicholson, 2006: 151-152; Vincent, 2006: 81. 
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to enable individuals to entertain and to pursue them.50 Accordingly, it is hard to claim that 
when Green urges the importance of state action, he neglects the value of individual 
freedom.51 
          To conclude this section, an idea of the common good which justifies state action does 
not necessarily cause state and social oppression. First of all, the idea of the common good, as 
Diggs indicates, ‘is served not by promoting the interests of some persons, in oblivion or at 
the expense of others, but by finding ways of serving the interests of all persons, or all 
concerned, fairly and equitably’ (Diggs, 1973: 291). Meanwhile, a state, by reference to such 
an idea of the common good, is the society of societies ‘so organised that everyone’s 
capacities have free scope for their development’ (Green, 1986a: 134-135; Simhony, 1993b: 
240-241). That is, each individual as a constituent part of the society should be provided with 
fair and equal opportunities for self-realisation, and concrete determinations of the common 
good may alter by virtue of innovative articulations made by individuals, and in this sense 
state action is constantly under monitoring. Hence, for Green, the state is a social organism in 
which individual practices and social institutions interact with each other in the pursuit of 
                                                
50 Although Green’s moral and social philosophy does acknowledge the persistence of value diversity, whether 
he could conceive a pluralistic world such as the one in which we live today is still in question (Vincent and 
Plant, 1984: 164; Carter: 2003, 29-30; Tyler, 2012: 38-40). As Boucher and Vincent have pointed out, ‘[i]n our 
present world, affected by claims of postmodern fragmentation, distinct forms of life, strong ethnic or national 
difference and multicultural theory, and the like, Green’s vision could look remote on one level’. ‘But’, they 
continue, ‘on the one hand, it is important to realise that Green’s vision does not ignore group difference or 
individual autonomy. Yet, on the other hand, neither does it celebrate difference in itself. It rather argues that 
this fragmentation is the result of modernity, but modernity also embodies historical and metaphysical 
teleological themes’ (Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 51). The role of Green’s practical philosophy in pluralistic 
issues of contemporary liberal politics will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
51 Tyler has suggested a perspectivalist interpretation in response to the collectivist and oppressive apprehension 
of Green’s social and political philosophy. To him, the common good is a heuristic principle indicating the 
direction in which each individual should proceed for critical examinations of the moral ideas embedded in 
social and cultural institutions (Tyler, 2012: 69-72). On the basis of this view, Tyler contends that to Green 
‘[s]ocial relationships derive their imperative character from the citizen’s careful judgement that engaging in 
them tends to facilitate the performance of distinctively human actions’ (Tyler, 2012: 163). Thus, in his view, 
with this idea of the common good as its foundation, Green’s idea of the state is to indicate a conceptual and 
critical standard against which each individual citizen can measure and judge the legitimacy of state action 
(Tyler, 2012: 172-175). Nonetheless, while Tyler’s perspectivalist reading of Green’s social and political 
philosophy provides a strong defence against the collectivist and oppressive contention, his interpretation of 
Green’s idea of the state does not cover Green’s consideration of the danger of state power in practice, nor how 
he resolves this danger. I will consider this practical dimension of Green’s political thought in the following 
chapter. 
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human perfection, while social conflict and value diversity persist in human society as the 
result of the divergence of human consciousness driving the dialectical process. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been shown that Green’s idea of the common good society implies a 
universal moral principle regulating the development of human society. Nonetheless, the 
concrete manifestations of the idea of the common good are various and diverse in virtue of 
the divergent moral ideas and values held by individuals, and therefore require a well-
organised society to reconcile and to accommodate the divergence. Founded on a system of 
rights, evolving through the development of human society, the well-organised society is the 
ideal state in which social conflicts and value diversity in the system are reconciled. However 
state action in accordance with a recognised and accepted common good is always in demand 
for an empirical state. Thus, while the common good principle is the ideal of human society, 
to Green, the distinction between the actual society and the ideal society, and the empirical 
state and the ideal state, is in relation to the moralisation process of human consciousness. It 
is dependent upon whether each individual person can recognise other persons and devote 
themselves to a non-competitive and non-exclusive society, or not. In the next chapter, I will 
argue that while for Green the task of social and state actions is to maintain fair and equal 
opportunities for each individual person in pursuit of self-realisation, he nonetheless 
articulates an important connection between the sovereign power and the moralisation of 
human consciousness. Self-government is thus an important condition necessary for an 
individual citizen to achieve the ideal of human perfection and moral autonomy in a 
reconciliatory society. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SELF-GOVERNMENT AND SOVEREIGN POWER:  
GREEN’S ETHICAL POLITICS  
 
1. Introduction 
So far it has been suggested that Green’s social and political philosophy has a firm 
foundation in his human ontology and philosophical ethics. In particular, he formulates an 
idea of the common good society as the moral ideal regulating the development of human 
society, and establishes a justification for state action to ensure and to provide each individual 
person fair and equal opportunities in pursuit of self-realisation. In the meantime, he indicates 
that self-consciousness is a distinctive feature of human beings, enabling us to conceive and 
to pursue diverse values and ideas, whereas social conflicts and value diversity persist in a 
society and constantly require state action. The divergence of social consciousness is 
accordingly a negative condition for state action, while the positive condition is by reference 
to the principle of the common good. Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that an empirical state, 
as a form of social community, is still an imperfect way of establishing ideal social harmony, 
it is different from other social communities in the sense that it has a compelling power to 
accommodate the social issues which other communities fail to tackle; that state is the 
supreme sovereign beyond individuals and communities. However, for Green, the basis of the 
state is the rational wills of individuals, and in this sense the state would not be an absolute 
ruler to individuals. That is, sovereign state as a form of social community is nonetheless 
founded on a recognised and accepted common good, and the recognised and accepted 
common good is immanent in social practices and is transformable through individual 
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articulations. Thus, the state, in so far as its actions are in accordance with that common 
good, is just for these individuals. 
          Nevertheless, Simhony indicates that a result from ‘Green’s apparent uncritical 
acceptance of the belief that self-government means good government’ is ‘a complete 
elimination from his thought of any concern for checking state power which was a central 
theme of classical liberalism’ (Simhony, 1991b: 320). While Green contends the importance 
of citizen participation in local politics and claims that the fundamental principle of state 
action is a recognised and accepted common good and is under the supervision of individuals, 
he seems to be ignorant of the danger of the extension of state power, but rather trusts the 
sovereign state so organised. It seems to be that, though Green has doubts with Hegel’s 
ethical state as the actualisation of the absolute freedom overwhelming individuals and 
communities, and suggests an idea of the ethical self to substitute, he nonetheless still fails to 
take the danger of state power in practice seriously enough. 
          In this chapter, I will argue that, firstly, Green is not so naïve as to trust the sovereign 
state completely. Conversely, he incorporates what former classical liberals argued for into 
his conception of the state, and maintains the separation of powers, whilst reminding us of the 
danger of the collision between powers. Secondly, and more significantly, through the 
sophisticated explication of the nature of the sovereignty in his Lectures on the Principles of 
Political Obligation, Green discloses the dynamic feature of liberal politics by means of 
which he advances his idea of the ethical self to an idea of the ethical citizen, suggesting that 
the self-government of the individual person is an important condition for moral autonomy 
and human perfection. In the following sections, accordingly, I will consider two meanings of 
power that Green employs to refer to the right of the state and the right of the individual 
respectively. Then I will discuss the constitution of the state with the role of the active citizen 
in Green’s thinking, and indicate that the sovereign is not held by the state or citizens, but is 
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rather present in the moral consciousness immanent in social conventions and moral habits. 
This signifies an ideal object for each individual citizen and the state to fight for, while the 
subject of the sovereign, conversely, is the object of the consciousness. Hence, according to 
this account of Green’s idea of the sovereign, I will argue that the dynamics of politics in 
Green’s thought is stirred by the opposition of the sovereign, as the object of consciousness, 
and citizens as the subject of the consciousness, and it is not until the two come to be 
identical, as the self-government of individual citizens, that we can settle a firm ground for 
self-realisation and the actualisation of the common good society. 
 
2. Sovereignty and might 
On the basis of the idea of the common good, Green’s conception of the sovereign state is 
correlative with his intention ‘to consider the moral function or object served by law, or by 
the system of rights and obligations which the state enforces, and in so doing to discover the 
true ground or justification for obedience to law’ (Green, 1986a: 13). As he argued, the first 
question of political philosophy is ‘the origin of State ... which is exactly correlative the 
question as to nature of political obligation’ (Green, 2005b: 72). The common good, political 
obligation and the sovereign state, in his view, are correlated with each other. However, 
challenging this correlation of Green’s, scholars have offered criticisms of his theory of 
political obligation in works, such as John Plamenatz’s Consent, Freedom and Political 
Obligation and H. A. Prichard’s Moral Obligation, and Duty and Interest. For Plamenatz, 
while Green argues a conception of political obligation on the basis of an idea of the common 
good, he nonetheless fails to make that argument convincing, for there is no single good that 
can be shared by individuals commonly. Nevertheless, Plamenatz indicates that Green has not 
claimed that the common good shall be universal, but always conceives it as particular 
(Plamenatz, 1968: chap. 3; Nicholson, 1990: 68, n. 1). On the other hand, Prichard argues that 
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the most important flaw in Green’s theory of political obligation is that he presumes the 
question about ‘why we should obey the sovereign state’ is valid, but fails to explain why we 
should obey this or that particular state. Instead of developing a sophisticated theory to 
explain why individuals should obey the state, Prichard claims that that reason is fairly 
simple: that ‘obedience to the ruler is contributory to the public interest, and therefore to our 
own good, and this being our purpose obedience is necessarily a duty’ (Prichard, 1968: 74; 
80). In Prichard’s view, to obey the state is just what a deliberate person will do for his or her 
own self-interest. In contrast, thus, Green’s theory of political obligation implicates an 
authoritarian notion of the state in taking an idea of the common good as the true ground for 
individuals to obey, in that each individual person is forced to identify and observe a single 
idea of the good as their self-interest. 
          Nonetheless, it has been pointed out previously that a conception of the common good, 
to Green, is always held by each individual, and that that conception in this sense is personal. 
As a ‘common’ good, it is the notion of good as an absolute desirable object for which every 
person who lives in a society strives. It is immanent in social and cultural institutions as a 
common interest to which individuals make contributions when they fulfil their social duties. 
However, as Simhony notes, ‘[f]or Green, the good does pertain to society as a whole which 
is, strictly speaking, the collective sense; but he employs “society as a whole” distributively, 
meaning each and every member of society individually, though jointly and not separately’ 
(Simhony, 2009a: 33-34). Moreover, since a conception of the common good is personal, 
each individual can have different apprehensions of it, and in this sense the reflected idea of 
the common good immanent in a society may lead to disagreement. A conception of the 
common good in Green’s thought is thus personal and may vary from one person to another 
(Monson, 1954; Nicholson, 1990: 68-71). Hence, while the task of the state is to reconcile 
these differences among individuals, Green’s idea of the common good is not a justification 
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for an authoritarian state. Nonetheless, as he says, ‘[t]he essential thing in political society is 
a power which guarantees men rights’ (Green, 1986a: 73). The right of the state to reconcile 
and to accommodate diverse conceptions of the common good and the disagreement among 
individuals is involved with a compelling power. 
          Here, it is important to distinguish two different meanings of the term ‘power’ in 
Green’s usage.  The first meaning of the term ‘power’ is used to indicate ‘the capability on 
the part of an individual for making a common good his own’ (Green, 1986a: 26). This is the 
capability each human person has to pursue the perfection of his or her rational will within a 
community. Rights therefore exist to secure the equally free exercise of the capability of each 
person to bring about a recognised common good in society. As Green indicates, ‘[t]he 
essence of right lies in its being not simply a power producing sensible effects, but a power 
relative to an insensible function and belonging to individuals only in so far as each 
recognises that function in himself and others’ (Green, 1986a: 36). A power in this sense is 
the moral capability that each individual person can advance in and through a social life. 
However, the mere fact that the power can produce sensible effects nonetheless implies that it 
is an important feature of sovereignty. 
          In his criticism of Spinoza and Hobbes’s conception of natural rights, Green indicates 
that a right in their view refers to a mere power: a physical capacity to act or to affect others. 
It is the power and the strength of each individual person by nature against other things or 
persons (Green, 1986a: 29-30, 40-41; Martin, 2011: 94-95). On the basis of this 
understanding of a right, the compelling power of a state, which is called sovereignty, is the 
combination of the powers of individuals: ‘[i]t is simply the naturalis potentia of a certain 
number of men combined; “of a people which is guided as if by one mind”’ (Green, 1986a: 
30). However, in Green’s view, though Spinoza and Hobbes both employ the term ‘power’ to 
explicate the nature of right, Spinoza is more consistent in using the term than Hobbes. For 
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Spinoza, since sovereignty is the combination of the powers of individuals, if the majority is 
against the sovereignty, the sovereignty as such simply disappears and is replaced. If an 
individual can exercise his or her power against the sovereign state, the individual ‘is so far 
not a member of the state and the state is so far imperfect’ (Green, 1986a: 31). The 
sovereignty accordingly is relative not absolute. But Hobbes ‘supposes his sovereign power 
to have an absolute right to the submission of all its subjects, singly or collectively, 
irrespectively of the question of its actual power against them’ (Green, 1986a: 39). Instead of 
accepting that sovereignty is relative, Hobbes introduces an idea of covenant to argue that 
when individuals consent to transfer their natural powers to the sovereign, they have given up 
the personal discretion to exercise them perpetually, and obey rather the absolute authority of 
the state. As Green observes, ‘[i]n order, however, to get a sovereignty, to which there is a 
perpetual obligation of submission, Hobbes has to suppose a covenant of all with all, 
preceding the establishment of sovereignty, and to the observance of which, therefore, there 
cannot be an obligation in the sense that the sovereign punishes for the non-observance ... but 
which no one can ever be entitled to break’ (Green, 1986a: 42). Nonetheless, to Green, this 
idea of a covenant is the flaw in Hobbes’s discussion of the sovereignty, for the existence of a 
covenant that prescribes an obligation to observe it is only possible after the sovereignty is 
established. Before the establishment of the sovereignty individual persons are in the war of 
all against all, and they do not follow any obligation but their own self-interest and self-
preservation. By introducing an idea of covenant into his argument, Hobbes renders it 
inconsistent. 
          However, for Green, neither Spinoza’s nor Hobbes’s account of right is adequate. He 
contends that when Spinoza and Hobbes conceive a right as a power held by each individual 
person naturally, their conception of that state of human persons, which precedes the 
existence of civil society, is negative. As Green argues, ‘[i]t was a state which was not one of 
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political society, one in which there was no civil government; i.e. no supreme power, 
exercised by a single person or plurality of persons, which could compel obedience on the 
part of all members of a society and was recognised as entitled to do so by them all, or by a 
sufficient number of them to secure general obedience’ (Green, 1986a: 46). Instead, a right 
for Green exists on the basis of a power claimed and recognised as contributory to a common 
good by individual persons. The power so claimed and recognised is not a mere physical 
capacity, but is rather a moral capability of human beings: ‘It is not in so far as I can do this 
or that that I have a right to do this or that, but so far as I recognise myself and am recognised 
by others as able to do this or that for the sake of a common good, or relative to this end’ 
(Green, 1986a: 36). However, if the definition of right is reliant upon the moral capability 
belonging to each human being, which is our rational will, at this point a crucial question 
arises as to whether or not a state can hold the right to rule and to govern individual citizens.  
          To state the question more specifically: does the state constitute a person who has the 
moral capability of rational will and therefore is entitled to hold a right or not? In the first 
place, a person or a group of persons may be considered to be representative of the 
sovereignty. A king, a prince, a committee, a parliament, or the majority of people can all be 
the sovereignty de facto. However, these offices in a society are not the state per se. For 
Green, a state ‘is a body of persons, recognised by each other as having rights, and possessing 
certain institutions for the maintenance of those rights’ (Green, 1986a: 103). It is the society 
of societies organised by individual persons and social communities, and does not refer to 
any determinate person or persons unless these persons are equal to the total amount of the 
people constitutive of the society. But, considering the scope and the complexity of the 
organisation of a modern state, Green thinks it impossible for all people as a whole to be the 
representatives of the sovereignty and to exercise the right of the state collectively (Green, 
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1986a: 61; Green, 1997: 31). In brief, a determinate person who is not equal to a state as such 
cannot be the holder of the sovereignty. 
          However, though a determinate person cannot be the holder of the sovereignty, we may 
conceive a legal personality as an analogy to a determinate person who has the moral agency. 
That is, a state is the society that ‘has a conscience’ as ‘the elements love and hate, the mind 
has hands and eyes’ (Green, 1997: 44); the state as the society of societies to the individual is 
‘as mother is to child so is mother country to colony’ (Green, 1997: 44). However, Green 
argues, this analogical argument is a rhetorical fallacy, ‘of which the plausibility is derived 
from the metaphysical character of language’ (Green, 1997: 44). It is therefore a misuse of 
language and a confusion of different ideas. Moreover, Green also claims that an idea of a 
legal personality is ‘derived from the possession of right, not vice versa’ (Green, 1986a: 27). 
It is when the right of the state has been recognised and institutionalised that a legal 
personality can be conceived. In other words, a legal person cannot be the holder of the right 
of the state before we recognise that right. 
          It seems to be, then, that the sovereignty is not a right at all, for there is no moral 
agency belonging to the state that can be claimed and recognised as contributory to a 
common good. The sovereignty is but a mere power ‘to protect those rights from invasion, 
either from without, from foreign nations, or from within, from members of the society who 
cease to behave as such’ (Green, 1986a: 103). However, it has been indicated before that a 
common good immanent in social and cultural institutions is an objective reason conceived 
by previous people. It is the absolute desirable object recognised and accepted by past 
generations, and is achieved and embodied in conventional morality. Accordingly, though a 
society is not a human person who has the moral agency, it is endowed with an agency that is 
acting for a common good. The right of the state that implies a claimed and recognised moral 
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capability as contributory to a common good indicates an agency derived from the objective 
reason embodied in social and cultural institutions. 
 
[W]hen the power by which rights are guaranteed is sovereign (as it is desirable that it 
should be) in the special sense of being maintained by a person or persons, wielding 
coercive force not liable to control by any other human force, it is not this coercive 
force that is the important thing about it, or that determines the habitual obedience 
essential to the real maintenance of rights. That which determines this habitual 
obedience is a power residing in the common will and reason of men, i.e. in the will 
and reason of men as determined by social relations, as interested in each other as 
acting together for common ends. It is a power which this ‘universal’ rational will 
exercises over the inclinations of the individual, and which only needs exceptionally to 
be backed by coercive force. (Green, 1986a: 74) 
 
The right of the state as such is accordingly not referring to the coercive force, but to an 
agency upholding individuals and communities as a whole. 
          At this point it is clear that the right of the state, which is called the sovereignty, does 
not lead the state to be authoritarian; however, the coercive force that accompanies the 
sovereignty nonetheless implies the possibility of oppression and coercion. The questions for 
Green’s idea of the sovereign state are therefore, firstly, ‘how a state unites individuals and 
communities as a whole and maintains a system of rights without using coercion?’ and 
secondly, ‘is there any measurement in the state that can prevent the force from misuse?’ To 
consider these questions leads us to Green’s view on the constitution of a state and the role of 
an individual citizen in a political society. 
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3. The constitution of the state and the separation of powers 
In Green’s view, the first condition for the constitution of a state is a systematic law 
harmonising diverse rights. For him, the existence of a state is to reconcile and to define the 
recognised rights subsisting in a society, and is to institutionalise these rights and harmonise 
them in a systematic law (Green, 1986a: 104). He suggests that ‘the state, or the sovereign as 
a characteristic institution of the state, does not create rights, but gives fuller reality to rights 
already existing’ (Green, 1986a: 103). However, since the state does not create rights, and 
rights are recognised moral claims immanent in a society, the constitution of a state is 
founded on some other forms of social community in which some moral claims and moral 
capabilities are recognised as rights. To Tyler, this view of societies prior to the state has two 
significant meanings: 
 
Firstly, temporally: early societies (families and tribes) had no formalised political 
structures, whereas modern ones tend to have them. Secondly, conceptually: the 
definition of ‘a state’ entails the concept of ‘a society’. The state is ‘for its members the 
society of societies – the society in which all their claims upon each other are mutually 
adjusted’. ... A crucial point here is that a state is an internally-complex relational entity 
and, as such, each part can function as it should only to the extent that every other part 
does so as well. (Tyler, 2012: 167) 
 
The state so organised is a political institution for reconciling, regulating and protecting the 
diverse rights of each social member and each social community in order to enable them to 
pursue and contribute to human perfection; it is ‘simply society’s political instrument for 
carrying out certain aspects of this task’ (Tyler, 2012: 175). 
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          Geoffrey Thomas, in a way, shares this instrumental view of Green’s concept of the 
state. He claims that ‘in his philosophical work Green had slight sense of the autonomy of 
politics. The role of politics is instrumental’ (Thomas, 1987: 23). However, Thomas notes 
that the distinction between the state and the society in Green’s thought is not so definite as to 
assert that the state is merely an instrument of the society. He indicates that ‘as the activity of 
the state extends to secure the fundamental interests of individuals, so the distinction between 
state and society blurs. In the first place and obviously the state forms certain social roles 
through its own activity; and secondly the fundamental interests which the state aims to 
secure are crucially subject to interpretation through the expectations which any given level 
of state activity itself engenders’ (Thomas, 1987: 345). It seems that a state is not a mere 
instrument for maintaining and organising rights derived from a society, but has more diverse 
functions. Besides the rights of citizens and the franchise that are included in political life, 
Green indicated that ‘the administration of the state gives rise to rights; to the establishment 
of powers necessary for its administration’ (Green, 1986a: 105). In other words, there are 
rights recognised after the social organisation as the state emerges. A state accordingly is not 
merely an instrument for organising the rights derived from other social relations, but is also 
a social relation in which some rights are able to be recognised.  
          Meanwhile, as indicated, the right of the state is derived from a recognised common 
good immanent in society, and is an agency supporting individuals and communities as a 
whole. If the state is not a social relation among individuals and communities in which such 
common good and agency are immanent, a state cannot be formed. As Green argues, an idea 
of the state is that ‘which has been operative in the minds of the members of the societies 
which have undergone the changed described [from recognised rights to a systematic law]52, 
                                                
52 Green remarks that change in the following paragraph: ‘In other words, it is true only on supposition that a 
state is made a state by the function which it fulfils of maintaining the rights of its members as a whole or 
system, in such a way that none gains at the expense of another (no one has any power guaranteed to him 
through another’s being deprived of that power). ... It secures and extends the exercise of powers, which men, 
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an idea only gradually taking shape as the change proceeded, and according to the more 
explicit and distinct idea of it which we form in reflecting on the process’ (Green, 1986a: 
104). ‘[B]ut’, he continues, ‘as a matter of fact we never apply it except in cases where it has 
gone some way, and we are justified in speaking of the state according to its idea as the 
society in which it is completed’ (Green, 1986a: 104). That is to say, the constitution of a 
state is an ongoing process in society; when the rights existing in the society are eventually 
reconciled by a systematic law, and we are conscious of the completion of that systematic 
law, a state therefore comes into being. 
 
When such a general law, has been arrived at, regulating the position of members of a 
family towards each other and the dealings of families or tribes with each other; when it 
is voluntarily recognised by a community of families or tribes, and maintained by a 
power strong enough at once to enforce it within the community and to defend the 
integrity of the community against attacks from without, then the elementary state has 
been formed. (Green, 1986a: 104-105) 
 
Hence, a state as the society of societies should not be merely a formal and instrumental 
institution, but a concrete social relation ‘in that impalpable congeries of the hopes and fears 
of a people bound together by common interests and sympathy, which we call the general 
will’ (Green, 1986a: 70). In Green’s view, as Horton says, ‘[t]he state is a moral entity that 
derives its character from its effective incorporation of the essential condition of the common 
good’ (Horton, 2010: 72). In the meantime, the persistence of a state is thus reliant on the 
public recognition of a systematic law in accordance with an idea of the common good, while 
                                                                                                                                                  
influenced in dealing with each other by an idea of common good, had recognised in each other as being capable 
of direction to that common good, and had already in a certain measure secured to each other in consequence of 
that recognition. It is not a state unless it does so’ (Green, 1986a: 103). 
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the way to maintain the recognition of all individuals and communities is in turn dependent 
upon a practical device. 
          It has been indicated that the sovereignty is an agency immanent in the society which 
supports different individuals and diverse communities as a whole. Nonetheless, in order to 
protect the state from external or internal attacks that may endanger the well-ordered society, 
a compelling force is needed as the second condition of the constitution of a state (Green, 
1986a: 103-105). However, Green suggests that there is a common misconception which sees 
the state as virtually equal to the sovereign state, and identifies the state solely with the idea 
of compelling force. He says that ‘the mischief of beginning with an inquiry into sovereignty, 
before the idea of a State has been investigated, is that it leads us to this abstract notion of 
sovereignty as merely supreme coercive power, and then, when we come to think of the state 
as distinguished by sovereignty, makes us suppose that supreme coercive power is all that is 
essential to a state, forgetting that it is rather the state that makes the sovereign than the 
sovereign that makes the state’ (Green, 1986a: 102) (italics added). The last sentence of 
Green’s argument makes the point discussed above clear, that is, for Green, the state is not 
merely a formal and instrumental institution, but rather a concrete social relation. It is when a 
social relation comes to have a systematic law regulating and reconciling existing rights that a 
state is formed and the right of the state is then recognised. On the other hand, it also 
indicates that the compelling force – which goes with the sovereignty – cannot be exercised 
rightfully without according to the common good immanent in the social relation. Green 
emphasises that ‘[i]t is not ... supreme coercive power, simply as such, but supreme coercive 
power, exercised in a certain way and for certain ends, that makes a state; viz. exercised 
according to law, written or customary, and for the maintenance of rights’ (Green, 1986a: 
102). A supreme coercive power alone is not the rightful way to maintain the public 
recognition and the legitimacy of such a systematic law for the maintenance of rights. 
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          At this point, for Green, the formation of a state is therefore important. On the one 
hand, it should inspire and maintain the common interests and sympathy of citizens as the 
public spirit uniting individuals and communities as a whole, and on the other hand, it also 
needs to measure the compelling force of the state and to judge whether it is in accordance 
with the public spirit. Regarding the former, Green suggests, it is a question of patriotism and 
‘the active interests of the citizens in the commonwealth’ (Green, 1986a: 94, 97). Patriotism, 
according to his definition, is ‘quickened by a feeling of which the patria, the fatherland, the 
seat of one’s home, is the natural object and of which the state becomes the object only so far 
as it is an organisation of a people to whom the individual feels himself bound by ties 
analogous to those which bind him to his family – ties derived from a common dwelling-
place with its associations, from common memories, traditions and customs, and from the 
common ways of feeling and thinking which a common language and still more a common 
literature embodies’ (Green, 1986a: 97). With that feeling in mind, ideally, an individual can 
share an idea of the common good with other fellow citizens. However, by virtue of the scope 
and the complexity of a modern state, it is not easy for a person to have and share the active 
interest in the service of the state with others, and consciously contribute to the subsistence of 
the state. Green observes that ‘there is a lowering of civil vitality as compared with that of the 
ancient, and perhaps of some exceptionally developed modern, commonwealths’ (Green, 
1986a: 94). It is more difficult to advocate the ideal of active and direct participation of each 
citizen in the function of a modern state than in a Greek city-state. Green’s idea of an active 
citizen is therefore not a citizen who participates directly in making political decisions with 
other citizens. As Simhony points out, ‘Green recognizes the need of the active citizen to 
“have a share, direct or indirect, by himself as a member or by voting for the members of 
supreme or provincial assemblies, in making and maintaining the laws which he obeys”. But 
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the activity of Green’s citizen is not as strictly political as that; rather, it embraces activities 
of “mutual helpfulness” in the “maintenance and furtherance of a free society,” which may be 
described as “obligation of support”’ (Simhony, 2001: 87). That is an obligation to support 
the state as long as it fulfils its task of ensuring fair and equal opportunities for each citizen. 
          However, it has been argued earlier that Green does encourage citizens to participate in 
local politics and to scrutinise state action. For him, although the direct participation in ruling 
and governing a state can be somewhat remote from individual citizens, and the idea of the 
common good immanent in the entire state can appear obscure for many citizens, it is by 
involving themselves in public affairs through local communities that citizens can still have 
‘a clear understanding of certain interests and rights common to himself with his neighbours’ 
and have ‘the needful elementary conception of a common good maintained by law’ (Green, 
1986a: 96). Nonetheless, Green also argues that it is the duty of the state to inspire the public 
spirit of citizens which is ‘necessary for the maintenance of a government in the public 
interest’ (Green, 1986a: 86). If a common good maintained by the law cannot be recognised 
by individual citizens, ‘[i]t is a sign that the state is not a true state – that it is not fulfilling its 
primary function of maintaining law equally in the interest of all, but is being administered in 
the interest of classes’ (Green, 1986a: 96). However, it should be noted that for Green the 
government is not the same as the state, as he indicates: ‘the state in modern times operates 
through three organs – the civil government, the national church, and the voice of usage of 
society’ (Green, 1997: 33-34). A state as a concrete social relation is different from a civil 
government as actual ruler and governor of political society.53 In this sense, while Green 
claims that it is the duty of a state to maintain the public spirit of citizens, he is not only 
referring to the civil government but to the church and to civil society as well. Nonetheless, 
                                                
53 Green’s usage of the term ‘society’ is to some extent confusing. He sometimes describes a civil society in 
which a form of the state has not been explicit, but sometimes also regards the state as a sort of society, the 
society of societies (Green, 1986a: 110). In order to prevent this confusion in what follows, I will use ‘the 
political society’ to refer to the state and ‘the civil society’ for the society in the state respectively when I 
mention them at the same time. 
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the civil government plays an important rule in a political society, for its administration holds 
the law-imposing and enforcing power that is associated with the coercive force of a state 
(Green, 1986a: 74-75). 
          So far it has been shown that, for Green, citizen participation and state action are both 
important ways to ensure individuals sharing a common spirit, which is in turn necessary for 
the public recognition of the legitimacy of the sovereign state and its legal system. However, 
to a modern democratic state, these important and necessary practices are to a certain extent 
institutionalised and presented in the representative government. It is known that a modern 
representative government in general has two departments: the administration and the 
legislature. The representatives who are elected by people to institute laws and to supervise 
the administration, on the basis of public interests, compose the legislature. An executive 
institution to enforce laws and to make policies in order to protect and to provide liberal and 
equal social conditions for each social member is the administration. But in Green’s view a 
representative government founded on atomistic philosophy (which was prevailing in 
nineteenth-century British social and political theories) is misleading. He argues that a 
founding on atomistic individualism means that ‘the bottom of representation is simply the 
idea of preventing any one material interest being swamped by another. Thus the executive is 
simply police. The function of government is purely negative prevention of unfair measures’, 
and ‘[t]here is no reason why this government should be obeyed, except that my wish is the 
wish of one, its order is the wish of the majority’ (Green, 1867a: 155). With the idea that each 
individual person is an atom and the state should prevent each person from harm or 
intervention, the function of the government is merely preventive and is one of policing 
(Green, 1867a: 155-156). Countering this atomistic theory of representative government, 
Green contends that ‘[i]t is so far as a government represents to them a common good that the 
subjects are conscious that they ought to obey it, i.e. that obedience to it is a means to an end 
 
 
148 
desirable in itself or absolutely’ (Green, 1986a: 79). For him, the legitimacy of the 
government to represent and to govern the people is grounded on the idea of the common 
good as the absolute desirable object for the people. 
          In the meantime, Green nonetheless maintains the distinction between the 
administration and the legislature within his idea of representative government: 
 
Whether the legislative and administrative agencies of society can be kept in the main 
free from bias by private interests and true to the idea of common good without popular 
control – whether again, if they can, that ‘civil sense’, that appreciation of common 
good, on the part of the subjects, which is as necessary to free or political society as the 
direction of law to the maintenance of common good, can be kept alive without active 
participation of the people in legislative functions, is a question of circumstances which 
perhaps does not admit of unqualified answer. (Green, 1986a: 93) 
 
Furthermore, in Green’s view, the administration comprises the imposition of law and the 
enforcing of power in a political society, but the legislature is primary. As he notes, ‘[t]he 
prime business of the political society, once formed, is to establish the legislative power’ 
(Green, 1986a: 50). The legislature as the representation of the people is more significant 
than the administration in relation to the legitimacy of the government. However, the 
difficulty in a modern state, as the quotation indicates, for Green, is how that representation 
can be legitimate without the direct participation of the people in the making of political 
decisions. 
          The central purpose of Green’s consideration of the social contract theory in Lectures 
on the Principles of Political Obligation is precisely to discover the foundation of the 
legitimacy of a modern state. In his view, social contract theorists, such as Hobbes, Locke 
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and Rousseau, invented a conceptual device concerning the covenant of all with all. In this 
context individuals consent to be ruled by an independent government: ‘[t]his they [the 
individuals] no doubt are so long as the government is exercised in a way corresponding to 
their several wishes, but so long as this is the case, there is no interference with their “natural 
liberty” to do as they like’ (Green, 1986a: 89). But Green argues that if the legitimacy of a 
government is founded on a covenant of all with all, this government seems to be irresistible, 
for the scope and the complexity of a modern state makes it too difficult to make the same 
covenant of all with all. Instead, Green indicates, ‘[i]f the authority of any government – its 
claim on our obedience – is held to be derived not from an original, or from any, covenant but 
from the function which it serves in maintaining those conditions of freedom which are 
conditions of the moral life, then no act of the people in revocation of a prior act need be 
reckoned necessary to justify its dissolution. If it ceases to serve this function, it loses its 
claim on our obedience’ (Green, 1986a: 53). To Green, the function of a state, as discussed 
before, is to ensure and to provide liberal and equal opportunities for all citizens in pursuit of 
their self-realisation through a system of law; further the right of the state to rule and to 
govern is founded on an idea of the common good recognised by these citizens. Thus, the 
legitimacy of a government, as the actual ruler and governor of a state, is therefore dependent 
upon whether it can ensure and provide fair opportunities for all citizens, and fulfils this 
function by reference to a recognised common good immanent in society. Therefore, 
according to this view, the legislature is the institution which represents the recognised 
common good, enacting laws and policies for the administration to enforce and to impose 
upon individual citizens with the compelling force. In addition, the compelling force in this 
design for the separation of powers can thus be under the supervision of the legislature in 
accordance with the idea of a common good. 
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          To summarise, it is clear that to participate in local politics and public affairs in local 
communities, for Green, is a direct and important way of preventing the state from using 
compelling power to maintain its unity. The public spirit holding individuals and 
communities as a whole can be maintained, to a certain extent, by involving the 
neighbourhood. However, as Simhony indicates, it is also dependent upon whether the state 
and the government have fulfilled their duties and functions properly. Meanwhile, the 
formation of a representative government, which generally includes the legislature and the 
administration, provides an institutional measurement for citizens to supervise the use of the 
compelling power. That is to say, Green has not overlooked the potential danger to the 
individuals of the compelling force accompanying sovereignty. Despite therefore clearly 
articulating the grounds for individuals to obey the law, he nonetheless still holds firmly to 
the idea of the separation of powers. Moreover, while he contends that the true foundation of 
political obligation lies in an idea of the common good rather than a covenant of all with all, 
he discloses an important dynamic feature of modern democratic politics. 
 
4. Citizens, the sovereign and the dynamics of politics 
It has been argued that Green depicts the moral development of an individual person as being 
founded on an ontological account of the dynamics of human consciousness, and indicates 
that the ideal of human perfection is after all unattainable, even though human self-
consciousness keeps driving us in pursuit of the ideal. With that rational desire moving us to 
strive for self-realisation, a system of rights, which is formulated by reference to a recognised 
common good immanent in a society, is a necessary condition for providing fair and equal 
opportunities for each of us to satisfy that desire. For Green, the task of social communities 
and the sovereign states is to maintain and to improve that system in accordance with the 
common good. Meanwhile, the device of the separation of powers institutes a measure for the 
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supervision of the exercise of compelling force accompanying the sovereignty, and 
constitutes the essence of representative government, which is an indispensable element of a 
modern democratic state. Green’s idea of a modern state, thus, does not as Simhony argued 
ignore the importance of the check of powers in a liberal state. Furthermore, looking on his 
explication of the nature of the sovereignty de jure, Green discloses the dynamic feature of a 
state, which is missing in the common view of the liberal democracy. 
          The liberal democratic view of a modern state in general regards the general election of 
the British Parliament as the periodic change of politics. It is claimed that when members of 
Parliament are re-elected and the administration is reformed within a certain period, the 
usurpation of political power can be prevented. The dynamics of politics are therefore 
confined by the regular election of the Parliament. However, Green contests this view of 
liberal democracy, and claims that ‘the question of what really needs to be enacted by the 
state in order to secure the condition under which a good life is possible, is lost sight of in the 
quest for majorities’ (Green, 1986a: 57). He continues: ‘as the will of the people in any other 
sense than the measure of what the people will tolerate is really unascertainable in the great 
nations of Europe, the way is prepared for the sophistries of modern political management, 
for manipulating electoral bodies, for influencing elected bodies, and procuring plebiscites’ 
(Green, 1986a: 57-58). Confining the dynamics of politics to the periodic election (thought of 
as the expression of the will of the people) is misleading, in Green’s view. On the one hand, 
the result of the election cannot represent the real will of the people; as indicated, Green 
observes that the election can be manipulated by means of sophistry and populism. On the 
other hand, the true foundation of a political society is not votes, but the recognised common 
good immanent in the society. Green does not trust the transient wills expressed in the votes, 
for these votes are inclined to be influenced by wilful desires rather than the general will. He 
argues that ‘[i]t is only as the organ of this general interest that the popular vote can endow 
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any law with the right to be obeyed’, and ‘as the popular vote is by no means necessarily an 
organ of the general interest, so the decree of a monarch or of an aristocratic assembly, under 
certain conditions, might be such an organ’ (Green, 1986a: 80). For Green, the foundation of 
a democratic state and its sovereignty is by no means the aggregation of the will of the 
people. However, though Green claims that the true foundation of a democratic political 
society and its sovereignty is an idea of the common good immanent in the society, it seems 
that to conceive and to recognise a conception of the common good as equal for all is as 
difficult as to represent as the will of all people. It is difficult for all people to agree what the 
exact conception of the common good is, as the foundation of a political society. 
Nonetheless, since Green claims that the idea of the common good is immanent in a society, 
as an objective reason conceived by and embodied in previous generations, the notion of 
habitual obedience seems to be concrete evidence for the legitimacy of a political society. 
          Concerning the distinction between the sovereignty de jure and the sovereignty de 
facto, Green introduces Austin’s notion of habitual obedience, remarking that according to 
Austin, ‘[i]f a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, 
receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is 
sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and 
independent’ (Green, 1986a: 67).54 That is, the idea of the sovereignty so defined is the 
habitual obedience of a certain people to an independent political ruler. Nonetheless, Green 
contests that Austin’s definition of sovereignty is not referring to the sovereignty de jure, for 
‘it considers the essence of sovereignty to lie in the power, on the part of such determinate 
person or persons, to put compulsion without limit on subjects, to make them do exactly as it 
pleases’ (Green, 1986a: 67). To Green, habitual obedience, as indicated earlier, is instead 
                                                
54 Bentham has made a similar claim of the sovereignty that: ‘[w]hen a number of persons (whom we may style 
subjects) are supposed to be in the habit of paying obedience to a person, or an assemblage of persons, of a 
known and certain description (whom we may call governor or governors) such persons altogether (subjects and 
governors) are said to be in a state of political SOCIETY’ (Bentham, 1977: 428; cf. Boucher and Kelly, 1994: 
21-22). 
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dependent upon an idea of the common good recognised and shared by people who live in a 
society. That is to say, the sovereignty de jure is the idea of the common good, not habitual 
obedience. Here, it is clear that a habit of obedience to a determinate person or persons 
cannot be the real justification for the legitimacy of a state. It is not habit providing grounds 
for a political society to demand people’s obedience, but a recognised common good 
immanent in the society.  
          Nonetheless, for Green, habitual obedience is to some extent the manifestation of the 
sovereignty de jure. There are two actual cases that he considers: the Roman Empire and the 
British power in India. In the first place, he indicates that the foreign power maintaining the 
inherited laws and the social conventions of the subject people is the sovereign in the proper 
sense. Both the Roman Empire and the British power in India, in Green’s view, meet this 
condition. He remarks that ‘just so far as the Roman Empire was of this sovereign, i.e. law-
making and maintaining, character, it derived its permanence, its hold on the “habitual 
obedience” of its subjects, from the support of the “general will”’ (Green, 1986a: 72). As to 
the British power in India, he comments that ‘an “habitual obedience” may fairly be said to 
be rendered by the Indian people to the English government ... because the English 
government presents itself to the people, not merely as a tax-collector, but as the maintainer 
of a customary law, which, on the whole, is the expression of the “general will”’ (Green, 
1986a: 72). Thus, insofar as the Roman Empire and the English government maintain and 
protect the customary or written laws of occupied countries and prevent further aggression or 
invasion from other countries, the habitual obedience of the people manifests their ruling 
meeting the conditions of the sovereignty de jure. 
          However, while a recognised common good immanent in the society for Green is an 
expression of the objective reason, regarded by previous generations as the absolutely 
desirable object for human perfection, the sovereignty de jure is not as stable as the notion of 
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habitual obedience implies, but is transformable and changeable instead.55 Each individual 
citizen as a self-conscious agent is capable of reflecting on the recognised common good as a 
willed object currently shared in the society, and each individual can also conceive a new 
object to substitute. The sovereignty de jure – as an individual citizen’s consciousness of this 
object – therefore does not indicate an absolute authority such as Hobbes justifies, but an 
ethical idea dependent upon the joint recognition of citizens of their absolutely desirable 
object embedded in social conventions and social practices. Thus, in terms of Green’s 
explication of the nature of the sovereignty de jure, the dynamics of politics is about the 
interaction between the sovereignty de jure, as the willed object of citizens, and the citizens 
as the subject of the sovereignty.  
          Along with the dynamic process, if the willed object of individual citizens is identical 
with the sovereignty de jure as the foundation of state action, the individual citizen in this 
sense will achieve his or her self-government in a social and political life. Green argues that, 
 
it remains true that only through a recognition by certain men of a common interest, 
and through the expression of that recognition in certain regulations of their dealings 
with each other, could morality originate, or any meaning be gained for such terms as 
‘ought’ and ‘right’ and their equivalents. 
          Morality, in the first instance, is the observance of such regulations, and though a 
higher morality – the morality of the character governed by ‘disinterested motives’, i.e. 
                                                
55 In Prolegomena to Ethics Green claimed that ‘there is an idea which equally underlies the conception both of 
moral duty and of legal right; which is prior, so to speak, to the distinction between them; which must have been 
at work in the minds of men before they could be capable of recognising any kind of action as one that ought to 
be done, whether because it is enjoined by law or authoritative custom, or because, though not thus enjoined, a 
man owes it to himself or to his neighbour or to God. This is the idea of an absolute and a common good; a good 
common to the person conceiving it with others, and good for him and them, whether at any moment it answers 
their likings or no. As affected by such an idea, a man’s attitude to his likes and dislikes will be one of which, in 
his inward converse, the “Thou shalt” or “Thou must” of command is the natural expression, though of law, in 
the sense either of the command of a political superior or of a self-imposed rule of life, he may as yet have no 
definite conception’ (Green, 2003: 232-233). That is, for Green, there is no definite conception of the common 
good as the final and universal truth for human perfection. See my discussion in the section five of Chapter 
Four. 
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by interest in some form of human perfection – comes to differentiate itself from this 
primitive morality consisting in the observance of rules established for a common good, 
yet this ‘outward’ morality is the presupposition of the ‘higher’. (Green, 1986a: 92) 
 
He then continues: 
 
Morality and political subjection thus have a common source – ‘political subjection’ 
being distinguished from that of a slave, as a subjection which secures rights to the 
subject. That common source is the rational recognition by certain human beings – it 
may be merely by children of the same parent – of a common well-being which is their 
well-being, and which they conceive as their well-being whether at any moment any 
one of them is inclined to it or no, and the embodiment of that recognition in rules by 
which the inclinations of the individuals are restrained, and a corresponding freedom of 
action for the attainment of well-being on the whole is secured. (Green, 1986a: 92) 
(italics in original) 
 
While moral subjection to conventional morality is the initial stage of an individual’s moral 
development, in which the individual uncritically follows instructions of conventional 
morality and unreflectively engages in the fulfilment of social expectations, the natural 
impulses and the selfishness of the individual are a matter of discipline and cultivation. 
Furthermore, while political subjection to sovereignty is, at the beginning, an individual 
citizen’s habitual obedience to a system of law, in which the individual obediently follows 
social and political regulations of the sovereignty and reciprocally entertains individual 
rights, the natural impulses and the selfishness of the individual are a matter of discipline and 
cultivation as well. Nonetheless, since an individual’s moral development requires protection 
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by a state, political subjection is an intermediate but indispensable phase for the individual to 
advance to a higher morality, whereas self-government in social and political life is a 
condition for moral autonomy. 
          It has been indicated before that, for Green, the self-realisation of the individual in the 
common good society is the achievement of the ideal of human perfection and moral 
autonomy. Moreover, there are two conditions for the achievement: (1) the provision of equal 
opportunities to each individual citizen, and (2) each individual person devoting himself or 
herself to the mutual service and interests of the common good shared and recognised by all 
(Green, 1986a: 159-162; Green, 2003: 288). Accordingly, while the nature of human self-
consciousness signifies the ideal is impossible to achieve unless it is at rest and the distinctive 
feature of being human has vanished, the self-government of an individual citizen 
nonetheless means that the second condition is met and the first condition is being worked on. 
For, while it is fair to say that, the practice of self-government indicates that an individual 
citizen has recognised an idea of the common good as his or her absolutely desirable object, it 
can also be argued that the foundation of state action, which is to provide and to ensure equal 
opportunities for each individual citizen to pursue self-realisation, is precisely the recognised 
common good as the sovereignty de jure. Thus, though the ideal of human perfection and 
moral autonomy in Green’s view is not possible to achieve, the self-government of the 
individual citizen is an important condition for the achievement of that ideal. Hence, behind 
Green’s advocacy of the enfranchisement and the democratic practice of each individual 
citizen there is a strong moral implication in which his idea of the ethical self moves on to 
become an idea of the ethical citizen.56 
                                                
56 Scholars have noted the significance of the idea of the ethical citizen in Green’s social and political thought; 
however, the relationship of the idea with Green’s notion of sovereignty has not been addressed yet. See, for 
example, Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 47-50; Vincent, 2001: 208-216; Tyler, 2006b; Hann, 2014; Martin, 2014; 
Simhony, 2014a: 442, 452-455. 
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          However, while the dynamics of politics in Green’s view relates to the interaction 
between the sovereignty (as a willed object of individual citizens) and the individual citizens 
(as the subject of the sovereignty), there is a latent danger of collision between powers in 
such dynamics, in that the change of the foundation of sovereignty indicates at least two 
discrepant conceptions of the common good existing in the state, and the right of the state to 
exercise its coercive force through the administration is consequently brought into question. 
Green has given us two examples of this danger. The first is historical. In his ‘Four Lectures 
on the English Commonwealth’, Green indicates that between the King and the Parliament, 
between the Royalists and the Presbyterians, there was ‘a right hitherto unasserted in 
Christendom, which, while the old recognized rights were in the suspense of conflict, became 
a might’ (Green, 1906k: 327). For him, the Presbyterians and Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658) 
had recognised the rise of a new spirit along with the development of the Reformation and 
came to elevate the importance of protecting the liberty of conscience for each person. They 
did not integrate this new conception of the common interest into an existing system of rights, 
but instead founded it on their own reformatory enthusiasm. Green remarks that their claim 
‘was not gradually to transmute, but suddenly to suppress, the feeling of the many by the 
reason of the few; a claim which all the while belied itself, for it appealed to popular, and 
even natural right, and which implied no concrete power of political reconstruction’. He then 
continues, ‘[i]t was a democracy without a δῆµος [demos], it rested on an assertion of the 
supremacy of reason, which from its very exclusiveness gave the reason no work to do’ 
(Green, 1906k: 330). That is, when citizens come to have a new conception of the common 
good and intend to promote a new idea of right, a current system of rights may be challenged 
and the first condition of the constitution of a state – to regulate and to reconcile existing 
rights within a systematic law – would thus not be met. In the meantime, since there are 
conflicting conceptions of the common good, the required social recognition for both the new 
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and the old rights is suspended. They therefore fail to meet the requirement of being a right 
and come to be mere powers. 
          Green’s second example is more general. He says that, 
 
in periods of conflict between local or customary, and imperial or written, law, between 
the constituent powers of a sovereignty, such as King and Parliament in England, of 
which the relation to each other has not become accurately defined, between a fallen 
and a rising sovereign in a period of revolution, between federal and state authorities in 
a composite state, the facts are best represented by saying that for a time there may be 
no right on either side in the conflict, and that it is impossible to determine precisely the 
stage at which there comes to be such a right on the one side as implies a definite 
resistance to right on the other. This of course is not to be taken to mean that in such 
periods rights in general are at an end. It is merely that right is in suspense on the 
particular point at issue between the conflicting powers. (Green, 1986a: 82) 
 
To Green, though there may be powers competing for sovereignty in a society, not all rights 
come to be mere powers, but the right of the state in particular, for the disorganisation of the 
society and the collision between powers, indicates the two conditions for the constitution of 
a state both fail to be met (Green, 1986a: 83-84). That is to say, while the dynamics of 
politics in Green’s thought signifies an important idea, namely the ethical citizen who strives 
for the ideal of self-realisation and human perfection within a social and political life, 
nonetheless there are potential dangers lurking in a state, particularly when the citizen 
transforms the conception of the common good and changes the foundation of the 
sovereignty. In this latter context the citizen’s obedience to the sovereign and to the 
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systematic law is suspended.57 Nevertheless, though Green has noticed the disorganisation 
and the disorder that may accompany the interaction between the sovereignty and individual 
citizens, in his view, there is no immediate solution with which to restore the social and 
political order until one of the competing powers meets the conditions for constituting a state, 
namely to maintain diverse rights in social relations by means of a systematic law and to 
ensure the integration of the state with the coercive force in accordance with a recognised 
common good. 
          In brief, according to Green, the dynamics of politics stems from different conceptions 
of the common good conceived by citizens. The changes of social and political constitutions 
are the results of the emergence of these differences. That is to say, politics is not merely 
about institutional measures, but also relates to actions and thoughts of the individual citizens 
who are the constituent parts of the state and who struggle for self-realisation and human 
perfection in a social and political life. It is not a mere instrument of the civil society, but an 
indispensable part of the common good necessary for the moral autonomy of each individual. 
Thus, Green’s social and political philosophy, on the one hand, does not overlook the danger 
of state power in practice; instead, he not only maintains the idea of the separation of powers 
but also notes the danger of the collision between powers. On the other hand, while he 
addresses that an individual citizen’s moral development is reliant upon the state providing 
and securing certain conditions, he also contends the importance of each individual citizen 
participating in public affairs and engaging in the practice of self-government. As Simhony 
remarks, ‘in Aristotelian fashion, Green believes that the state is “a society of which the life 
is maintained by what its members do for the sake of maintaining it”’ (Simhony, 2014a: 454; 
                                                
57 In this very context there is an issue of the duty of disobedience about which Green distinguishes four cases: 
(1) when the legitimacy of the sovereignty and the system of rights is doubtful and in dispute; (2) because of the 
government’s conduct there are no legal means to repeal a law; (3) when the political society and whole system 
of rights are corrupted and controlled by private interests and against the common interests of the public; (4) 
when resisting an objectionable or disputable law would not infringe the foundation of social order and the 
authority of the entire system of rights (Green, 1986a: 80-81). Tyler has offered a profound discussion of 
Green’s idea of civil disobedience, see Tyler, 2012: chap. 8. 
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cf. Green, 1986a, 37; Simhony, 2014b). This mutuality and reciprocal relationship between 
the state and citizens is therefore an important point in which ‘Green departs notably from the 
Hegelian model’ (Hobshouse, 1918: 118). Viewing the ideal of human perfection and moral 
autonomy as the unattainable telos, Green’s moral and political philosophy, as Bernard 
Bosanquet claims, contains a pessimistic view of human life (Bosanquet, 1899: 289). But it is 
also thanks to this sceptical element in his mind that his practical philosophy is more humane 
and less doctrinaire. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored Green’s idea of the sovereign state and its relation to practical and 
autonomous citizens in society. In response to Simhony’s argument that Green has omitted 
the danger of state power in practice, thus missing an important lesson of classical liberalism, 
I argue that while Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation focuses on the 
explication of the true ground of the individual’s obedience to the law and the state, it also 
develops a moral justification for state action as well as the foundation of the political 
legitimacy, by which Green indicates the boundary of state power. Meanwhile, along with his 
consideration of the nature of the sovereignty, Green not only maintains the notion of the 
separation of powers in his conception of a modern state but also notes the danger of the 
collision between powers. Furthermore, Green’s social and political philosophy also has a 
focus on the importance of citizen participation in social and political life and the integration 
of a state. That is, for Green, any potential disintegration of a state depends upon whether 
individual citizens conceive and recognise an absolutely desirable good as their shared 
common good or not, and the practice of self-government by each individual citizen is thus a 
necessary condition for the actualisation of the common good society. At this point, Green’s 
systematic practical philosophy is therefore completed in a dynamic account of liberal 
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politics and an understanding of the self-cultivation of individual consciousness in social and 
political life. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
GREEN’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
CONCEPT OF LIBERAL POLITICS IN A PLURALISTIC 
SOCIETY 
 
1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters explore Green’s practical philosophy. This latter philosophy is built 
upon a metaphysical treatment of human agency, a concept of the ethical self, an idea of the 
common good society, and a dynamic notion of politics. On the basis of this practical 
philosophy, Green not only addresses the complex relation between consciousness and action 
in moral and political activities, but also attempts to restore the autonomy of moral 
philosophy from the naturalistic and empiricist metaphysics and the hedonistic and utilitarian 
philosophy, and to rearticulate the spirit of Liberalism in a social and political sense. By 
providing a moral justification for state action to intervene and to improve each citizen’s 
social and economic conditions, the fundamental spirit of Liberalism, in Green’s view, is one 
which assists the people in fighting against arbitrary privileges and levelling social and 
political inequalities. The aim is ultimately to achieve an ideal society in which every 
individual person can realise his or her true self. A sovereign state accordingly has a moral 
function for individual persons, whereas it cannot directly foster a person’s moral character 
and freedom. In contrast with so-called Classical Liberalism, for which laissez faire is the 
main tenet, Green’s re-articulation of Liberalism therefore maintains a moral ideal. He is thus 
concerned to both advocate and to protect individual freedoms, on the one hand, whilst on the 
other to secure equal and fair living and working conditions for each person in society, no 
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matter to which social class he or she belongs. This latter theme underpins the claim that 
Green has, minimally, potential sympathies with a form of liberal socialism. 
          On the basis of this systematic exploration of Green’s practical philosophy, the main 
task of this chapter is to consider a theoretical potentiality of Green’s idealistic conception of 
liberal politics with regards to two correlative issues of the contemporary liberal political 
philosophy. The first issue is one of pluralism. The rise of contemporary understandings of 
pluralism in modern social and political philosophy can be traced back to the writings of 
Isaiah Berlin. It has been suggested previously that Berlin criticises the philosophy of 
monism and holism vehemently.58 For him, there is no absolute and final coherent system of 
truth. Every idea or value is incompatible with each other. For Berlin values and ideas are 
thus tragically plural and irreconcilable. He claims that while ‘monism, and faith in a single 
criterion, has always proved a deep source of satisfaction both to the intellect and to the 
emotions’, it is ‘used to justify the a priori barbarities of Procrustes – the vivisection of the 
actual human societies into some fixed pattern dictated by our fallible understanding of a 
largely imaginary past or a wholly imaginary future’ (Berlin, 2002: 216). Opposing the 
philosophy of monism and holism, Berlin argues, pluralism is ‘a truer and more humane 
ideal’ than the goal of seeking rational, universal and absolute knowledge of humankind. The 
plurality of values and ideas is the actual condition of human thought, based on the human 
characteristic of free choice. Hence, stemming from notions of individual freedom, there are 
many incompatible and incommensurable values in human society, for ‘there is no “common 
measure or ranking”’ and ‘there is no other determinate and general procedure for solving 
conflicts, such as a lexical priority rule’ (Berlin and Williams: 1994: 306). Accordingly, the 
challenge of Berlin’s value pluralism to modern liberal politics is that if there is no common 
measure and no systematic law in a society to accommodate these incompatible and 
                                                
58 See my discussion in the section one of Chapter Four. 
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incommensurable values, can a liberal democratic state maintain the integration of the society 
without transgressing individual freedom or not? 
          The second issue relates to political liberalism. While Berlin proposes a value 
pluralism challenge to modern liberal politics, John Rawls (1921-2002), an influential 
political philosopher in the twentieth century, indicates that the fact of pluralism has been 
undeniable since the Reformation. The plurality of religious belief ‘fragmented the religious 
unity of the Middle Ages and led to religious pluralism, with all consequences for later 
centuries. This in turn fostered pluralisms of other kinds, which were a permanent feature of 
culture by the eighteenth century’ (Rawls, 2005: xxii). Coming from the principle of 
toleration, which is the result of the religious wars in the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries, a doctrine of political liberalism is seen to develop. This doctrine advocated a 
constitutional democratic state to protect the liberty of conscience and the freedom of thought 
in response to ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism as a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, 
including both religious and nonreligious doctrines’ (Rawls, 2005: xxiv). However, though 
Rawls contends the incompatibility of these plural comprehensive doctrines, his political 
liberalism maintains a rational foundation for liberal and democratic politics. That is, while 
there are diverse and conflicting comprehensive doctrines in a society, each individual citizen 
as a rational person has two important moral powers: a capacity for a sense of justice and a 
capacity for a conception of the good. With these two moral powers, Rawls claims that ‘[t]he 
point of the ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their fundamental discussions 
within the framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based on 
values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse and each is, in good faith, 
prepared to defend that conception so understood. This means that each of us must have, and 
be ready to explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other citizens (who 
are also free and equal) may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us’ (Rawls, 2005: 
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226). Hence, on the basis of this reasonableness, Rawls contends that rational persons can 
constitute an overlapping consensus, as neutral ground, on which a liberal and democratic 
constitutional state might accommodate diverse and incompatible comprehensive doctrines. 
This can be done whilst maintaining social and political stability and without using 
compelling force. However, while Rawls conceives metaphysical doctrines as 
comprehensive, which cannot provide a ground for the overlapping consensus, his 
ontological conception of the rational human person nonetheless is metaphysical. Thus, an 
issue arises as to whether liberal political philosophy should disown any metaphysical 
doctrine in response to the challenge of pluralism or not. 
          Focusing on these two issues, in this chapter I will argue that although Green’s 
practical philosophy is an intellectual work of nineteenth-century British society, its idealistic 
conception of liberal politics is still useful in approaching these two contemporary issues. On 
the basis of this idealistic conception of liberal politics, firstly, it will be clear that a 
metaphysical doctrine is essential to the liberal political philosophy, and secondly, Green’s 
dynamic view of the relationship between practical citizen and state action in a liberal and 
democratic society can provide a possible response to the challenge of pluralism, in which the 
ideas of human freedom and human equality are not necessarily incompatible. However this 
potential compatibility, in practice, is nonetheless an ideal. In the meantime, I will discuss 
two contemporary interpretations of Green’s moral and political thought – Carter’s ethical 
socialism and Tyler’s liberal socialism – in order to indicate the legacy of Green’s practical 
philosophy, namely, an idealistic liberalism. 
 
2. A question of pluralism 
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In order to introduce Green’s practical philosophy into the contemporary pluralism issue, the 
first question a commentator has to answer is ‘how a nineteenth-century Victorian could 
conceive the complexity of the pluralistic world nowadays?’ 
          Some commentators have attempted to answer this question already. We have noted 
that Boucher and Vincent comment that the pluralistic and fragmented society we encounter 
in the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries seems remote from Green’s age, but it should be 
borne in mind that this plurality and fragmentation are the result of historical development.59 
To them, Green, as distinct from Rawls, ‘does offer a notion of comprehensive unity 
premised upon a historical development of ideas, although it is an equivocal unity’ (Boucher 
and Vincent, 2000: 51). Green’s practical philosophy in this sense is important for us to 
comprehend how the world we are living in came to be. On the other hand, in tackling this 
difficulty of Green’s nineteenth-century philosophy in the context of contemporary pluralism 
such as we ourselves encounter in modern society, Carter appeals to the plurality in 
nineteenth-century British society. He argues, ‘Green also accepted that there can exist a 
difference in the moral values and beliefs in society in the way he dealt with the rights and 
duties that can be shared by groups at a level below the nation-state. So it is possible for 
ethnic, religious or national groups to recognise rights for themselves, without these rights 
being recognised by society’ (Carter, 2003: 31). That is to say, according to Carter, a 
pluralistic world to this extent was not unforeseen by Green.  
          On 10th January 1882, Green suggested that ‘[s]ociety was becoming every day more 
complicated, and they [the people] wished so to order, so to arrange, that complicated society 
that everyone, whatever his station, whether peer or peasant, capitalist or labourer, townsman 
or countryman, should have a fair chance of making the best and most of himself’ (Green, 
1882: 385). To Green, it was exactly because the modern society was becoming increasingly 
                                                
59 See footnote 50 in section four of Chapter Five. 
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complex and complicated that the practice of the common good principle was more and more 
significant for a liberal democratic state. Also, he claimed that ‘[t]he special features of the 
object in which the true good is sought will vary in different ages and with different persons, 
according to circumstances and idiosyncrasy’, thus ‘in all its forms the interest has the 
common characteristic of being directed to an object which is an object for the individual 
only so far as he identifies himself with a society, and seeks neither an imagined pleasure nor 
a succession of pleasures, but a bettering of the life which is at once his and the society’s’ 
(Green, 2003: 281). In Green’s view, the relationship between the individual and the society 
is mutual and reciprocal. It is a fact that individuals can have different values and ideas by 
virtue of having different circumstances and personalities, but these values and ideas are 
nonetheless articulated in relation to a certain form of social life. For him, the relation 
between the individual and the society in which he or she exists is organic. They are not 
independent from each other, but rather interdependent for a certain purpose and at a certain 
time. A society, or any other form of civil combination, in which there is no common aim 
shared and recognised by its constituent individuals, is just inconceivable. 
          On the other hand, it is because the common aim in a society has not been accepted and 
recognised by individuals that the compelling power of a state is in action. As discussed 
previously, for Green, a state may use compelling power to maintain a system of rights and to 
ensure each individual citizen has fair and equal opportunities for self-realisation, and the 
justification for this state action is in accordance with a recognised common good immanent 
in the society and the system of rights. A right, as a power, claimed and recognised as 
contributory to a common good is the fundamental condition for the individuals and the state 
to exercise their powers. Thus, if there is no common good but incompatible and 
incommensurable values held by individuals, the condition for the individuals or the state to 
exercise rights vanishes, and the rights become mere powers. That is to say, though the 
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plurality of a modern society is the result of human history, in Green’s view, it cannot be 
denied that there is a recognised common good in the society, as the condition necessary for 
individuals and the state to exercise their rights. Furthermore, without this necessary 
condition for determining a right and for a society to be possible, there is no pluralistic 
society, but conversely fragmentary individuals set against each other. 
          At this point, it is clear that Green does acknowledge a certain kind of pluralism, but 
one which should be maintained in a social and political framework. However, even though 
Green can conceive a pluralistic issue in the liberal democratic society, a second question 
arises: ‘what kind of pluralism is possible in Green’s thought?’  
          I have indicated that the pluralistic issue under consideration here is the one which 
Berlin and Rawls have attempted to address previously, and therefore, I will confine my 
discussion of the second question to whether the kind of pluralism in Green’s thought relates 
to Berlin’s or/and Rawls’s pluralism or not. Regarding the difference between Berlin’s 
pluralism and Rawls’s, Rawls himself has remarked that ‘[f]or Berlin the realm of values is 
objective, but values clash and the full range of values is too extensive to fit into any one 
social world; not only are they incompatible with one another, imposing conflicting 
requirements on institutions; but there exists no family of workable institutions that can allow 
sufficient space for them all. That there is no social world without loss is rooted in the nature 
of values and the world, and much human tragedy reflects that. A just liberal society may 
have far more space than other social worlds but it can never be without loss’ (Rawls, 2005: 
197, n. 32). According to Rawls, Berlin’s pluralism is one of diverse objective values that 
exist in the human society as a matter of fact. This kind of pluralism, as Crowder points out, 
is ‘the claim that there are, in fact, multiple goods that contribute, objectively, to human well-
being—that is, the notion of value pluralism may be understood as a set of normative claims’ 
(Crowder, 2007: 131). These objective values, for various individuals and communities, are 
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normative claims that regulate and guide their forms of life, but they are incompatible, 
incommensurable and irreconcilable with each other. Therefore, when choosing some of 
them as the normative standard in a society, others are unavoidably excluded. A perfect 
reconciliatory human society is therefore impossible. 
          As to Rawls’s pluralism, he defines it as that ‘[a] modern democratic society is 
characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one 
of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the 
foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by 
all, or nearly all, citizens’ (Rawls, 2005: xvi). For Rawls, the pluralistic issue in a modern 
society is founded on the nature of human reason, by which each rational individual person 
can claim diverse reasonable values and goods against others. The problem lies not with the 
simple fact that there are diverse, plural and conflicting conceptions of the good, but with the 
existence of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the ‘convictions and 
attachments help to organize and give shape to a person’s way of life, what one sees oneself 
as doing and trying to accomplish in one’s social world’ (Rawls, 1985: 241). Taking a 
different stance from Berlin, the pluralistic issue Rawls addresses, in a doctrine of political 
liberalism, is the notion of plural and diverse conceptions of good conceived and claimed by 
individuals with practical reasons, not objective existence of values and goods. 
          According to these interpretations of Berlin’s and Rawls’s work, the pluralism in 
Green’s thought is closer to Rawls’s than to Berlin’s. For Green, each individual person as a 
self-conscious agent has the capability of conceiving different ideal objects as the good for 
which he or she will strive. By means of the effort of practical rational will that each 
individual person has, there are diverse and plural conceptions of good existing in a society. 
However, Green also believes that there is an ideal of common good in accordance with 
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which a non-competitive and non-exclusive society can be organised, and every individual 
person can access fair and equal opportunities in pursuit of self-realisation. That is, Green, 
unlike Berlin, does have an idea of the harmonious and reconciliatory society for which 
humanity struggles. 
 
The very possibility, however, of raising the question whether men are really the better 
for the acceptance of humanitarian ideas, indicates the extent of their actual currency. 
Their influence may be traced alike in the positive law, and institutions maintained by 
law, of civilised nations; in the law of opinion, the social sentiments and expectations, 
prevalent among them; and in the formulae by which philosophers have sought to 
methodise this law of opinion. ... Given the idea of a common good and of self-
determined participators in it – the idea implied, as we have seen, in the most primitive 
human society – the tendency of the idea in the minds of all capable of it must be to 
include, as participators of the good, all who have dealings with each other and who can 
communicate as ‘I’ and ‘Thou’. With growing means of intercourse and the progress of 
reflection the theory of a universal human fellowship is its natural outcome. (Green, 
2003: 242) 
 
To Green, along with the developments made by the Stoic philosophers, the Roman jurists 
and Christendom, an idea of common humanity evolved in the ordinary intercourse of 
different people and different nations. Nonetheless, he recognises the self-interested motives, 
the geographical demarcations, the national antagonisms that are all impediments to the ideal 
being achieved and realised (Green, 2003: 251). He claims that ‘its retardation by those 
private interests which have made it inconvenient for powerful men and classes to act upon it, 
and have led them to welcome any counter-theory which might justify their practice; such, 
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e.g., as the interests which led some of the American communities, after claiming their own 
independence on the ground that “all men are born free and equal”, to vindicate negro slavery 
for nearly a hundred years and only to relinquish it after a tremendous war in its defence’ 
(Green, 2003: 242-243). In brief, while Green acknowledges the plurality of reasonable 
values in the social world, he advocates the ideal of the common good society as a moral and 
practical principle for which each human person strives. The problem is how to proceed to 
the ideal without using force in such pluralistic world. 
 
3. Political liberalism: with or without metaphysics? 
In response to the issue of reasonable pluralism, Rawls, as indicated before, assumes a 
conception of the human person. For him, each individual citizen as a reasonable person has 
realised his or her two moral powers – a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of 
good – to a sufficient degree to be ‘free and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who 
have an enduring desire to honor fair terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating 
members of society’ (Rawls, 2005: 55). Based on this conception of the human person, Rawls 
conjectures two kinds of consensus that could be achieved and formulated by individual 
citizens. The first is a constitutional consensus that ‘at a certain time, because of various 
historical events and contingencies, certain liberal principles of justice are accepted as a mere 
modus vivendi, and are incorporated into existing political institutions’ (Rawls, 2005: 159). It 
is a set of basic liberal political principles by which individual citizens can constitute 
democratic procedures ‘for moderating the political rivalry, and for determining issues of 
social policy’ (Rawls, 2005: 163). By means of these procedures, individual citizens as 
reasonable beings can come to agreement about constitutional essentials, a social and 
political entity ‘required to give due weight to the idea of society as a fair system of 
cooperation between free and equal citizens, and not to regard it, in practice if not in speech, 
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as so much rhetoric’ (Rawls, 2005: 166). This reasonable agreement so constituted is an 
overlapping consensus. The public reason by reference to which a political society and a 
government make political decisions and institute social and political structures accordingly 
enables a just and liberal society. 
 
Public reason is characteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of 
those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of 
the public: what is the political conception of justice requires of society’s basic 
structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve. Public reason, 
then, is public in three ways: as the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the 
public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its 
nature and content is public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed by 
society’s conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis. 
(Rawls, 2005: 213) 
 
On the grounds of this notion of public reason, Rawls therefore argues that the legitimacy of 
exercising coercive force to maintain political stability in a pluralistic society exists ‘only 
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as 
reasonable and rational’ (Rawls, 2005: 217). That is, while there are conflicts among diverse 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, individual citizens, as reasonable persons, can construct 
and constitute a liberal and just political institution with which to maintain the integration of 
society and to reconcile plural comprehensive doctrines jointly. 
          Interestingly, Green’s idea of the common good society has features in common with 
this Rawlsian view of a just and liberal society. Firstly, the capability of practical rational will 
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for Green is not a moral agency that can only present in each individual person’s thoughts 
and actions. It is also an agency that presents in social and cultural institutions as the 
embodiments of objective reasons which are recognised conceptions of the common good by 
previous generations. These are the legitimate foundation on which the current social and 
political society regulates and reconciles diverse rights in social relations. Secondly, Green’s 
idea of the common good society as the principle of justice also signifies an ideal just and 
equal society in which individual persons can pursue diverse and plural ways of self-
realisation with each other non-exclusively and non-competitively. Thirdly, individual 
persons who live in a just and equal society and are entitled to be competent right-holders are 
recognised by each other as equal free citizens. Accordingly, it seems that while Green and 
Rawls both recognise the issue of reasonable pluralism evolving in the liberal and democratic 
society, their responses to this issue are also similar. 
          Nonetheless, there is an important difference between Green and Rawls, which means 
that Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics is still relevant to contemporary liberal 
political philosophy, and is to do with their different views of the status of metaphysics in 
social and political philosophy. As indicated, Rawls considers metaphysics to be a kind of 
comprehensive doctrine. For him, ‘[p]hilosophy as the search for truth about an independent 
metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a 
political conception of justice in a democratic society’, for ‘the conception of citizens as free 
and equal persons, need not involve ... questions of philosophical psychology or a 
metaphysical doctrine of the nature of the self’ (Rawls, 1985: 230-231). Bearing in mind the 
fact of reasonable pluralism being the actual condition of human society, Rawls devotes 
himself to developing a theory of the just and well-ordered society on the grounds of a 
constructivist conception of individual person. By ensuring his conception of a reasonable 
person is not metaphysical but political, as the one is a part of the public culture shared in the 
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Western liberal democratic society, Rawls believes that a moral and political conception of 
the individual person can be separated from a metaphysical doctrine of the human person. In 
his view, the conception of reasonable person is ‘a moral conception, one that begins from 
our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of thought, deliberation and 
responsibility, and adapted to a political conception of justice and not to a comprehensive 
moral doctrine’ (Rawls, 1985: 232, n. 15). It is not a conception of the human person based 
upon a precisely articulated system of moral, religious, or philosophical values or beliefs, but 
a conception developed from social practice and historical development. For Rawls, the ideal 
just and liberal society is a political idea ‘rooted in the basic intuitive ideas found in the 
public culture of a constitutional democracy’ (Rawls, 1985: 246). It is separable from those 
comprehensive metaphysical and moral doctrines as the source of conflicts and 
disagreements among individual persons. In response to the question of pluralism, there is no 
need for political liberals to begin with comprehensive philosophical and metaphysical 
doctrines. 
          Nonetheless, as Boucher and Vincent point out, ‘to deny metaphysics absolutely is, 
paradoxically, to affirm metaphysics’ (Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 45). While Rawls makes 
a strong stand against metaphysics, this stand as such is a metaphysical claim. For Boucher 
and Vincent, ‘we might redescribe Rawls’s ideas as plausible metaphysical assumptions 
about human beings and their relation to society. Metaphysics is not about blind prejudice, it 
rather refers to the most deep-rooted, yet often quite reasonable presuppositions we make 
about the character of our reality’ (Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 45). Meanwhile, Charles 
Taylor has also pointed out that the contemporary controversies of liberal political 
philosophy, particularly the so-called liberal-communitarian debate, contain a confusion of 
ontological issues with advocacy issues. Taylor argues that the ontological issues ‘concern 
what you recognize as the factors you will invoke to account for social life’ (Taylor, 1995: 
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181). Such as atomism, which is distinct from holism, is about beliefs in ‘(a), the order of 
explanation, you can and ought to account for social actions, structures, and conditions in 
terms of properties of the constituent individuals; and in (b) the order of deliberation, you can 
and ought to account for social goods in terms of concatenations of individual goods’ 
(Taylor, 1995: 181). On the other hand, the advocacy issues concern moral and political 
stands or policies one adopts, such as the distinction of individualism and collectivism, in that 
the former gives primacy to individual rights and the latter to the community life or the 
collective goods (Taylor, 1995: 182). Thus, clarifying the distinction between ontological and 
advocacy issues, Taylor argues that the confusion of this distinction in contemporary debates 
causes scholars to fail to go beyond the dualism between atomistic individualism and holistic 
collectivism. This means that they are incapable of conceiving a holistic individualism 
position, a position which could assist liberals to remedy the error of atomism. To Taylor, 
atomistic individualism ‘fails to take account of the degree to which the free individual with 
his own goals and aspirations, whose just rewards it is trying to protect, is himself only 
possible within a certain kind of civilization; that it took a long development of certain 
institutions and practices, of the rule of law, of rules of equal respects, of habits of common 
deliberation, of common association, of cultural development, and so on, to produce the 
modern individual; and that without these the very sense of oneself as an individual in the 
modern meaning of the term would atrophy’ (Taylor, 1985: 309). On the contrary, taking the 
position of holistic individualism, the significance of social and moral horizons, which are the 
background for an individual shaping conceptions of his or her self and the good life, can be 
restated. While liberals such as Rawls have related their moral and political conception of the 
individual person to a particular context – the public culture of liberal democracy – they 
cannot provide an adequate explanation of how culture or context is important and 
indispensable to an individual person on the basis of the atomism ontology. This is because 
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they have not taken the concepts of community and communal identity seriously enough. 
While community and communal identity, as a matter of fact, have influences on individuals’ 
conceptions and judgements in constituting an overlapping consensus, the atomistic 
individualism resolves community and communal identity into compositions of individual 
persons, and conceals the presence of them as such. Hence, by drawing upon the importance 
of the ontological issues for explicating the conception of human person, Taylor has correctly 
indicated a fundamental query in relation to contemporary liberal political philosophy: the 
omission of the importance of a metaphysical and ontological doctrine of the human person 
and its relation to society. 
          Green, on the other hand, not only contends the importance of a valid and consistent 
metaphysics as his criticism of empirical and naturalistic philosophy, but also founds his 
systematic practical philosophy on a metaphysical treatment of human agency. It has often 
been suggested that Green expounds a human ontology as the primary foundation of his 
ethics and politics, and explicates the complex relationship between human consciousness 
and human action. He therefore provides a comprehensive and sophisticated account of the 
moral and political person. In particular, on the basis of this comprehensive and sophisticated 
account of the moral and political person, Green avoids two defects in Rawls’s concept of 
liberal politics, and in this sense, has a more adequate apprehension of the nature of liberal 
democracy. 
          The first issue relates to the priority of the right over the good. By separating 
comprehensive doctrines from public affairs, Rawls holds that the basic right of each 
individual citizen to have a just and liberal circumstance in which to live occurs prior to the 
diverse conceptions of the good in the political agenda. For him, the contestation of diverse 
and plural conceptions of good is not a political issue that can be settled by political powers 
insofar as the contestation does not endanger and transgress the basic social and economic 
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structures that provide and secure fair and equal opportunities for each individual citizen. In 
terms of the political conception of justice, Rawls contends that to ensure each individual 
person has basic rights is more important than deciding which conception of good is the 
moral ideal for which each person should struggle (Rawls, 2005: 173-211). However, while 
the political conception of justice has its historical origins and social circumstances, this 
conception per se is not a mere abstract and a priori principle regulating thoughts and actions 
of individual persons. Conversely it is a particular and historical conception recognised and 
accepted by these persons and embodied in social and cultural institutions through their social 
practices. According to Green’s view, this recognised and embodied conception of justice is 
indicating precisely the idea of the common good shared by individual persons in a society. 
For him, the principle of justice is developing and evolving in ‘the language in which we 
most naturally express our conception of the duty of all men to all men indicates the school – 
that of tribal, or civil, or family obligation – in which we have been trained to the conception’ 
(Green, 2003: 238). Nonetheless, for Green the constitution of rights comes before the 
actualisation of good in a society. The principle of justice, as an idea of the common good, is 
immanent in the society, but each individual person can still have different ideas of self-
realisation by reference to that common good. Therefore, in order to prevent competitions 
and conflicts among individual persons, by virtue of these different ideas, and further to 
provide each of them with fair and equal opportunities to pursue diverse ways of self-
realisation, rights are the necessary condition for the actualisation of the good in which 
individual persons can achieve his or her ideal self. Thus the relationship between the right 
and the good in Green’s view is dual. On the one hand, the principle of justice as the 
foundation of rights is a common good recognised by individual citizens, and in this sense, 
the good is prior to the right. On the other hand, while the actualisation of different modes of 
self-realisation, that different individual citizens strive for, requires fair and equal 
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opportunities provided and ensured by the political society, rights are an indispensable 
condition in which individual citizens can obtain their desired state of common good 
(Simhony, 2009b: 9-14). In other words, compared with Rawls, Green provides a more 
comprehensive account of the relation between the right and the good on the ground of his 
human ontology, rather than asserting the priority of the right over the good and omitting the 
importance of community life. 
          The second relates to Rawls’s conception of politics. While Rawls makes a sharp 
distinction between comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions, his conception of 
politics has two important conditions. Firstly, it is ‘presented as freestanding and expounded 
apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background’ and ‘is a module, an 
essential constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by various reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by it. This means that it can be 
presented without saying, or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it 
may belong to, or be supported by’ (Rawls, 2005: 12-13). Secondly, it is ‘not’ about 
‘conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as 
ideals of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, 
and in the limit to our life as a whole’ (Rawls, 2005: 13). That is, though Rawls also 
addresses the moral and conventional features of a political conception, the above two 
conditions delimit his conception of politics within a doctrine of neutral proceduralism: to 
‘formulate a definitive list of rights, principles and institutional arrangements that are 
unassailable and will create the basis of a consensus that is both moral and neutral’ and to 
‘create the conditions necessary to deliver indisputable results’ (Mouffe, 2005: 138-139). 
          However, Rawls’s conception of liberal politics has encountered certain criticisms. 
Gerald Gaus indicates that while Rawls holds that the exercise of state power can be justified 
in accordance with public reasons, which are founded on an overlapping consensus of 
 
 
179 
reasonable persons, there are possibilities for the state power to be exercised without public 
grounds. He contests that Rawls’s overlapping consensus and reasonable agreement are both 
confined to the issue of constitutional essentials and are important for the constitution of a 
just and liberal society. However, Rawls has not made it clear how the exercise of state power 
would be prevented from becoming oppressive if there is no public grounds concerning 
issues of non-constitutional needs. Gaus remarks that ‘a Rawlsian state will not be grossly 
oppressive, as it must respect the publicly justified essentials; it does, though, allow many 
small coercive impositions that are explicitly justified on what seem manifestly non-public 
grounds. In its day-to-day operations, political liberalism sanctions the majority’s use of state 
power to advance its “comprehensive doctrines”’ (Gaus, 1999: 273). Instead of trying to 
constitute a consensus of reasonable persons, Gaus claims that constitutional politics ‘is not 
the realm of consensus, but of conclusive justifications – those not open to reasonable doubt’ 
(Gaus, 1999: 275). For him, liberal politics is nonetheless of ‘the justification of coercive 
authority that is not open to reasonable doubt’ (Gaus, 1999: 276). According to Gaus, what 
Rawls’s conceptions of reasonable person and overlapping consensus indicate is that Rawls 
has underestimated the severity of reasonable pluralism and the necessity of authoritative 
judgment in the political arena. 
          Chantal Mouffe, on the other hand, contends that this is a general misconception in the 
liberal view of politics. She argues that ‘[w]hen we look at the argument closely, we see that 
it consists in relegating pluralism and dissent to the private sphere in order to secure 
consensus in the public realm. All controversial issues are taken off the agenda in order to 
create the conditions for a “rational” consensus. As a result, the realm of politics becomes 
merely the terrain where individuals, stripped of their “disruptive” passions and beliefs and 
understood as rational agents in search of self-advantage – within the constraints of morality, 
of course – submit to procedures for adjudicating between their claims that they consider 
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“fair”’ (Mouffe, 2005: 139-140). To Mouffe, while Rawls assumes the conception of a 
reasonable person as the foundation from which to develop a doctrine of political liberalism 
in response to the question of pluralism, he has concealed the most significant feature of 
politics, that is, the antagonism among diverse values, genders, nations, ethnicity, and groups, 
which is driven by passions and desires as well as practical reasons. In other words, Rawls’s 
concept of a reasonable person implies a common ground for each individual citizen to 
constitute an overlapping consensus, and at the very outset the validity of reasonable 
pluralism as an issue is resolved. In Mouffe’s view, Rawls’s political liberalism fails to 
comprehend the necessity of conflict and antagonism which constitutes politics as such, and 
is thus a negation of politics.60  
          Therefore, according to Gaus’s and Mouffe’s criticisms of Rawls’s conception of 
liberal politics, it can be concluded that, firstly, Rawls overstates the role of practical reason 
in justifying the exercise of state power. This is because, secondly, he has not taken the 
inherent role of antagonism and conflict in politics seriously enough.  
          Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics, in contrast, meets the second 
requirement, by addressing the function of animal instinct and impulse for an individual 
person’s moral development, within a social and political life. In the first place, it has been 
suggested that while the distinctive feature of human action is self-conscious, the animal part 
of human beings is indispensable, because the motivation for our action and the drive of our 
thinking both rely upon our animal wants and natural impulses. On the other hand, it is when 
we come to discipline and cultivate these wants and impulses in and through conventional 
morality and habitual obedience to a social and political regime that we can be capable of 
                                                
60 For Mouffe, ‘[t]he liberal claim that a universal rational consensus could be produced by an undistorted 
dialogue, and that free public reason could guarantee the impartiality of the state, is only possible at the cost of 
denying the irreducible antagonistic element present in social relations, and this can have disastrous 
consequences for the defence of democratic institutions. To negate the political does not make it disappear, it 
only leads to bewilderment in the face of its manifestations and to impotence in dealing with them’ (Mouffe, 
2005: 140). 
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conceiving a shared and recognised idea of the common good and an ideal of the universal 
moral principle. For Green, ‘the perfection of the human soul may involve the constant 
presence of a lower nature, consisting in certain tendencies, never indeed dominant, but in 
conflict with which alone the higher energies of man can emerge’ (Green, 2003: 327). The 
animal nature of human beings, in this sense, is an impediment to our moral development in 
pursuit of the ideal of human perfection, but it is also a necessary condition for development 
to be possible. Moreover, starting from this view of the human condition, for Green, there are 
social conflicts and value diversities persisting in society which demand state action for 
reconciliation. While animal wants and natural impulses can encourage an individual’s moral 
development, they can also make the person selfish and self-conceited. Thus, due to the 
existence of human selfishness, there are people suffering in society to whom fair and equal 
opportunities, in pursuit of self-realisation, are unavailable. State action, as the representation 
of the self-government of individual citizens, is therefore important for society to be 
improved and to advance towards an ideal harmony. Nonetheless, since self-consciousness 
and the animal nature of the human organism are both essential parts of being human, the 
process of self-government is perpetual and endless. In other words, a social and political life 
for individual citizens always contains social conflict and value diversity in relation to self-
cultivation and self-government. Hence, it is clear that with a basis in a metaphysical and 
ontological treatment of human agency, Green’s conception of liberal politics not only 
addresses the non-rational dimensions of an individual person, but also indicates the 
significance of conflict and diversity in a social and political life. 
          To sum up, for Green, as for Rawls, the question of pluralism relates to the fact that 
there are diverse and plural reasonable conceptions of good, and they may lead to conflicts in 
society. In response to this pluralism issue, Green and Rawls both propose an idea of a just 
and liberal society in which individual citizens can formulate a public and objective reason as 
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the justification for the state to exercise its coercive force if necessary. Nonetheless, while 
Green begins his idea of the just and liberal society with a metaphysical and ontological 
treatment of human agency, Rawls refuses to do so. As a consequence, Green’s response to 
the issue of reasonable pluralism is more adequate than Rawls’s, for Rawls’s conception of a 
reasonable person has presumed a common ground for individual persons to reach an 
overlapping consensus and invalidates the issue at its very start. Meanwhile, the conception 
of liberal politics so formulated which underpins Green’s idea of the common good society 
can avoid two criticisms to Rawls’s political liberalism as well. Green’s conception of liberal 
politics notes the non-rational parts of a human person, and the inherent role of conflict in 
social and political life, and in this sense, Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics is 
not a negation of politics. However, whether this conception of liberal politics can meet the 
requirement of providing a justification for making authoritative judgement in the political 
arena, simultaneously being closed to reasonable doubt, yet managing not to infringe 
individual freedom, is the question to which I return now.  
 
4. Practical citizen and political authority: Green’s idealistic liberalism  
There are two distinctive contemporary interpretations of Green’s social and political 
philosophy: one is Carter’s ethical socialism, and the other is Tyler’s liberal socialism. Carter 
claims that ‘Green and the idealists were not supporters of Classical Liberalism, which they 
associated with the Manchester school of political economy and with individualist notions of 
human relations’ (Carter, 2003: 136). Instead of advocating the laissez-faire idea, Green and 
his idealistic followers elucidated ‘concepts like the common good and a proactive state 
providing a basic minimum of conditions act as the foundations for a “Constructive” 
Liberalism’ (Carter, 2003: 137). At the same time, Carter argues that ‘[i]t is also true that 
they were socialists as well’ (Carter, 2003: 144). For Carter, while the idealists articulated a 
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doctrine of constructive liberalism and were influential in the formation of New Liberalism, 
‘they also redefined their thought as a form of ethical socialism’ (Carter, 2003: 150). 
 
The essential features of this new idealist-inspired ideology were: a belief in a common 
good, which could unite the interests of different individuals; the support for equality of 
opportunity, to help create a less class-ridden society; a positive view of liberty, 
meaning more than simply freedom from interference; and the belief in the role of the 
state as more than a ‘policeman’, but as the representative of the whole community and 
able to help shape social conditions for the better. It is these features which 
distinguished the idealists’ work from traditional liberalism, and these elements which 
they turned into a justification for socialism. (Carter, 2003: 3) 
 
In terms of this view, Carter contends that though Green, as well as his idealist followers, 
were not committed socialists, their idealist philosophical arguments made contributions to 
the development of ethical socialism in Britain, such as R. H. Tawney’s social and political 
thought. 
          On the other hand, while Tyler agrees with Carter’s claim that Green and his idealist 
followers were influential for the development of ethical socialism, he nonetheless argues 
that Carter’s claim ‘fails to place due weight on the fact that Green saw individual 
conscientious self-determination and personal responsibility as the central, necessary features 
of a virtuous, “free life”’ (Tyler, 2010: 4). To Tyler, Green was clearly aware of the danger 
that ‘inappropriate state action would create what is now termed a “culture of dependency”’ 
(Tyler, 2010: 4). He argues that Green values the importance of individual self-development 
and maintains that ‘the state should concern itself primarily with the removal of hindrances to 
the individual’s own efforts to develop themselves according to their respective 
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understandings of what their development would consist in’ (Tyler, 2010: 5). That is, state 
action is to remove external hindrances to an individual person’s moral development, but it 
cannot directly assist that moral and internal development. This is the work of each 
individual’s internal conscience. Therefore, according to this argument, Green’s liberal 
concern is with the boundary of legitimate state action. Thus Tyler contends that ‘the term 
“liberal socialism” is more apposite than Carter’s “ethical socialism”’ (Tyler, 2010: 5). 
          However, the distinction between the internal, as individual conscience, and the 
external, as state action, is actually misleading for our understanding of Green’s practical 
philosophy. For Green, personal action and state action both relate to the individual human 
consciousness: both are but representations of particular rational wills which an individual or 
a group of individuals conceive when striving for actualisation. This is the underlying tenet of 
liberal democracy: self-government as an important condition through which an individual 
person can engage in an ethical life. The legitimacy of state action in this sense is limited by 
the wills of individual citizens. However in practice the device of representative government 
remains something which can be manipulated by politicians. Further the particular rational 
wills of individual citizens within a democracy may also clash. At this point, the pluralism 
issue in Green’s thought is not a question challenging liberal democratic states, but rather 
reflects reality, in that the particular rational wills of individual citizens are both plural and 
conflicting. States always have to tackle this plurality in order to maintain the stability of a 
social and political life. 
          Returning to the question of whether Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics 
can meet the requirement of providing a justification for making authoritative judgements in 
the political arena, this accordingly relates to Green’s explication of the relation between self-
government and state action. Firstly, the conflict and antagonism in a society take place 
among diverse and plural representations of particular rational wills held by different citizens; 
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however, for Green, this is a normal phenomenon of human social life. Meanwhile, in 
Green’s view, diverse and plural representations of particular rational wills nonetheless have 
a common source, namely, as the condition in which the individual citizens entertain the idea 
of the good life. This is the current social and cultural institution in which the citizens grow 
up and live. Thus Green argues that:  
 
[t]he idea of the good ... is an idea, if the expression may be allowed, which gradually 
creates its own filling. It is not an idea like that of any pleasure, which a man retains 
from an experience that he has had and would like to have again. It is an idea to which 
nothing that has happened to us or that we can find in existence corresponds, but which 
sets us upon causing certain things to happen, upon bringing certain things into 
existence. Acting in us, to begin with, as a demand which is ignorant of what will 
satisfy itself, it only arrives at a more definite consciousness of its own nature and 
tendency through reflection on its own creations – on habits and institutions and modes 
of life which, as a demand not reflected upon, it has brought into being. (Green, 2003: 
284) 
 
For Green, individual persons can only have an idea of the self and the idea of the good in 
and through a social life, and accordingly, there is a common ground behind their plural and 
conflicting values that is the basis of the current social and cultural institutions, and the 
source of legitimacy for state action. Nonetheless, unlike Rawls’s overlapping consensus, 
presupposing a rational and universal ground, this common ground in Green’s view is rather 
an enabling condition necessary for diverse ideas and values to be possible, not a reasonable 
solution for the pluralism issue. 
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          Secondly, while plural and conflicting individual values, the common ground 
upholding existing social and cultural institutions, and the source of the legitimacy for state 
action all exist in relation to the rational wills of individual citizens in different ways, the 
individual citizens are conversely capable of transforming society and the state, despite 
holding plural and conflicting values. That is, to Green, value conflicts can be reconciled if 
individual citizens can recognise an idea of the common good shared for all and through 
which state action is authorised: it is because we conceive ourselves as self-interested 
individuals that we confine our ideas of the good life to private pleasures and personal 
happiness and come to be hostile to political authority. If we can limit our selfishness and 
instead care about each other, we could attain a better knowledge of our relationship with 
other people and with society, and struggle for the ideal of a reconciliatory society jointly. 
Nonetheless, the ideal can only be achieved in and through our social practices and ordinary 
dealings with other people in the community. 
 
In knowledge so derived, where from the nature of the case our judgments are 
incapable of verification in the ordinary sense by reference to matters of fact – for the 
motive which an act expresses is not what we commonly mean by a matter of fact – 
there is, no doubt, much liability to arbitrariness in the interpretation of the self-
consciousness to which alone we can appeal. Against such arbitrariness, it would seem, 
we can only protect ourselves by great circumspection in the adoption of our formulae, 
so that they may be as nearly adequate as possible to the inner experience which we 
mean them to convey, and by constant reference to the expression of that experience 
which is embodied, so to speak, in the habitual phraseology of men, in literature, and in 
the institutions of family and political life. (Green, 2003: 105) 
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Once we realise that there is a common interest to which it is important that each of us 
contribute and which is indispensable to the actualisation of our self-realisations, state action 
can be justified in accordance with the common interest as a necessary condition for the 
persistence of social and political life. 
          Finally, since state action and political authority can be justified insofar as they are for 
the maintenance and the protection of the common interest, they are to an extent not contrary 
to individual freedom. As indicated, in Green’s view, the abuse of state power can be 
prevented through the self-government of individual citizens. That is, the self-government of 
all individual citizens can maintain the common interest and the public spirit in society and 
supervise political decisions, laws and policies made and enforced by the government and 
parliament. Even though the privileged classes in a liberal democratic state may have the 
ability to manipulate the measurements for state action, i.e. the representative government 
and the general election, and their particular interests may therefore overwhelm the 
recognised common good for all, active interests and the direct participation of all citizens in 
public affairs can nonetheless prevent the abuse of state power. Further, the self-government 
of individual citizens is also a necessary condition for the citizens to achieve moral 
autonomy. While the exercise of the sovereign power has to be in accordance with the 
recognised common good in society under citizens’ supervision, it is also a means for 
individual citizens to cultivate their natural impulses and animal instincts towards the 
reconciliation of their practical reason with their will, of their subjective rational wills with 
objective rational wills immanent in the society, and of their selves with the world. Hence, 
according to Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics, whether political authority is 
open to reasonable doubts is not an issue, for the formation and the exercise of the authority 
should be both dependent upon the self-government of all citizens, which themselves are also 
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on the basis of social practices and ordinary dealings and are indivisible parts for citizens to 
achieve their moral autonomy.  
          To conclude, in response to the pluralism issue in a liberal and democratic society, 
Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics indicates the necessity of practical 
participations of individual citizens in public affairs. Nonetheless, making political decisions 
and instituting laws and policies remain the tasks of the government and parliament. 
Meanwhile, political authority and state action are important for the moral development of 
individual citizens; these are constituted in relation to the self-cultivation and the self-
discipline of the citizens. Such self-discipline limits selfish inclinations, and establishes the 
conditions necessary for transforming individuals into caring citizens. Therefore if all 
individual citizens can recognise and establish basic respect for each other and strive for the 
actualisation of social harmony jointly, the pluralistic issues can one day be reconciled in a 
non-competitive and non-exclusive society. However the actualisation of the harmonious and 
reconciliatory society remains an unattainable ideal for human beings. Thus, to an extent, 
Green, as Tyler indicates, ‘could agree with Berlin that, “To demand more than... [value 
pluralism] is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine 
one’s practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political 
immaturity”’ (Tyler, 2012: 40). Green’s idealistic liberalism does provide a metaphysical 
ground for human beings to work towards perfect reconciliation with the world and with each 
other. But it does not offer a metaphysical doctrine arguing that human activities must be 
determined a priori. It rather takes the form of a philosophical investigation of the 
complexities of the human condition. Based on his sophisticated account of the relationship 
between consciousness and action and the ways in which this relationship develops and 
evolves in moral, social and political life, Green’s systematic practical philosophy suggests 
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an idealistic conception of liberal politics which continues to offer substantive arguments for 
contemporary political philosophy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the potential theoretical contribution that Green’s practical 
philosophy can provide for contemporary political philosophy. We have seen that while the 
pluralistic issue in Green’s mind was different from Berlin’s objective value pluralism, it is 
nonetheless closer to Rawls’s conception of reasonable pluralism. However, Green’s 
metaphysical exploration of human ontology provides him with a more adequate perspective 
with which to explain that pluralistic phenomenon in a modern liberal and democratic 
society. It is thus possible to avoid some of the defects remaining in Rawls’s suggestions 
regarding the pluralism issue. Accordingly, this indicates that, firstly, though the status of 
metaphysics in contemporary political philosophy is in doubt, such an approach does offer 
scholars the chance to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the human condition. 
Secondly, on the basis of an idiosyncratic theory of human ontology, the centre of Green’s 
conception of liberal politics is the interaction between human consciousness and human 
action. It is neither proceduralism nor an instrumental view of politics, but is rather a view 
that explores the complex relationship between morality and politics as well as the 
autonomous domain of politics. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
CONCLUSION 
 
1. Green’s practical philosophy and idealistic conception of liberal politics 
This thesis has argued that Green’s practical philosophy starts from a sophisticated theory of 
consciousness and action and articulates an idealistic conception of liberal politics. The 
contents of this systematic practical philosophy include a metaphysical treatment of human 
agency, an idea of the ethical self, an idea of the common good society, and a dynamic notion 
of political activity, while the final achievement of this philosophical system – until Green’s 
sudden death on 26th March 1882 – is a theory of ethical politics, a creative work 
consolidating Green’s theoretical visions and practical commitments. 
          In response to the prevalent social and political issues in nineteenth-century British 
society – the aggravation of social inequalities, the deficiency of representative government, 
the decline of spiritual morality and social virtue – Green insisted in starting from a different 
metaphysics of knowledge and moral action in order to clarify and to remedy the 
metaphysical mistakes inherent in the empiricist and naturalistic philosophy. Learning and 
adapting aspects of German idealist philosophy Green developed an innovative approach to 
critical reflection. Of particular interest here was his critique of certain key aspects of 
Enlightenment philosophy. Thus Green’s first important systematic accomplishment was his 
introduction to David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. At the core of his critical 
examinations of the empiricist and naturalistic philosophy was his concern with the human 
condition in a rapidly changing social reality. As Chapter Two illustrated, worrying about the 
naturalistic and materialistic view of the relationship between human beings and the world, 
Green utilised the teaching of German idealist philosophy to transform the doctrine of 
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Christian theology, developing a spiritual and moral understanding of the human condition. 
With that notion in mind, Green therefore aimed to establish a rich metaphysical and 
ontological theory of human agency. The concise but illuminating result of these studies was 
encapsulated in his criticisms of late nineteenth century naturalistic and evolutionistic theory. 
          However, Green was not just a blind follower of German idealist philosophy. As 
Chapter Three argued, while Green adopted the teaching of German idealist philosophy to 
examine British empiricist and naturalistic philosophy, he nonetheless intended to develop 
and modify its core arguments. Green thus identified the remaining dualism present within 
Kant’s philosophy. He then amended it by developing a theory of human consciousness 
which provided a firm foundation from which he could then build up a systematic practical 
philosophy. Recognising the self-distinguishing and self-objectifying nature of human 
consciousness, Green argued that human consciousness is the core content of each individual 
person’s free agency. With this reflective agency they can come to conceive and to 
understand the idea of the self, other persons and the world. Thus, he outlined the first crucial 
aspect of his human ontology and restored human free agency against the strictures of all 
forms of naturalism and determinism. 
          On the basis of the work accomplished in his metaphysics of knowledge, Chapter Four 
explored Green’s elucidation of a developmental account of human consciousness, 
particularly in the second book of Prolegomena to Ethics. This focused on his metaphysics of 
moral action. Exploring natural and instinctive impulses of human beings, Green argued that 
the two distinctive features of human consciousness – that is the self-distinguishing and the 
self-objectifying capacities– can transform instinctive drives into the coordination of desire 
and intellect. By means of the coordinating efforts of desire and intellect, Green indicated that 
each person can form an idea of the object distinguished from an idea of the self. The human 
will signifies the state of consciousness in which the person identifies his or her self with a 
 
 
192 
particular idea of the object as the good for satisfying certain kinds of desires in his or her 
mind. Practical reason, in Green’s view, indicates the state of consciousness in which the 
person can learn and come to realise that there is always a better kind of the good for self-
satisfaction. The agent consequently acquires a primitive conception of the moral law, that is, 
the reconciliation of practical reason with the will as the ideal of human perfection. 
          Beginning with this developmental account of human consciousness, firstly, the 
metaphysics of knowledge and the metaphysics of moral action are two parts of Green’s 
human ontology. These enable Green to complete his ontology by applying the idea of a self-
distinguishing and self-objectifying consciousness to the actual self-improving and self-
realising agent. Secondly, through this explication of human ontology Green indicated the 
ontological and ethical commitments of the society for the individual person. Against the 
egoism and the atomism of hedonistic utilitarian moral philosophy, Green specified the 
significance of a collective life for each individual person. While the personality of each 
individual can only be formed and developed in a social community, the social life can 
cultivate and educate the individual person, particularly with regard to the idea of living with 
and caring for other persons in pursuit of a shared common interest. In this sense the 
instructions and expectations of the society form a moral law with which the individual 
person judges what is good and what bad. Thirdly, by exploring this ontological and moral 
relationship between the individual and the society, Green depicted the process of the 
moralisation of human consciousness. This moves from unreflective social obedience, via a 
turbulence stage in which a person may revolt against society and cannot find a way to 
reconcile his or her own moral and social ideas with the society, to the final stage in which 
the person either accepts the instructions of the society as his or her duties in pursuit of the 
ideal of human perfection, or finds a way to reconcile his or her own subjective moral ideas 
with social conventions and moral habits. According to this depiction of the moralisation of 
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human consciousness, Green proposed an idea of the ethical self, largely as a substitute for 
Hegel’s concept of the ethical state. For him, each individual person, as a self-conscious 
agent, has to strive constantly for his or her moral autonomy and perfect freedom within a 
social life. It is the nature of self-consciousness will to persistently lead the person to 
conceive a better idea of the good to act upon. This is unlike Hegel’s contention that human 
beings can achieve absolute freedom in the ethical state. 
          Bearing this sceptical notion in mind, Green’s idea of the common society contains a 
necessary internal contradiction with which he is able to justify state action. Social conflict 
and value diversity are irresolvable in human society. The maintenance of a system of rights, 
that provides each individual citizen with fair and equal opportunities with which to pursue 
self-realisation and human perfection, requires state action. Unlike the classical liberals who 
espoused the tenets of non-intervention and laissez-faire, for Green, as for Mill, state action 
and government intervention were necessary for tackling social inequalities. However, since 
Mill and Green founded their justifications for state action on different moral and social 
philosophies, there are marked disagreements between them. In particular, Green attacked 
Mill’s hedonistic conception of individual morality and claimed that Mill’s utilitarian 
justification for state action could lapse into the ‘politics of the stronger’. Instead, Green’s 
ethical justification for state action maintains value diversity, on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, advocates the importance of citizen participation in local communities and public 
affairs. For him, the liberal anxiety, concerning the collectivist tendency underlying state 
action claims, can be organised into two concerns. There are, firstly, the centralisation of state 
power, and secondly, the demolition of individual freedom and social differentiation. These 
concerns, however, can be dismissed if individual citizens are not just passive recipients of 
the living provision and the social welfare provided by the government, but are also active 
participants in local and municipal politics. This participatory dimension ensures that a public 
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spirit is recognised and shared. Chapter Five therefore concludes that Green did provide a 
reasonable justification for state action. Such a justification maintains the stability and the 
equality of opportunity for all in a society, though Green also acknowledged that there is a 
gap between the empirical state and the ideal state. 
          Along with this view of the relationship between individual freedom and state action 
and the distinction between the empirical state and the ideal state, Chapter Six posits that 
Green did not overlook the danger of state power in practice. Conversely he retained the 
notion of the separation of powers in his conception of the modern democratic state. That is, 
the legislature and the administration have different functions and different duties. The 
former makes political decisions and constitutes laws, and the latter executes and enforces 
these decisions and laws. Meanwhile, for Green, members of the legislature represent the 
recognised and accepted common good of all citizens as the fundamental criterion to rule and 
to govern the country. The officers in the administration follow the concrete and determinate 
requirements from the legislature in order to actualise and to contribute to a recognised and 
accepted common good. With respect to the representation of the idea of the common good, 
recognised and shared by all citizens, Green nonetheless claimed that a general election is not 
sufficient. He emphasised the importance of citizen participation in local and municipal 
politics and public affairs. 
          The crucial reason for Green to contend the importance and vitality of citizen 
participation is not only the democratic dimension of state power, but also relates to the moral 
development of each individual citizen. The moral subjection to a conventional morality and 
the political subjection to a political sovereign are indispensable for an individual person to 
both discipline and to cultivate her animal wants and natural instincts as the primary root of 
human selfishness. Thus, the self-government of each individual citizen is a necessary 
condition with which to achieve moral autonomy and ideal social harmony. The sovereignty 
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de jure of the state in this sense is only the social and political expression of that practice of 
self-government. 
          At this point, Green’s practical philosophy has evolved from a metaphysical and 
ontological theory of consciousness and action, through a moral theory of the human society 
and the liberal state, to an ethical and practical conception of politics. Hence, if my 
systematic exploration of Green’s arguments is sustainable and tenable, it then follows that 
Green’s practical philosophy has three distinctive features. (1) Immanence: according to the 
characteristics of his elucidation of human consciousness – self-distinguishing, self-
objectifying, self-improving and self-realising – an individual’s thoughts and actions are 
developing, constituting and transforming in and through daily practices within social 
relations. Before the individual comes to reflect upon these practices, he or she is merely 
following the instructions and expectations of social conventions and moral habits. Thus the 
core argument is that, in Green’s view, moral and social ideas are immanent and operating in 
each individual person’s mind before they are fully recognised and understood. 
 
The idea, in its various forms, of something that human life should be, of a perfect 
being for whom this ‘should be’ already ‘is’, cannot proceed from observation of 
matters of fact or from inference founded on such observation, though in various ways 
(on which we cannot here dwell) it regulates that observation and inference. Such ideas 
or principles of action, at work before they are understood, not only give rise to 
institutions and modes of life, but also express themselves in forms of the imagination. 
(Green, 2003: 381-382) 
 
(2) Dialectical: while moral and social ideas are immanent in each individual person’s mind, 
as a self-conscious agent, the individual person is capable of reflecting and conceiving 
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different conceptions of these ideas and is able possibly to challenge and to change current 
social and cultural institutions. By virtue of that self-reflection and social criticism, an 
individual person can foster his or her personality, moving towards a caring and 
conscientious character, while the individual may also potentially become a sceptic or a 
simple speculator. In the meantime, along with the reflections and reformations that can be 
experienced by the individual, a society is also possibly transformed and reorganised by 
reference to a different conception of moral and social ideas, that is insofar as the conception 
is recognised by all individual citizens as their common good. The process of social 
reformation accordingly is slow. It cannot be accomplished by social or political revolutions 
suddenly. For Green, radical revolution may lead to anarchy and may cause greater social 
evils. Nonetheless, Green recognised the dialectical development relation between individual 
freedom and social institution. He further held that movement towards the ideal of human 
perfection is, in the final analysis, unattainable, by virtue of the ontological limitations of 
human beings. Thus, the dialectical movement, as well as human history in this sense, is 
endless. 
          (3) Mutuality: while the relationship between individual freedom and social institution 
is dialectical, it is also argued that the dialectic is not premised on two completely separable 
entities, that is, the individual and the society. On the contrary, for Green it is a dialectic 
between two interdependent parts of a spiritual whole. Thus, the formation of society is 
dependent upon the embodiment of an objective reason, conceived by people who recognise 
the reason as signifying the absolutely desirable good common for all. However, when an 
individual person reflects on the current idea of the common good and has a new conception 
of the ideal object, recognised and accepted by all citizens, the transformation of society takes 
place. In terms of this view, the persistence of a social and political life is reliant upon the 
mutual support of the society and the individual. Since they are two constituent parts of an 
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organic whole, not two separable entities, society should ensure equality of opportunity for 
the individual, and the individual should engage in social services and public affairs in order 
to maintain public spirit. 
 
2. The legacy of idealistic liberalism 
Having identified the three distinctive features of Green’s practical philosophy, in Chapter 
Seven, I draw upon Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics and his systematic 
practical philosophy in order to examine the pervasive and complex issue of contemporary 
pluralism. Firstly, I argue that there is a certain kind of pluralism in Green’s thought which is 
closer to Rawls’s reasonable pluralism than to Berlin’s objective pluralism. Secondly, by 
comparing Rawls’s political liberalism with Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics – 
in response to the pluralism issue – I explore the idea that Green’s perspective is better 
equipped to answer the problems of pluralism than Rawls’s in at least two aspects: (1) 
Green’s ontological theory of consciousness and action includes both the rational and the 
non-rational parts of the human person. This is unlike Rawls’s overstatement of the role of 
reasonableness in the formation of a constitutional consensus and the constitution of an 
overlapping consensus; (2) Green’s sophisticated explication of human ontology 
acknowledges that conflict and antagonism are indispensable factors for the development of 
human society, providing a justification for state action and government intervention in order 
to maintain social and political stability. Nonetheless, the most important vision that Green’s 
idealistic conception of liberal politics articulates is his ethical understanding of self-
government. Although a modern liberal democratic state has several constitutional devices 
and mechanisms for measuring and supervising state powers, each individual citizen’s 
participation in public affairs is still the most significant way to prevent the state coming to 
be authoritarian or oligarchic. Furthermore, Green also identified an ethical commitment in 
 
 
198 
social and political life that relates to self-cultivation and the self-discipline of each 
individual person in their pursuit of the actualisation of moral autonomy. Green’s conception 
of politics in this sense is not simply negative and instrumental. Politics is to prevent 
individual freedom from harm or interventions and to remove the hindrance to the 
individual’s self-realisation. However there is also a positive dimension. Politics is 
indispensable for the moral development of the individual, in the sense that the individual’s 
practice of self-government is a necessary condition for achieving his or her moral autonomy. 
On the basis of this conception of politics, Green’s idealistic liberalism unfolds a different set 
of possibilities for contemporary political theorists to conceive and to envisage the meaning 
of political life. 
          In addition to the legacy of Green’s idealistic liberalism, I believe that it is precisely 
because Green’s systematic practical philosophy and conception of liberal politics contain 
vibrant intellectual resources and ideas that his social and political philosophy remains 
significant in the history of political philosophy. As Dimova-Cookson and Mander observe, 
‘[t]he return to Green in the 1980s was caused by an interest in his social ontology: his 
specific way of explaining why individuals are social beings. This return was an attempt to 
counterbalance the dominant influence of liberalism. Later, in the context of the liberal-
communitarian debate, Green was seen as someone who offered a better form of 
communitarianism. What made him particularly interesting was that his “communitarian” 
ideas had liberal underpinning. In the 1990s, Green’s liberal-communitarian reconciliation 
model was well noted’ (Dimova-Cookson and Mander, 2006: 2; cf. Sweet, 2009). In a word, 
although Green’s practical philosophy, as an intellectual and historical product of nineteenth-
century British society, seems to be remote from contemporary social and political issues, its 
philosophical and theoretical visions, and its passionate and practical commitments, are still 
worthy of investigation today. 
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3. Limitations and prospect of Green’s ethical theory of politics 
In spite of the innovatory character of Green’s idealistic liberal philosophy there are 
nonetheless several limitations within Green’s ethical theory of politics. One such limitation 
is the conservative tendency of Green’s social and political claims. We have seen that, 
according to Green’s rights recognition thesis, the reform of a system of rights requires the 
collective moral consciousness to uphold this notion; without meeting this requirement, the 
legitimacy of the reform remains in doubt. Holding that moralised view of a social and 
political reform, Green’s idealistic liberalism has been considered by Richard Bellamy to be 
conservative. He argues that ‘Green sought to foster the Victorian ideal of self-improvement, 
not to challenge it. ... As a result, Green’s approach to social reform increasingly served a 
conservative purpose’ (Bellamy, 1990: 148). To Bellamy, Green’s philosophical visions are 
limited by the historical circumstances of nineteenth-century British culture. In a similar vein, 
Michael Freeden also indicates that Green’s idealistic liberalism has a conservative tendency. 
To Freeden, Green’s social and political philosophy seems not to have been an indispensable 
factor for the rise of the New Liberalism, which advocated more radical social reforms than 
Green expected (Freeden, 1996: 197). Such a conservative interpretation of Green’s social 
and political philosophy should probably be understood as an assertion, supported by a 
historical judgement, that Green shared self-regarding virtues with other Victorians, and thus 
tended to maintain social and political stability rather than espouse radical social and political 
reforms. Nevertheless, Green not only contests the dualism of self-regarding and other-
regarding tendencies, which lurk in many British moral doctrines, but also claims openly that 
‘[a]ll virtues are really social; or, more properly, the distinction between social and self-
regarding virtues is a false one’; that is, every virtue involves a person’s rational will and is in 
this sense self-regarding, but the moral merit of the virtue – its goodness or badness – is by 
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reference to a recognised common good immanent in the society (Green, 1986a: 190). Hence, 
while we may consider Green’s social and political philosophy as potentially conservative by 
virtue of his rights recognition thesis, we should also be cautious about any assertion that 
Green was simply a conventional or unremarkable Victorian. 
          Some scholars have also claimed that, in terms of historical and social circumstances, 
Green’s social and political philosophy insists on a homogeneous conception of the nation-
state, and accordingly is not applicable to a multi-national and multi-cultural society. Will 
Kymlicka, for example, argues that ‘[f]or liberals like Mill, democracy is government “by the 
people”, but self-rule is only possible if “the people” are “a people” – a nation. The members 
of a democracy must share a sense of political allegiance, and common nationality was said 
to be a precondition of that allegiance. Thus T. H. Green argued that liberal democracy is 
only possible if people feel bound to the state by “ties derived from a common dwelling place 
with its associations, from common memories, traditions and customs, and from the common 
ways of feeling and thinking which a common language and still more a common literature 
embodies”’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 52; cf. Green, 1986a: 97). For Kymlicka, the homogeneous 
notion of the state is a distinctive feature of nineteenth-century liberal political philosophy, 
and therefore, the rights of the minority for Green as well as for Mill was not a significant 
issue (Kymlicka, 1995: 50-53). 
          It is true that Green’s notion of the nation or the people is homogeneous, and he may 
not have had an idea of a multi-national or multi-cultural society. However, while Green does 
not advocate radical and sudden social and political transformation, his ethical theory of 
politics nonetheless suggests a radical implication that an individual citizen, as a self-
conscious agent, is capable of proposing and conceiving new conceptions of the common 
good or right, though this may potentially lead to a collision between the old regime and the 
new. In particular, instead of being a conservative interested only in maintaining the current 
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system of rights, Green was a radical liberal who believed, for example, that demonstrations 
organised by farmers, labours and workers could exert positive pressure on politicians and 
statesmen to consider necessary reformations of existing social and political institutions. He 
was thus a social activist who fought for the welfare of the working class and other minorities 
in society, such as women and ordinary working people (Green, 1867b: 230-232; Anderson, 
1991; cf. Rodman, 1964). Hence, it would be a fair conjecture that if Green had lived in our 
own age, he would also have urged the rights of the minorities in a liberal and democratic 
society, as Kymlicka suggests. In a word, the criticism of Green’s homogeneous notion of a 
nation-state and a people should be understood as a historical limitation of Green’s 
imagination, rather than a theoretical limitation of Green’s social and political arguments. 
          However, though there are certain historical limitations in Green’s practical 
philosophy, his distinctive theory of consciousness and action and the ethical conception of 
politics remain insightful and inspiring for contemporary political philosophy. It has also 
been suggested that Green’s idealistic conception of liberal politics contains a different 
perspective of political life from the view found in contemporary political liberals (that is a 
rational proceduralist notion of the neutral state). Instead, Green’s ethical theory of politics 
advances the significance of citizen participation and the ethical meaning of the sovereign 
power. At the same time his conception of politics also suggests a cosmopolitan idea, namely 
that the ideal of human life and human society is a non-competitive and non-exclusive 
common good society in which each human person can obtain fair and equal opportunities in 
pursuit of his or her self-realisation. In particular, as Leighton observes, ‘[b]y 1900 Green’s 
reputation as a moral and political philosopher extended throughout the British empire, 
Europe, the United States, and even to China and Japan’ (Leighton, 2004: 62). Green’s 
practical philosophy and his idealistic liberalism, as such, have not only a range of theoretical 
potentialities which are worthwhile for political theorists and international relations theorists 
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to study, but its wider historical influence is also a compelling topic for academic 
investigation in terms of a genealogy of knowledge perspective. However, such research is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. What has been achieved, though, in this thesis, firstly, is a 
systematic exploration of Green’s practical philosophy, which has given particular attention 
to his theory of consciousness and action. This is a theory of consciousness which 
successfully integrates his metaphysics, moral and ethical theory, with his social and political 
theory. Considered together these form a coherent whole. Secondly, I have explored Green’s 
idealistic conception of liberal politics. The central aspect of this liberal politics is Green’s 
account of the ethical citizen, which embodies valuable philosophical resources for 
contemporary political philosophers to reconsider the nature of liberal politics. To conclude, 
this thesis has thus excavated and re-assessed Green’s philosophical works, particularly in 
order to re-engage critically with his social and political ideas and then ultimately to show 
how they can throw considerable light on current debates and issues in contemporary political 
theory. 
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